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My dissertation addresses a puzzle: Why has a nationwide counterpublic sphere, in 
which citizens formulate oppositional discourse to challenge the state, emerged and 
persisted in China? Existing studies, mostly based on experiences in Western Europe, 
theorize that a robust civil society is indispensable for a flourishing public sphere. 
Contrary to the theory, however, a nationwide counterpublic sphere has risen in China in 
the absence of a well-developed civil society. This anomaly in relation to the dominant 
theory of the public sphere makes the Chinese case a negative case in comparative 
historical sociology. Rather than completely abandoning the dominant theory, I identify 
its central proposition – namely, that a social-cultural foundation is needed for a public 
sphere to grow and persist, and examine how this foundation came to exist in China.   
Through a multi-faceted, comparative, and historical analysis that draws on a variety 
of sources, I argue that, whereas theorists examining the emergence of the public sphere 
in Western contexts emphasize the role of civil society, in the Chinese case it is the state 
that is – unintentionally and paradoxically – the architect of the counterpublic sphere. 




responded to the legitimation crisis it faced in the late 1970s by creating legal institutions 
and transitioning to a market economy connecting China with the rest of the world. In 
doing so, it inadvertently contributed to the social-cultural foundation for a counterpublic 
sphere. 
To develop my central argument, I first establish the existence of a flourishing 
nationwide counterpublic sphere. Next, I show that in the process of institution-building 
to address the state’s crisis, the Chinese state established a shared symbolic structure 
based on laws and rights. Then, I examine how the state’s use of media to disseminate law 
unwittingly led to the formation of collaborative networks that connected media and legal 
professionals. I show how these professionals appropriated the symbolic structure of laws 
and rights to produce critical news reports and promote civic culture. Finally, I examine 
the processes by which these initially limited liberalization effects escalated into a 
nationwide counterpublic sphere. 
  
 





1.1. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINA 
The publication of the English translation of Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1989 sparked interest in and debates over the 
study of the public sphere in the Chinese context. Some scholars employed the 
Habermasian concepts to explore whether a public sphere existed in China (Rowe 1990), 
while other scholars cautioned against simple extensions of Habermas’s intellectual 
agenda to the Chinese context, considering the enormous disparity between 
socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions in the Chinese and European contexts 
(Calhoun 1993; Wakeman Jr 1993). Surprisingly, an important book written by the 
Chinese writer and linguist Lin Yutang,
1
 A History of the Press and Public Opinion in 
China (1936), went unmentioned in the debates. The omission is notable as Lin’s work 
demonstrated the significance of studying public opinion in China in its own right. Lin 
published the book in the U.S. in 1936, twenty-six years before the publication of The 
                                                 
1
 Lin Yutang (1895-1976) grew up in China. After receiving his bachelor’s degree in China, he studied at 
Harvard University and the University of Leipzig. 
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Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in Germany (Habermas 1962) and 
thirteen years before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Lin Yutang 
narrated the history of public opinion from the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD) to the 
Republican era in the early twentieth century. Unfortunately, unlike The Structural 
Transformation and Lin’s own well-known prose works and novels,
2
 A History of the 
Press and Public Opinion garnered little attention, despite the fact that it was one of the 
only, if not the only book to systematically examine public opinion as a socio-political 
force in China. Lin (1936:2) wrote the book to understand “the power of public opinion 
and… how the seed of Chinese democracy, contained in the ancient principle that a good 
government always listened to the voice of the people, grew and developed, and 
sometimes blossomed forth and was sometimes cruelly trampled upon by 
temperamentally autocratic rulers.” He described the development of public opinion in 
China as a tug-of-war between the ruler and the people given the tendency of rulers to 
suppress public criticism and the long-standing institution of censorship.  
Despite their very different backgrounds, Lin and Habermas’s views on the 
normative role of public opinion in substantiating democracy are remarkably similar.
3
 
Reflecting on the transition from imperial rule to a Republican form of government in 
China, Lin (1936:115) stated: “All changes of form of government are futile, unless there 
is a growth in the power of public opinion, able to bring the government to act in 
                                                 
2
 Lin Yutang was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1940 and 1950. His book My Country and 
My People (1935) was on the New York Times bestseller list. 
3
 Both Habermas and Lin conceptualize public opinion as public discourse instead of aggregated political 
attitudes.  
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accordance with its dictates.” Similarly, Habermas said private people “come together to 
form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before 
public opinion (Habermas 1989:25).” And yet, the two scholars constructed very different 
narratives about the realization of public opinion as a force capable of disciplining 
political authority in their respective contexts of Western Europe and China.  
Juxtaposing the narratives in The Structural Transformation and A History on the 
Press and Public Opinion reveals distinct trajectories of the development of public 
opinion. In The Structural Transformation, Habermas (1989) accounts for the rise of the 
classic European bourgeois public sphere since the seventeenth century in the process of 
transition from absolutist states to bourgeois constitutional states in Europe, as well as the 
devolution of this public sphere in the twentieth century. In Habermas’s analysis, the 
emergence of the public sphere was a consequence of the socioeconomic transformation 
from feudalism to capitalism, and the state did not intend to regulate the emerging social 
space during its initial formation (Eley 1992).
4
 In general, little antagonism and struggle 
appeared in Habermas’s narrative about the rise of the public sphere. 
In contrast to this, Lin’s narrative describes a much more passive public sphere 
that generally remained inactive except in unusual circumstances. As he put it (1936:5) 
summarized his observation: “It seems that the power of public opinion was always 
dormant in the nation, and if only placed under a good leadership or goaded by national 
                                                 
4
 Habermas states that the state’s elimination of censorship in 1696 was a critical factor for the development 
of the public sphere in Britain (Habermas 1989: 58-59). 
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danger, could and did it assert itself, fighting under great odds.” Also in Lin’s narrative, 
the Chinese state always attempted to contain public criticism and propagate official 
discourse. Even when public opinion surged in exceptional conditions, a tug-of-war 
between the state and the people, as well as between dominant and oppositional discourse, 
existed.  
Lin documented how public opinion was mobilized in certain exceptional 
situations in China. In the first scenario, scholars in the Imperial civil service system 
revolted against eunuchs who usurped the power of governance based on scholars’ sexual 
and class identity. This scenario became less relevant with the demise of the Imperial rule. 
In the second scenario, various social groups, such as intellectuals, students, and workers, 
mobilized national identity against the corrupted state and foreign invaders. This scenario 
occurred more often in the nineteenth century with the occurrence of two conditions 
associated with Western Europe: the emergence of the modern Chinese press and the 
expansion of capitalist imperialism to China. China did not have newspapers published 
for the general public until the early nineteenth century. Early Western European 
missionaries and merchants thus played a major role in shaping the modern Chinese press. 
And those Chinese intellectuals who also contributed to this process were zealous in 
introducing the Chinese people to Western notions of liberty, democracy, and 
constitutional reform. In this way, then, the development of the modern Chinese press was 
simultaneously a process of socio-political movements. The emerging modern Chinese 
press advocated modernization and political reform, mobilized public opinion against 
 
   5 
 
imperialism and the corrupted government, and eventually contributed to the founding of 
the Republic of China.  
Even after the transition from Imperial to Republican rule, however, the 
antagonism between the state and public opinion endured. Yet, rather than developing 
into a permanent socio-political force, public opinion returned instead to a more dormant 
state, partly due to continued state censorship in the Republican era. Lin (1936:168) wrote: 
“We cannot ignore the contemporary censorship of books, magazines and newspapers in 
China, because it alone explains the retarding of the growth of public opinion.” In fact, 
Lin was not alone in criticizing the Kuomintang (i.e., the Chinese Nationalist Party) and 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s political control. Before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
established the People’s Republic of China, the CCP actually accused the Kuomintang of 
harming freedom of speech and the press. A few CCP members even petitioned the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1946, requesting that it investigate the 
Kuomintang’s violent censorship practices.
5
 Ironically, the CCP turned from a victim to a 
perpetrator after it sized the reins of power in China. China consistently ranks as one of 
the countries with the least freedom of press and of speech by the Freedom House and the 
Reporters Without Borders. The Freedom in the World Index compiled by the Freedom 
                                                 
5
 For example: People’s Daily, May 16 1946; People’s Daily, August 9 1946; People’s Daily, March 28 
1947. 
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Given the CCP’s ability and will to censor political communication and suppress 
civil society, one would expect that the development of public opinion in the People’s 
Republic of China would be similar to that in Lin’s narrative. In other words, public 
opinion could be mobilized temporarily based on national identity under exceptional 
circumstance, but it is unlikely that public opinion would become a constant social force 
capable of holding the government accountable. And yet, public opinion that identifies 
social problems and challenges the Chinese Party-state in the name of citizens has been 
rising and influencing the legislative, executive, and judicial decisions of the Chinese 
government, even when national identity and collective memory about imperialism are 
not mobilized. 
A number of events in the recent decade illustrate this novel development. In these 
instances, citizens came together and not only persuaded one another to form and express 
consensus, but also attempted to convince a government infamous for suppressing public 
criticism to change its behavior. In 2003, Sun Zhigan, a 27-year-old man in Guangzhou, 
died in police custody after being wrongly detained and beaten by the police in the 
detention center. His death triggered strong criticism of the government, eventually 
leading to the overhaul of unconstitutional detention regulations. In 2008, the Chinese 
                                                 
6
 According to Reporters Without Borders, China is the world's biggest prison for journalists, bloggers and 
cyber-dissidents. “World Report – China,” Reporters without Borders, accessed April 30, 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/report-china,57.html. 
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government ordered that all new computers were to be sold with pre-installed 
content-control software to prevent the viewing of pornography. Chinese netizens or 
Internet users
7
 accused the state of infringing upon their right to free communication, and 
the government was forced to abandon the policy. In 2008, the Deng Yujiao case in 2009 
demonstrated that public opinion was influencing even judicial decisions.
8
 Deng Yujiao 
worked in a hotel in Hubei that offered sexual service, but Deng, herself, was not a sexual 
worker. One day, several local government officials asked Deng to provide sexual service. 
When she refused, the officials beat her severely. In her effort to defend herself, Deng 
stabbed the officials with a knife, killing one of them. The police charged Deng with 
intentional homicide. The case soon provoked intense public criticism of the government. 
Faced with this outcry and increased public scrutiny, the district court eventually 
exempted Deng from punishment. When interviewed about the case, the Vice President of 
the Hubei Higher People’s Court said that judges should consider how the public 
perceives cases on trial and avoid arousing public sentiment.
9
 The above stories are just 
the tip of a growing body of empirical evidence indicating the increasing influence of 
public discourse. 
The rise of public opinion in China also invokes citizens’ political right to attack 
censorship and question the authoritarian regime. In 2012, the Propaganda Department of 
                                                 
7
 Chinese people call Internet users “netizens” in China. When I use the term “netizens,” I simply refer to 
Internet users.  
8
 In this event, there was some criticism about whether court decisions should be influenced by public 
opinion. The normative relationship between court decisions and public opinion in a country without an 
independent judiciary is an important legal issue worth discussing. 
9
 Accessed April 30, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200909/0922_17_1360006.shtml.  
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Guangdong Province interfered in the publication of the Southern Weekly’s New Year 
special editorial. The Southern Weekly is a weekly newspaper based in Guangzhou. It is 
considered as one of the most outspoken newspapers in China although it is affiliated with 
the Guangdong provincial government. The title of the original editorial was “Dream of 
China and dream of constitutionalism.” Its main thesis promoted notions of freedom, 
liberal democracy, and constitutionalism. Guangdong propaganda officers bypassed the 
ordinary editorial practices to significantly change the editorial. After journalists 
disclosed this intervention, intellectuals, lawyers, media professionals, students, 
entrepreneurs, celebrities and ordinary citizens forcefully protested against censorship and 
supported the Southern Weekly. The original editorial was also circulated online by the 
public. Protesters, identifying themselves as citizens, demonstrated outside the Southern 
Weekly’s headquarters. The protest banners and signs unequivocally demanded liberal 
democracy, constitutionalism, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and political 
reform. Protests in China were supported by individuals and civil society organizations in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. The language and concepts invoked by Chinese in China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan were almost identical, even though the three Chinese societies have 
very different trajectories of political development and are categorized as “Not Free,” 
“Partly Free,” and “Free” respectively by the Freedom House.
10
 This kind of large-scale 
collective resistance against censorship was never imagined in Lin Yutang’s narrative.  
                                                 
10
 China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are categorized as “Not Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Free” respectively by 
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With the rise of public opinion and the state’s continued effort to contain it, 
particularly its more dissident voices, the tension between official and excluded 
discourses has become increasingly salient and constant. On the one hand, the Chinese 
state continues to try to monopolize discursive space through official discourse and the 
censorship or exclusion of other voices (McCormick and Liu 2003). On the other hand, 
citizens recognize and resist this monopoly, circulating discourse that challenge the state 
and dominant discourse. The discursive space created by these excluded discourses 
constitutes a nation-wide counterpublic sphere distinct from the dominant public sphere. 
Indeed, it is the recognition and articulation of exclusion from the dominant sphere that 
makes this discursive space “counter” (Asen 2000; Dahlgren 2005; Fraser 1990).
11
 
In short, placing the present in historical perspective reveals the continuity and 
disjuncture between the past and present of public opinion in China. What continues to 
exist over time is a tug-of-war between the state and public opinion – efforts of the state 
to monopolize public discourse and efforts of the people to resist such exclusion. The 
public mobilization of national identity discourse in opposition to foreign countries and 
the Chinese state when collective memory about imperialism is invoked (He 2007; Wu 
2007) is another historical practice that continues in the present. What is novel about 
                                                 
11
 The concept of counterpublic sphere is a theoretical reconstruction of Habermas’s notion of the public 
sphere, which has been criticized for excluding subordinated groups. This concept was first formulated in 
terms of class and further developed in terms of gender, race, sexuality, and the relationship between citizens 
and the state (Asen and Brouwer 2001b; Fraser 1990; Negt and Kluge 1993). As Asen (2000) remarks, what is 
“counter” about counterpublics cannot be fixed ontologically and reduced to specific persons, space and 
topics. What makes counterpublic spheres counter is recognition and articulation of exclusion, and there 
could be distinct axes of domination in different contexts. Citizens that formulate oppositional discourse to 
challenge the state do not necessarily intend to overthrow the state or the regime. 
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public opinion today is the strength and consistency of its presence. Lin (1936) argued 
that, due to continuing censorship, public opinion would likely remain inactive except in 
unusual circumstances such as a national crisis, hence his decision to end A History on the 
Press and Public Opinion with call to awaken public opinion in China.
12
 Seven decades 
after the publication of Lin Yutang’s book, public opinion has, indeed, woken up. 
Although the Chinese state – after the shift from the Kuomintang to the CCP – continues 
to suppress public opinion and restrict civil liberties, public opinion that challenges the 
state now asserts itself frequently and constitutes a counterpublic sphere. As a 
socio-political force capable of influencing the state, public opinion in China increasingly 
resembles the Western European public sphere described in Habermas’s narrative, despite 
the very different socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions in the Chinese and 
Western European contexts. Yet, while the outcomes in these contexts increasingly 
converge, we still know little about the very distinct path that this development took in 
China. Research is still needed to understand the underlying socio-political and cultural 
transformations that have enabled and sustained the rise of a counterpublic sphere in 
China.  
                                                 
12
 Lin (1936: 179) wrote: “But we are today long past the period of leaving politics to the whims of 
temporary regimes; today we must fight for the constitutional principle of the freedom of the press and of 
personal civil rights as a principle. Democracy after all simply means that the average man can and will take 
an intelligent interest in man’s group life.” 
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1.2. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE  
This dissertation aims to account for the presence of a flourishing counterpublic 
sphere in China. I argue that the Chinese case is not only important in its own right, but 
also has profound implications for literature on the public sphere and beyond. In this 
section, I situate the Chinese case in relation to the literature on the public sphere in order 
to: first, explain why the existing literature is insufficient to account for the Chinese case; 
second, specify the problem of this dissertation; third, discuss the significance of the 
problem.  
1.2.1. Literature on the Relationship between the Public Sphere and Civil Society 
Existing studies, mostly based on experiences in Western Europe, theorize that the 
development of the public sphere depends on that of civil society (Calhoun 1993; Eley 
1992; Fraser 1990; Habermas 1989; Habermas 1996; Koller 2010; Madsen 1993; Somers 
1993; Tilly 2007). Implicit in this argument is a distinction between the two concepts of 
public sphere and civil society. The public sphere is generally understood as a discursive 
arena, “a network for communicating information and points of view” (Habermas 
1996:360). There are various conceptions of civil society (Alexander 2006:23-36), but all 
share in common that it is distinct from and defined in relation to the state. Only social 
organizations outside of the state are considered part of civil society (Alexander 2006; 
Beetham 1997; Calhoun 1993).
13
 The current literature assumes the indispensability of a 
                                                 
13
 Among the many disagreements about the definition of civil society, not the least is whether a market 
economy should be conceptualized as part of civil society (Beetham 1997). 
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relatively autonomous and vibrant civil society for a flourishing public sphere. For 
instance, Craig Calhoun (1993:276) writes, “Such a public sphere depends on a favorable 
organization of civil society. It is not enough that there simply be civil society or even 
civil society more or less autonomous from the state.” In a similar vein, Richard Madsen 
(1993:187) states, “ In the thinking of Habermas, and of a long tradition of western 
political theory, a democratic public sphere arises from civil society. That is, a democratic 
public sphere does not descend from the realm of a benevolent state, it arises from below, 
from a voluntarily organized citizenry. The development of an active civil society is a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the development of a public sphere.” Habermas 
(1996, p. 369) also contends that, without a supportive civil society, the public sphere 
cannot dicipline the political authority. In addition, the capacities of a public to identify, 
interpret and present society-wide problems anchor in “the voluntary associations of civic 
society and [are] embedded in liberal patterns of political culture and socialization” 
(Habermas 1996:359). These theorizations of the relationship between a public sphere and 
civil society are supported by empirical studies that find a dysfunctional public sphere in 
the absence of an active civil society (Baiocchi 2003; Somers 1993).   
Theorizing the relationship between civil society and the public sphere also speaks to 
the very foundation of the public sphere. Certain social-cultural conditions must exist for 
a public to organize itself and use reason to persuade each other, discipline the state, and 
influence politics (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Koller 2010). Through a complex social 
process, a certain political culture – defined as a set of symbols and practices – develops 
and spreads across social groups. Based on this shared understanding, actors produce and 
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disseminate public discourse, while also generating solidarity, division and antagonism 
(Alexander 2006; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999). An adequate explanation of the rise of a 
public sphere must, therefore, be able to answer the following questions: What are the 
origins of the political culture of using arguments to influence politics? How does this 
political culture extend to various social groups? And how do individuals develop the 
interest and capacity to use public discourse to influence politics?  
Existing studies suggest that when civil society – broadly defined as space outside 
the state – is well-developed, it is likely to produce capable agents for the public sphere 
because it allows individuals to articulate interests, develop a common identity and 
democratic political culture, and acquire the capability to participate in politics (Calhoun 
1993; Diamond 1994; Eley 1992; Fraser 1990; Habermas 1989; Habermas 1996; Koller 
2010; Madsen 1993; Somers 1993; Tilly 2007). For example, in Habermas’s (1989) 
narrative, the conjugal family that emerged in the transition to capitalism produced 
rational agents who believed in the autonomy of market and their own independence, 
while also coming to value the non-instrumental aspects of life (Habermas 1989: 46). 
Owing to cultivation in the conjugal family, private people acquired rationality and the 
capability to conduct rational and critical argument in public forums (Habermas 
1989:46-47).
14
 Other scholars focus on how socialization in voluntary associations 
produces capable agents. For instance, generalizing from social histories in Europe, Eley 
                                                 
14
 Some scholars, for instance, Nancy Fraser (1992) and Margaret Somers (1993) criticize Habermas’s 
argument and contend that Habermas fails to examine how interaction in the public sphere can influence 
individuals’ subjectivity and political practices.  
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(1992, pp. 296-7) points out that voluntary associations were key sites where people 
expressed opinions, formed identity, and developed a political culture.  
Existing literature points out that the capacity of civil society to sustain the public 
sphere lies in its accommodating peoples to organize themselves beyond the direction and 
control of the state (Calhoun 1993; Diamond 1994; Evans and Boyte 1992; Somers 
2008:189). Freedom from political authority makes it possible for civil society to nourish 
“schools of democracy owned by participants themselves (Evans and Boyte 1992:ix).” 
Accordingly, when the state suppresses civil society, it indirectly impinges upon the 
development of the public sphere. Therefore, Habermas (1996, p. 369) argues that a 
panoptic state not only controls a dysfunctional public sphere, but also undermines the 
private basis upon which the public sphere is built.  
1.2.2. Statement of the Problem 
The above theory of the public sphere describes the Western European experience 
nicely, but it does not transfer well to the Chinese context. According to the above 
literature, when a strong authoritarian state not only imposes censorship but also controls 
civil society, it is unlikely that a nationwide counterpublic sphere could flourish. Contrary 
to the theory, however, public opinion and a nationwide counterpublic sphere have risen 
in China in the absence of a well-developed civil society.  
Unlike the European states described in traditional theories of the public sphere, the 
Chinese state takes an interventionist approach to governing. The state has been the 
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architect of the market, and though goods such as the news have been commodified, their 
production and distribution are still highly regulated. The Chinese state has failed even to 
relinquish its grip on the family, as famously demonstrated by its one-child policy. And 
plentiful evidence shows that associational life and social organizations in China remain 
highly restricted despite the transition to a market economy. The Chinese government has 
adopted a corporatist strategy, incorporating non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
into the state and co-opting them through various strategies. Non state-sponsored NGOs 
are precariously situated due to their ambiguous legal status (Edele 2005; Heurlin 2010; 
Spires 2011). According to the Freedom House “Freedom in the World Index,” China still 
ranks as “not free” in terms of civil liberties and political rights, despite third-wave 
democratization in nearby countries in East Asia.
15
 As Figure 1-1 shows, civil liberties in 
China deteriorated following the 1989 Tiananmen incident, not returning to their pre-1989 
level again until 1997. And even since then, civil liberties have plateaued, rather than 
continuing to improve post-1997. As Figures 1-2 indicates, protection of political rights 
has also remained static since 1989.  
                                                 
15
 Civil liberties evaluate freedom of expression and belief, associational and organization rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy and individual rights. Political rights measure electoral process, political pluralism 
and participation, and functioning of government. 
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Figure 1-1: Trends of freedom in civil liberties in China, South Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan, 1985-2009.  
Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World. Countries and territories with a combined average 
rating of 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free"; 3.0 to 5.0, "Partly Free"; and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free." 
 
Figure 1-2: Trends of freedom in political rights in China, South Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan, 
1985-2009.  
Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World. Countries and territories with a combined average 
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Despite these restrictions characterizing China’s civil society, public opinion that 
identifies social problems and challenges the Chinese Party-state in the name of citizens 
has become increasingly vocal and influential on the Chinese government. The growth 
and vitality of this counterpublic sphere does not correspond to the existing theory based 
on experiences in Western Europe. This inconsistency between the extant public sphere 
literature and the Chinese case is the puzzle this dissertation aims to address: How can we 
explain the presence and continuing existence of a flourishing nationwide counterpublic 
sphere in China despite the absence of the relatively autonomous and vibrant civil society 
theorized as necessary for such a public sphere to exist? In other words, if the 
social-cultural foundation of the nationwide counterpublic sphere in China does not 
derive from a well-developed civil society, from where does it emerge? Given the 
government’s suppression of civil society, how have Chinese citizens developed civic 
capacities to persuade one another and challenge the state? How can such a nationwide 
counterpublic sphere continue to exist?  
1.2.3. The Significance of the Problem 
The questions examined by this dissertation are significant because their answers can 
contribute to the understudied but crucial area of the public sphere. Prominent scholars 
from various intellectual traditions, particularly John Dewey (1927), C. Wright Mills 
(1956), Jürgen Habermas (1962), Hannah Arendt (1966), and Bruce Ackerman (1980), 
consider the capacity of publics and the function of the public sphere to be at the heart of 
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democracy and democratization. Nonetheless, few sociological studies pursue these topics. 
As Andreas Koller (2010:262) points out in a recent special issue of Social Science 
History devoted to the public sphere, “the study of the public sphere is a missing chapter 
in comparative historical sociology despite the rise of historical social science.” Scholars 
in media and communication studies have made greater efforts than sociologists to study 
the public sphere, but, not surprisingly, even this laudable research tends to focus on 
aspects related to media and information communication technologies (ICTs), owing to 
disciplinary boundaries. These studies treat critical conditions in broader contexts (e.g., s 
state-society relationship and institutions beyond media) as exogenous, and thus 
contribute little to exploring the social-cultural foundation of the public sphere or 
explaining its development (Calhoun 1998; Habermas 2006; Koller 2010). Moreover, 
sociological study of the public sphere in non-Western contexts is even more rare. The 
unfortunate result is that scholars have tended to generate theories of the public sphere 
based on a small number of experiences in the West. By focusing on China and situating 
the Chinese case in relation to literature based on Western experiences, my dissertation 
helps to unpack the supposedly universal process by which a public sphere develops, 
rendering our understanding more locationally and historically specific.  
The problem examined by this dissertation is significant also because it can deepen 
understanding of the critical process of democratization and liberalization in authoritarian 
contexts. The Chinese case is an example of incremental political transformation, in 
which citizens have gained more influence on the decision-making of the authoritarian 
state in a politically restricted environment. Social scientists tend to give little attention to 
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incremental political change in authoritarian countries, focusing instead on those 
occasions when a wholesale transition from authoritarian rule occurs, as evidenced by the 
surge of studies of civil society after the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe. In these 
studies, the development of civil society is used to explain the regime transition, and 
scholars generate theories about democratization and liberalization based on these 
“successful” cases (Diamond 1994). Existing studies argue that the emerging civil society 
in Central Europe and the USSR was the result of the state’s failure to address systematic 
crises in the 1960s and 1970s. The state’s failure in these sites to homogenize and 
propagate values and represent different interest groups forced it to relinquish some social 
space, ultimately culminating in the collapse of the communist regimes (Bernhard 1993; 
Weigle and Butterfield 1992). These studies have limited ability to explain 
democratization and liberalization in cases where the state has coped with systematic 
crisis successfully and continues to restrict independent social groups, such as the Chinese 
case. Therefore, existing studies still cannot adequately address a critical question raised 
by Emirbayer and Sheller (1999:147): “Can changes in economic or political organizations, 
or even both, conduce to democracy in the absence of a self-organized citizenry?” By 
examining the relationship between the state, civil society, and the public sphere in China, 
this dissertation can illumine understanding of liberalization and democratization.  
In sum, my core argument is that while theorists examining the emergence of the 
public sphere in Western contexts emphasize the role of civil society – broadly defined as 
space outside the state, the Chinese case suggests a completely unexamined and distinct 
process in which the state is the unintended and paradoxical architect of the counterpublic 
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sphere. In other words, precisely that actor whose absence from certain areas of life is 
theorized as so crucial to the development of the public sphere in traditional narratives – 
the state – emerges as the key to understanding the emergence of a counterpublic sphere 
in China, a setting where such a development was deemed an impossibility.  
In the remaining three sections of this chapter, I present my theoretical framework, 
discuss methodology and research methods, and outline my argument and the 
organization of this dissertation. 
1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, I develop a theoretical framework to explain the rise of China’s 
counterpublic sphere. I begin by discussing four perspectives related to the study of the 
public sphere: (1) the Habermasian framework, (2) the media-centered perspective, (3) 
the media effects perspective, and (4) the historical and cultural sociology perspective. I 
argue that these four perspectives are unsatisfying in terms of providing a comprehensive 
theoretical framework to analyze the Chinese case. I then present a multi-level theoretical 
framework that addresses the inadequacies of the four conventional perspectives. Rather 
than discussing any one of these approaches in depth or detailing their various strengths 
and weaknesses, my goal here is to discuss their relevance and contribution – or lack 
thereof – to the study of the Chinese case.  
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1.3.1. Four Perspectives Related To the Study of the Public Sphere 
The Habermasian framework  
Although Habermas’s The Structural Transformation (1989) set a groundbreaking 
intellectual agenda and remains the most influential work in the study of the public sphere, 
it does not provide sufficient theoretical guidance for conducting empirical research 
(Benson 2004; Benson 2009; Calhoun 1992a; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Peters and 
Wessler 2008). There are two major issues with the Habermasian framework.  
First, at the macro-level, the Habermasian framework tends to neglect the role of the 
state due to the assumptions it makes about the separation and opposition of state and 
society (Baiocchi 2003; Benson 2009; Eley 1992; Fraser 1990). Since this framework 
considers a non-interventionist state a condition leading to the rise of the public sphere 
and attributes the degeneration of the public sphere to an interventionist state (Habermas 
1989), analysis of the role of the state is, by definition, minimal in theories of the rise of 
the public sphere.
16
 Yet, this neglect leads to an inadequate explanation of the 
development of the public sphere. Some scholars have pointed out the necessity to 
understand the state’s deregulation of society and protection of the public sphere. As Eley 
(1992:321) astutely puts: “As Karl Polanyi always insisted, the road to laissez-faire was 
paved in state intervention. The same was true of sociocultural and political, no less than 
                                                 
16
 In fact, there is little cross-fertilization between literatures on the public sphere and the state (Eley 1992: 
19-20; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999). On the one hand, public sphere scholars, especially Habermas, focus on 
an analysis of society, to the exclusion of the state. Meanwhile, for their part, state theorists do not allude to 
political culture and the public sphere in their analysis of the state. In short, both traditions share a similar 
shortcoming – assuming a sharp separation of state and society. 
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economic freedoms: to deregulate society and confirm a protected space for the public, an 
entire regulative program was required.” Similarly, Michael Schudson (1994:532) argues: 
“ …at least for liberal societies, it is important to see the place of the state in the 
construction civil society and the public sphere. I think it is important to examine not only 
how people make their voices effective in bringing issues before the public but how 
governmental institutions help to form the “voice” of citizens in the first place.” 
Second, the Habermasian framework does not adequately specify the concrete action 
and process that lead to the rise of the public sphere. The cause of the problem is that this 
framework operates at a very high-level of analysis without having a clear and effective 
analytic strategy at the meso-level to make the macro-level analysis concrete. In 
Habermas’s analysis of the rise of the public sphere in Western European countries 
(1989), the transition from feudalism to a capitalist economy was considered the most 
fundamental causal condition for the emergence of the European bourgeois public sphere. 
A market economy led to the emergence of the conjugal family, which further produced 
agents with the capacity to conduct rational and critical arguments. In the end, it is 
abstract concepts such as capitalist economy and conjugal family that play the most 
crucial role in Habermas’s analysis. This leaves readers with questions about whether and 
how specific actors and their interaction with one another, with institutions, and with the 
larger environment play any significant role in the development of the public sphere.  
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The media-centered perspective 
The media-centered perspective focuses on media and ICTs (Benson 2009; Calhoun 
1998; Dahlgren 2005). In The Structural Transformation (1989), mass media is 
considered as one of the causes that led to the degeneration of the European public sphere. 
Although scholars criticize Habermas’s treatment of mass media as being one-sided 
(Calhoun 1992b; Polan 1990), they agree that mass media plays a crucial role in the 
development of the public sphere (Baker 2002; Baker 2007; Benson 2009; Boggs 2000; 
Bourdieu 2001; Calhoun 1988; Cook 2006; Curran 1991; Dahlgren 1995; 2000; 2005; 
Kellner 2000; Schudson 2002; Thompson 1995).  
Many studies have pointed to the impact of media system on politics. In the Western 
context, scholars have repeatedly argued that economic power has entrenched media 
systems and contributed to depoliticized public communication and politically alienated 
citizens (Boggs 2000; Bourdieu 2001). In the Chinese context, scholars study the political 
consequence of the state’s policy shift in the media field. In the past, newspapers in China 
were totally subsidized by the state and expected simply to serve as mouthpieces of state 
propaganda. In 1992, the state began to substantially withdraw its funding of the media, 
forcing newspapers to rely on advertising and sales to survive. As a result of this process 
of media marketization, although newspapers are still state agencies responsible for 
propaganda, they are also market actors that must attract readers to survive. Scholars have 
studied the political implications of this process, yet most studies do not find the expected 
liberalizing effects. The most common argument is that media marketization has not 
 
   24 
 
produced significant liberalizing effects in China given the state’s updated control 
mechanisms (Hassid 2008; Lee 2000; Lynch 1999; Zhao 1998; 2004; 2008). 
Furthermore, existing studies also consider whether and how new ICTs, especially 
the Internet, can ameliorate the pathological media system and impact the public sphere 
(Benkler 2006; Clay 2011; Dahlgren 2000; Dahlgren 2005; Downey and Fenton 2003; 
Papacharissi 2002). In the Chinese context, scholars debate the political consequences of 
the rise of the Internet. Some argue that the Internet has democratic consequences (Tai 
2006:289; Tang 2005:87, 98; Yang 2009; Zheng 2008). Others contend that the Internet 
does not have democratizing consequences as it remains primarily a playground for 
entertainment under the control of the state (Kluver, Wu, Morozov, Wang, Bachman, and 
Yang 2010; Peters 2002; Yang 2009, p.10). There are also middle ground arguments that 
are more ambivalent about the development (Zhao 2008; Zhou 2006). 
The media-centered perspective has its strength and weakness. Unlike the 
Habermasian framework, the media-centered perspective operates at a meso-level, mostly 
from the tradition of institutional analysis and field analysis. As such, this line of research 
specifies very well how concrete institutions and actions shape the public sphere. Despite 
these merits, the media-centered perspective has two related drawbacks. First, the single 
focus on media underestimates or even ignores the role of other spheres of life and 
institutions in constituting and shaping the public sphere, but actors and institutions 
beyond the media field can shape the social-cultural foundation of the public sphere as 
well (Alexander 2006; Habermas 1996). Media must draw on culture – conceptualized as 
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symbolic systems and relational practices – to produce news reports and discourse, but the 
media-centered perspective fails to map out this cultural structure, let alone explain its 
origin, contestation, and transformation. Furthermore, the media-centered perspective also 
tends to be inadequate in accounting for the social process that creates social bonds and 
antagonism. The second related drawback of the media-centered perspective is its 
treatment of identity formation – the process by which individuals see themselves and act 
as members of a public. As the media-centered perspective highlights the media system, it 
is limited in analyzing how other meso-level conditions and processes impact identity 
formation. 
The media effects perspective 
The main research question that the media effects perspective addresses is whether 
and how exposure to media impacts individual political attitudes and behavior (Lee 2005; 
McLeod and McDonald 1985; Mutz and Martin 2001; Norris 2005; Norris and Inglehart 
2009; Weber, Loumakis, and Bergman 2003; Xenos and Moy 2007). Similar to the 
media-centered perspective, the media effects perspective also focuses on media, but it 
mainly operates at the micro-level. Drawing primarily on analyses of aggregated survey 
data, this approach provides evidence to evaluate whether and how media consumption 
and use of ICTs contributes to alienated or civic-minded citizens. Nonetheless, the media 
effects perspective is still limited in two ways. First, even though the media effects 
perspective researches the association between media use and political attitudes and 
behavior, it provides limited evidence of how this association is produced. Second, the 
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media effects perspective leaves critical institutional and social processes that shape the 
cultural and social foundation of the public sphere unanalyzed. 
The historical and cultural sociology perspective 
Drawing on institutional and social network analysis, the historical and cultural 
sociology perspective highlights how institutional and social processes produce the 
social-cultural foundation of the public sphere (Alexander 2006; Emirbayer and Sheller 
1999; Somers 1995). Unlike the media-centered perspective, the historical and cultural 
sociology perspective does not restrict itself to the media system. For instance, in 
Alexander’s (2006) analysis of the American public sphere, Alexander incorporates not 
only communication institutions, but also legal institutions and the institutions of voting 
and political parties into his analysis. Since the historical and cultural sociology 
perspective does not restrict itself to studying media, it provides more a holistic and 
comprehensive analysis of the public sphere. Yet, the historical and cultural sociology 
perspective still has two inadequacies.  
First, the historical and cultural sociology perspective tends to be limited in 
theorizing the relationship between dominant and counterpublic spheres in an 
environment where fundamental political and civil rights and a basic consensus about 
democracy are lacking. This problem is that scholars in this tradition have worked from a 
baseline understanding of a certain type of society where certain things can be taken for 
granted. For instance, in Alexander (2006)’s analysis of the public sphere in the United 
States, he addresses how dominated groups and their supporters utilized institutions to 
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channel their voices and mobilize social movements. Importantly, though, as dominated 
as these groups and their supporters were, they did have certain basic rights to speak out 
and initiate collective action. According to Alexander’s analysis, a certain consensus also 
existed in American society about the most fundamental principles of democracy. The 
contestation was not so much about these basic principles, but about how to apply these 
principles to determine who ought to be included in civil society. Similarly, Emirbayer 
and Sheller’s framework (1999) explicitly assumes the existence of fundamental rights 
that protect civil society. But these assumptions about fundamental rights and consensus 
about democracy do not hold in a context like China. An adequate explanation of the 
Chinese case thus requires extra theoretical elemants to explain how dominated groups 
were able to overcome enormous political hurdles.  
Second, the historical and cultural sociology perspective pays little attention to the 
macro-process at and beyond the level of the nation-state. This implicit assumption about 
the insignificance of the macro-process may not always hold true. As Habermas’s 
analysis demonstrates, the development of the European public sphere was conditioned by 
the transition from feudalism to capitalist economy (Habermas 1989). Scholars further 
point out that the building of nation-states may impact the development of the European 
public sphere as well (Calhoun 1992b; Eley 1992). In the contemporary world, the 
process of globalization and transnational institution building can impact the public 
sphere through shaping domestic institutions, culture, and pattern of social relationship 
(Fraser 2007; Nanz and Steffek 2004). Hence, an adequate theoretical framework should 
take the macro-process into account. 
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Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the above four perspective helps to 
develop a theoretical framework to study the Chinese case. On the one hand, the four 
perspectives highlight different levels of analysis. Their contributions suggest the 
necessity to develop a theoretical framework that can integrate various levels of analysis. 
On the other hand, the four perspectives all impose assumptions that may not be 
appropriate across contexts. To adopt the insights of the four perspectives and address 
their inadequacies, I develop a multi-level theoretical framework that is not restricted by 
the problematic assumptions of the four perspectives.     
1.3.2. A Multi-Level Analysis of China’s Counter public Sphere  
In this section, I flesh out the theoretical framework that I use to pursue my research 
problem. At the macro-level, my theoretical framework incorporates an analysis of the 
state, highlights state-society relations, and considers the impact of global conditions. To 
investigate how the macro-process led to concrete action that contributed to the 
counterpublic sphere in China, I propose to study the development and overlap of the 
media and legal fields from the perspective of field theories. Finally, my theoretical 
framework includes an analysis of politicization at the micro-level and its co-constitutive 
relationship with meso-level processes. 
Macro-level analysis 
My theoretical framework highlights state-society relations at the macro-level in 
order to address the inadequacy of the Habermasian framework’s assumption regarding 
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the irrelevance of the state to the rise of the public sphere. Similar to Eley (1992) and 
Schudson (1993)’s critiques calling attention to the state’s deregulation of society and 
protection of the public sphere, I advocate analyzing the state’s role in the development of 
the counterpublic sphere. But whereas Eley and Schudson’s critique and studies of 
Chinese politics from the state-society relation perspective (Perry 1994; Zhao 2001; 
Zheng 2008) only suggest studying the intended consequences of state action, I propose to 
analyze both intended and unintended consequences of the state’s action on state-society 
relations. The state is not a clearly bounded and monolithic entity (Bourdieu 1994; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Clemens and Cook 1999; Fligstein and McAdam 2011; 
Lieberthal 1992). Though state actors in authoritarian contexts tend to inhibit society, 
certain state actors could intentionally contribute to the growth of a counterpublic sphere 
even in a politically restricted environment. Furthermore, owing to the complexity of 
institutional processes, state actions addressing any one problem or crisis can have 
unintended consequences in other realms (Krippner 2011). To be sure, merely pointing 
out the existence of unintended consequences is not adequate, so it is important also to 
specify the conditions and mechanisms by which unintended consequences conducive to 
liberalization and democratization can occur. To examine the intended and unintended 
consequence of the state’s action, I disaggregate the state along temporal, sectoral, and 
regional dimensions and explore various roles of state actors in contributing to the 
cultural and social foundation of China’s counterpublic sphere.  
At the macro-level, my theoretical framework also considers China in a global 
context, as this context and the conditions therein can structure the action of both state 
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and non-state actors and impact state-society relations. The nation-state does have 
sovereignty and agency, but its actions are also conditioned by the global political 
economy and transnational institutions (Castells 2008; Fraser 1990). Existing studies have 
shown how the Chinese state has been both constrained and enabled by the global 
capitalist economy and transnational institutions in its pursuit of political and economic 
goals. For instance, in order to profit from international trade, the Chinese state subjected 
itself to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) when building domestic 
institutions (Bhattasali, Li, and Martin 2004; DeWoskin 2001; Lee 2003; Lin 2004; 
Pangestu and Mrongowius 2004; Wang 2001; Zhao 2008). Similarly, global conditions, 
especially when translated into local institutions and culture, can also impact non-state 
actors and their relation to state actors (Guthrie 2009). As Lin Yutang’s (1936) study of 
the history of public opinion in China shows, the development of China’s modern press 
was highly influenced by European missionaries and Western notions of democracy, 
freedom and constitutionalism. Furthermore, the mobilization of public opinion in the 
Qing Dynasty against the state was a reaction to capitalist imperialism. Accordingly, 
scholars of the public sphere who emphasize the enormous disparity in socioeconomic, 
political, and cultural conditions in the Chinese and European contexts (Calhoun 1993; 
Wakeman Jr 1993) should also consider similarities across contexts due to global 
processes. 
In short, at the macro-level, my theoretical framework incorporates an analysis of the 
state, highlights state-society relations, and takes into account global conditions. Yet, as 
the critique of the Habermasian framework suggests, if a macro-level analysis is not 
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complemented by a meso-level analysis, the former tends to be too abstract and 
susceptible to problematic assumptions about the homogeneity of actors. In order to 
investigate the concrete processes and actions that led to the rise of the counterpublic 
sphere in China, I include in my theoretical framework a meso-level analysis based on 
field theories. Specifically, I propose to study how macro-level processes impacted the 
development and overlap of media and legal fields, as well as the consequence of these 
field-level processes for the development of China’s counterpublic sphere. 
Meso-level analysis 
Although studies from the historical and cultural sociology perspective draw on 
institutional and social network analysis to study the public sphere (Alexander 2006; 
Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Somers 1993), I propose to conduct meso-level analysis 
from the perspective of field theories. Field analysis provides an effective analytic 
perspective for two reasons. First, the nature of a public sphere as a field makes field 
analysis an appropriate approach to study the public sphere. A field is a meso-level order 
where actors interact with one another based on a set of common understandings 
regarding the purposes of the field, the relationships between actors, and the rules in the 
field (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011). Although public spheres can have 
different characteristics, one of most common and primary purposes of a public sphere is 
to identify fundamental societal problems, analyze their causes, and search for solutions. 
Through discussing societal problems, individual and collective actors aim to influence 
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politics (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Habermas 1989; 1996; 2006; Peters 2008).
17
 
Members of a public interact according to a set of common rules (Alexander 2006; 
Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Habermas 2006). Once the rules of the game are established, 
actors need to exert political influence according to these rules in the public sphere. Even 
politically and economically powerful actors need to convert their power into appropriate 
logics that are recognized in the public sphere in order to exert their influence (Habermas 
2006). As such, a public sphere is essentially a field. As field theories provide an arsenal 
of analytical tools to analyze the formation of fields, as well as their stability and 
transformation (Fligstein and McAdam 2011), field analysis is helpful for researching the 
development of a public sphere. 
Second, field analysis provides more analytical leverage than alternative approaches 
at the meso level of analysis. Like institutional and social network analysis (Alexander 
2006; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Somers 1993), field analysis highlights the significant 
role of institutions and social networks in constituting and shaping the public sphere 
(Bourdieu 2005). As such, field analysis can also incorporate insights from institutional 
theories and social network analysis. Compared with other approaches, however, field 
analysis also has a unique analytical strength. 
Certain versions of field theories accentuate the conditions and mechanisms that lead 
to field overlap – the intersection of fields – and the consequences of field overlap in 
                                                 
17
 The news media are expected not only to uncover problems, but also to help the public analyze those 
problems and come up with solutions. These practices are broader than what is conventionally referred to as 
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practices. 
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terms of creating structural opportunities for mobilization and social change (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992; Evans and Kay 2008). This theorization of field overlap is important 
for the study of the public sphere because a public, by definition, is comprised of actors 
coming from different fields of life. The emergence and transformation of the public 
sphere can be conceptualized as the result of a series of field overlaps from the 
perspective of field theories (Benson 2009). Field theories thus help to investigate the 
integrative process by which various actors form a public. Furthermore, as I have stated, 
the historical and cultural sociology perspective tends to be limited in explaining the rise 
of a counterpublic sphere in an environment where fundamental political and civil rights 
are lacking. The focus of field theories on how field overlap creates structural 
opportunities for change helps to understand the conditions and mechanisms by which 
challengers can transform a field despite the dominance of incumbents. 
Given that field theories and the notion of field overlap in particular can illuminate 
the study of the Chinese case, the next question to consider is which fields are of 
particular importance to the development of China’s counterpublic sphere. I argue that a 
sufficient analysis should consider the development and intersection of the media and 
legal fields. As such, my theoretical framework differs from the media-centered 
perspective in that it considers more than just the relationship between the media field and 
the public sphere. This approach also differs from the historical and cultural sociology 
perspective in that it explicitly theorizes the conditions and mechanisms leading to the 
overlap of the media and legal fields, as well as the consequences of this overlap. 
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The media field is crucial to the public sphere for two reasons. First, the media field 
provides an integrative interface. It links individuals through the production and 
circulation of information, particularly news. In the media field, the main actors are 
journalists, media organizations, regulatory agencies, ordinary citizens, and advertising 
buyers. The mass media reaches numerous readers in a large-scale society. Furthermore, 
in the process of producing news, journalists are also likely to establish connections with 
actors in other arenas, such as intellectuals, organizations, grievants and state agencies. 
The kind of social networks that journalists establish can impact news production. Second, 
the media field is a venue where political culture is produced and disseminated. Existing 
studies show that characteristics of the media field and media, such as the relationship 
between professional, market and political power in a media field, and the properties of 
ICTs, can impact the production of news, public discourse and political culture (Baker 
2002; Baker 2007; Benkler 2006; Calhoun 1988; Calhoun 1998; Cook 2006; Schudson 
2002; Thompson 1995). When the media is able to mediate the discussion of fundamental 
societal problems, it can help to produce a more critical political culture and facilitate the 
function of an effective public sphere (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Habermas 1989; 
1996; 2006; Peters 2008). In essence, the media field is critical to the development of the 
public sphere, but how it shapes the public sphere is indeterminate.  
Although my theoretical framework incorporates an analysis of the media field, I do 
not assume that the media field and the media shape the public sphere in homogeneous 
ways; rather, I suggest investigating variations among media and among different media 
fields as heterogeneity can drive the transformation of the public sphere and trigger the 
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formation of a counterpublic sphere. The conventional view tends to see mass media as 
uniformly unbeneficial to the advancement of democracy (Boggs 1997; Bourdieu 2001; 
Graber 2003; Habermas 1989; Mills 1956). Conforming to this view, scholars writing 
about the Chinese context often describe Chinese media as being successful in 
disseminating propaganda for the government and pursuing economic benefits, but as 
disinterested in democratic causes (Brady 2007; Lynch 1999; Pan 2010; Zhao 2004).  
This conventional view is not so much wrong, as inattentive to the variation within 
the media. Both media organizations and media fields can be different across temporal 
and spatial dimensions. For example, various configurations of market, political, and 
professional power in regional media fields can contribute to differences in media 
organizations across regions in a nation. Advancement of ICTs can also lead to 
differences in media fields over time. Inattention to this variation is consequential as 
historical studies on liberalization and democratization have shown that alternative media 
can amplify dissident voices, galvanize mass support, and advance liberalization and 
democratization (Lee 2003; Tang 2006). Accordingly, my theoretical framework 
highlights variation among media organizations and media fields, the causes of this 
variation in a politically restricted environment, and the consequences of this variation for 
the development of China’s counterpublic sphere. 
In addition to the media field, my theoretical framework incorporates an analysis of 
the legal field. The role of the legal field is rarely discussed in the literature on the public 
sphere. In the legal field, the main actors are lawyers, their professional associations, law 
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firms, legal official, state agencies, and ordinary citizens; the main agenda in the legal 
field is the interpretation and application of law (Edelman et al. 2010). The legal field 
should be incorporated into analysis of China’s counterpublic sphere for three related 
reasons. First, under certain conditions, the legal field can provide a cultural integrative 
interface. As Habermas (1996:353-354) pointed out, law serves as a common cultural 
medium and language for citizens to identify and talk about problems across different 
spheres of life. To be sure, Habermas’s statement depends on many factors, such as legal 
tradition and the state’s effort to diffuse law to citizens. In many authoritarian countries, 
legal principles and texts remain unknown to citizens and irrelevant to everyday life.
18
 
Yet, when law penetrates society, it can serve as a common cultural medium. 
Second, although law is an instrument of domination, it can also be a symbolic 
resource for challenging the state’s power (Bourdieu 1987; 1994; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992:112), and this has critical implications for explaining how resistance and opposition 
is possible in a politically restricted environment. Given its institutional characteristics, 
law can be a resource that can be used against the state. Using codified law to govern is a 
form of symbolic domination through which the state imposes a common set of coercive 
norms (Bourdieu 1987; 1994; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:112). The dilemma facing the 
state is that it cannot reap the benefits of this domination without at least appearing to 
subject itself to the order of law (Bourdieu 1987; Bourdieu 1994). Existing studies show 
that when authoritarian states begin to use law to govern the populace and recognize 
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 See, for example, discussion of this issue at the World Justice Project website: 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/ (Accessed April 30, 2013). 
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citizens’ rights, citizens respond by learning how to mobilize law to negotiate and contend 
with the state (Lee 2007; Moustafa 2007; O'Brien and Li 2006). Furthermore, law’s 
cultural characteristic as a plastic medium allows actors to develop alternative discourse 
and thus facilitates political contention (Balkin 2009; Somers 1993). Legal reasoning is 
often indeterminate as the process of fact-finding, application of legal doctrines, and 
interpretation of law is rife with opportunities for innovation and contestation (Balkin 
2009). Citizens are not necessarily bound by the state’s interpretation of legal texts or 
principles. Of course, whether ordinary citizens are able to use law as a resource against 
the state hinges on many factors, particularly support from legal professionals. This 
relates to my third reason explaining why the legal field is critical to the development of 
China’s counterpublic sphere.  
Third, legal professionals can play a critical role in connecting oppositional forces 
and promoting a critical political culture. Legal professionals have expertise in turning 
law into a symbolic resource against the state’s power. Their occupation also gives them 
opportunities to interact with citizens who encounter injustice. Therefore, the legal field 
can be a critical venue for resistance. To be sure, legal professionals may not have an 
interest in using law to challenge the state, and the authoritarian state tends to regulate the 
legal profession. Nonetheless, as studies of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan 
suggest, the legal field in an authoritarian context tends to become more diversified over 
time. Although the majority of legal professionals are likely to remain aloof to politics, 
some legal professionals can begin to challenge the authoritarian state and mobilize 
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contention (Chou and Nathan 1987; Yang 1993). When legal elites are able to connect 
with other social groups and spread their viewpoints, they can contribute to the formation 
of oppositional discourse and a critical citizenry, while also spreading resistance. It is thus 
critical to investigate how a highly regulated legal field can diversify and cultivate 
politicized legal professionals. 
In addition to analyzing the media and legal fields, I propose to investigate the 
conditions and mechanisms that can lead to the overlap of the two fields, as well as the 
consequence of this overlap. As I have stated, variation within the media and legal fields 
can drive transformation of the dominant public sphere, but critical media organizations, 
journalists, and legal professionals are likely to be the minority in their respective fields. 
It is thus important to consider whether and how this limited influence can be integrated 
and amplified. In this aspect, field theories provide critical insight as they theorize how 
actors can overcome unfavorable conditions and gain political leverage through field 
overlap mechanisms. According to field theories, field overlap is a critical structural 
condition that facilitates political mobilization and contention. When two fields intersect, 
actors in one field have an opportunity to access and utilize material and symbolic 
resources in the other field, thus having more leverage to resist dominant logics and bring 
about change (Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam 2010; Evans and Kay 2008; Thornton 
and Ocasio 2008). The complexity and interconnection of institutions in contemporary 
society (Edelman et al. 2010; Friedland and Alford 1991) creates multiple opportunities 
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for actors to use field overlap mechanisms. It is thus critical to analyze how institutions 
enable and facilitate the overlap of the media and legal field.  
In sum, in order to investigate how concrete processes and actions led to the rise of 
the counterpublic sphere in China, I propose to study the development and overlap of the 
media and legal fields from the perspective of field theories. Thus far, my theoretical 
framework focuses more on how political elites – government officials and media and 
legal professionals – shape and connect the media and legal fields in intended and 
unintended ways. Nonetheless, the rise and sustainability of the counterpublic sphere still 
depends on the participation of ordinary citizens in forming public discourse and 
influencing politics. Therefore, my theoretical framework further incorporates an analysis 
of how ordinary citizens become a member of the counterpublic sphere at the micro-level 
and the consequence of this politicization for the development of the counterpublic 
sphere. 
Micro-level analysis 
At the micro-level, my theoretical framework focuses on identify formation and 
political participation, as well as how politicization at the individual level creates a 
boundary that delineates a counterpublic sphere. Identify formation – how an individual 
relates himself or herself to other citizens and the state – is critical to the constitution of a 
public, as members of a group require some common identity (Calhoun 1992b; Dahlgren 
1995; 2005; Fraser 1990). Identity also shapes political action and social boundaries 
(Calhoun 1991b; Tilly 2002; 2005). An investigation of identity formation and its 
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consequences for political action and social boundaries is particularly important for 
analyzing China’s counterpublic sphere as this will help to explain how collective feelings 
of exclusion and antagonism against the state first emerged and became the basis for 
political participation. 
I propose to examine identify formation and its relation to political participation and 
meso-level dynamics by analyzing the transformation that occurs for actors themselves as 
they experience changes in a broader political environment and participate in the 
discursive arenas. I pay particular attention to how the dynamics in media and law fields 
jointly shape identity and political participation, as existing studies suggest that the media 
can mediate the formation of a common identity (Anderson 1983; Dahlgren 1995) and 
law can empower citizens and provide a basis for forging identities (Somers 1993). In 
addition, since existing studies suggest that a shared cultural medium in a society can be 
used to create social bonds and division (Alexander 2006), I will also investigate how 
citizens draw on the cultural medium that is partly established and diffused by actors in 
the media and legal fields to generate solidarity, division, and antagonism.  
1.4. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHODS 
To pursue the research problem of the dissertation, I employ negative case 
methodology from the perspective of comparative historical sociology. A negative case is 
an anomalous case in which the outcome predicted by a theory does not occur (Emigh 
1997; Smelser 1973). Negative case methodology examines such anomalous cases against 
a theoretical explanation that embodies knowledge of numerous cases. Although negative 
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case methodology examines a single case, it is intrinsically comparative as it compares 
the anomalous case with a theory based on multiple cases. The negative case 
methodology is consistent with Lakato’s philosophy of science and his calls for pursing a 
progressive research program (Lakatos 1975). Instead of refuting existing theories and 
their hard-core propositions, negative case methodology aims to expand the range of a 
theory’s explanation by incorporating potentially damaging findings into the existing 
theory. In so doing, negative case methodology preserves the fundamental proposition of 
a theory, while further developing its content and expanding its range of application 
(Emigh 1997). 
Employing negative case methodology, I examine the Chinese case against the 
existing theory of the public sphere that derives from cases in the West. The Chinese case 
is a negative case as it deviates from the prediction based on the existing theory. As 
discussed earlier, according to existing literature on the public sphere, which is primarily 
based on research in Western contexts, a thriving nationwide counterpublic sphere should 
not exist in China owing to the absence of a necessary condition – an autonomous and 
well-developed civil society. Yet, this prediction has not been borne out in China. On the 
contrary, a flourishing nationwide counterpublic sphere has emerged and continues to 
exist. The anomaly of the Chinese case thus provides an opportunity to expand the theory 
of public sphere. Rather than abandoning the hard-core proposition of the existing theory 
– namely, that a social-cultural foundation is needed for a public sphere to grow and 
persist, this dissertation explores alternative paths by which the public sphere in China 
developed, in the absence of an active civil society. By specifying the form the 
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social-cultural foundation of the public sphere has taken in China, how that foundation 
was formed given unfavorable conditions, and how this foundation has been used to 
formulate public opinion that challenges the state, this dissertation extends the theory of 
the public sphere beyond the Western contexts.  
I examine the Chinese case through a multi-faceted, comparative, and historical 
analysis that draws on a variety of sources. When employing negative case methodology, 
scholars often draw on a variety of research methods to investigate the connection 
between different aspects in a single case. The purpose is to understand a single historical 
trajectory in detail (Emigh 1997). I follow the same strategy, triangulating various types 
of data and methods of analysis in order to enhance the validity of my empirical analysis. 
Since each empirical chapter in the dissertation has its own distinct research design, data 
sources and research methods, I will describe research design, data sources, and research 
methods in detail in each empirical chapter. Here, I present only the major data sources 
that I analyzed. These include:  
(1) Newspapers: I analyzed content of newspapers at both national and local levels 
published in China between 1949–2010 and across localities. 
(2) Yearbooks, laws and regulations, and other official documents: I examined Chinese 
Journalism Yearbooks between 1983 and 2008, Law Yearbooks of China between 1987 
and 2010, gazetteers published by local governments, and Party Congress reports. I 
searched Chinalawinfo (a law database established by Peking University) to research laws 
and regulations that regulate media, the Internet, and news production. 
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(3) Speeches and anthologies of CCP leaders: I examined speeches and anthologies of 
CCP leaders to investigate how they decided to develop media and legal institutions in 
China. 
(4) Interviews data: I conducted in-depth interviews with informants and ordinary citizens 
between 2009 and 2012 in China and the United states. I conducted 78 in-depth 
interviews with informants. I interviewed experienced journalists in many newspaper 
organizations. The journalists I interviewed are well-positioned to recount the 
development of the press. I also interviewed high-level employees at the four major 
Internet portals in China. Companies like Yahoo in the U.S. are Internet portals. In China, 
these portals provide news service and operate social media. As such, they provide critical 
venues where news and public discourse are circulated and produced. Additionally, I 
interviewed scholars and government officials familiar with media, telecommunications 
services, and China’s WTO negotiations. I also interviewed lawyers and legal scholars. 
Finally, I interviewed public intellectuals and activists. All interviews were organized 
around a set of questions tailored to the respondent’s area of expertise. In addition to 
informants, I also conducted 50 in-depth interviews with citizens in 2011, as ordinary 
citizens are consumers and producers of news and public discourse. I conducted in-depth 
interviews to understand the transformation that occurred for citizens on the ground. 
(5) Survey data: I analyzed the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey, the 2008 Asian Barometer 
Survey, the 2002 AsiaBarometer Survey, and the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey to 
investigate the relationship between perceptions of institutional contradictions, use of 
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information technology, and political attitudes towards institutions in China. I also 
analyzed the World Values Surveys (WVS, 2005-2008) data to investigate the 
relationship between media and political attitudes and to examine whether my findings in 
the Chinese case hold true in other contexts. The dataset has 54 countries, but because 
questionnaire items on my variables were not available for six countries, my analysis is 
restricted to 48 countries. 
1.5. MY CENTRAL ARGUMENT AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The central argument of this dissertation is that while civil society plays a key role in 
enabling and facilitating the development of the public sphere in Western contexts, in the 
Chinese case it is the state that is – unintentionally and paradoxically – the architect of the 
counterpublic sphere. While continuing to suppress public opinion and restrict civil 
society, the Chinese state responded to the legitimation crisis it faced in the late 1970s by 
creating legal institutions and transitioning to a market economy connecting China with 
the rest of the world. In doing so, it inadvertently contributed to the social-cultural 
foundation for a counterpublic sphere. In the process of institution-building at both local 
and global levels to address the state’s crisis and enhance its legitimacy, state actors 
rebuilt the legal field and reconstructed the media field. In the process, the state 
unwittingly created symbolic resources for resistance and facilitated the overlap of the 
media and legal fields, leading to the formation of collaborative networks that connected 
media professionals, legal professionals, other elites, and ordinary citizens. State and 
non-state actors embedded in these social networks appropriated the institutions built by 
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the state to form and spread oppositional discourse that challenges the state and the 
dominant discourse. Certain state actors, particularly certain newspapers, intentionally 
contributed to this counterpublic sphere; others did so unwittingly. In this respect, part of 
what we think of as civil society in Western contexts actually exists within the Chinese 
state as these state agencies helped citizens to build the same symbolic structure to 
communicate, develop a collective identity, and understand their rights and responsibility 
to participate in politics. Furthermore, as the social-cultural foundation of the 
counterpublic sphere has been sustained by the institutions built by the state, the state, in 
turn, cannot completely crack down on this counterpublic sphere to the extent that it 
cannot fundamentally change these institutions. 
Having argued for the critical importance of the state in facilitating the rise of the 
nationwide counterpublic sphere in China, I should emphasize that I am not suggesting 
that non-state actors no longer play a significant role. Rather, I argue that only when we 
attend to the intended and unintended consequences of state action can we better account 
for the rise of the nationwide counterpublic sphere in China.  
In order to develop my central argument, I organize the rest of the dissertation as 
follows: In Chapter 2, I first establish the existence of a flourishing nationwide 
counterpublic sphere in China through a longitudinal study from 1949-2010. As Robert 
Merton (1959:xiii) once usefully reminded sociologists, it is wise to ensure the existence 
of a fact before giving an explanation of it, so as to avoid providing explanations for 
“things that never were.”  
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In Chapter 3, I investigate the origin and diffusion of the symbolic structure of 
China’s dominant public sphere and counterpublic spheres, as culture is one of the critical 
foundations of the public sphere. This chapter focuses on the interaction of the macro- 
and meso- level process. I explore how the macro-conditions – the CCP’s legitimation 
crisis in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution – contributed to the Party-state’s 
decision to build the legal field and recognize law as a critical form of symbolic resource 
even though the Party-state did not intend to build a rule of law under liberal democracy. 
The Chinese state’s extraordinary ability to disseminate law to the public made China one 
of the very few authoritarian countries where legal information is widely accessible and 
comprehensive to citizens. As a result of law dissemination, the Chinese state established 
a shared symbolic structure based on laws and rights that penetrates the society.  
In Chapter 4, I examine how the development of the legal field led to unintended 
consequences that facilitated the production of critical news reports – reports that identify 
fundamental societal problems, analyze their causes, and search for solutions – even 
though critical news reporting is often discouraged, if not completely suppressed by the 
state. This chapter studies how a macro-level condition, the Chinese state’s embrace of 
the market economy, shaped the state’s decision to reconstruct the media field and make 
Chinese media simultaneously state and market actors. This decision was an important 
condition that led to variation among media organizations in terms of critical news 
reporting. After identifying this variation, I address how and why certain media 
organizations were able to use field overlap mechanisms to access resources in the legal 
field, collaborate with legal professionals, and appropriate the symbolic structure based 
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on law for critical news reporting, despite pervasive censorship and restricted political 
environment. 
In Chapter 5, I examine the processes by which the limited liberalization effects 
outlined in Chapter 4 escalated into a nationwide counterpublic sphere, with a particular 
focus on meso- and micro-level interaction. This chapter first analyzes how the Chinese 
state decided to expand and restructure the media field, given the emergence of new ICTs 
and the benefits that accrued with joining the WTO. Next, I investigate how this 
restructuring inadvertently amplified the influence of pro-liberal media and legal 
professionals and further triggered a series of field overlaps. I show how these processes 
extended critical cultural elements and practices from legal and media professionals to 
other elites and ordinary citizens. Then, I study how the above meso-level process 
impacted identity formation and led to the politicization of citizens. Finally, I investigate 
how this politicization, in turn, drove the formation of public discourse and opinion, 
delineating the contours of an emergent counterpublic sphere. 
In Chapter 6, I summarize the research findings and discuss their contribution to the 
existing literature. I also consider the generalizability and limitations of the research. I 
end the dissertation by discussing the broader implications of the findings and giving 
recommendations for further research.   
In the Appendix A of the dissertation, I present analysis of the Asian Barometer 
Surveys data and the AsiaBarometer Surveys data to show the declining trust in 
institutions, as well as the relationship between media use, perceptions of institutional 
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contradiction, and trust in institutions in China. In the Appendix B of the dissertation, I 
present analysis of the World Value Surveys data. The purpose is to facilitate discussion 
of the extent to which my findings in the Chinese case are relevant to other contexts. As 
these analyses are not key components to my research problem, they are reviewed only in 
the appendices, rather than the main text of the dissertation. 
 




 Situating the Rise of a Nationwide Counterpublic Sphere in Historical Context 
The two premises of this dissertation are that a flourishing nationwide counterpublic 
sphere has emerged in China, and that such a sphere is unprecedented in the PRC’s 
history. Previous case studies have provided scattered evidence of a counterpublic sphere 
in China (Qian and Bachman 2010; Tai 2006; Zhao 2008), yet there has been no 
systematic effort to demonstrate its historical roots, emergence, growth, and significance. 
As Merton (1959:xiii) usefully reminded us, it is advisable to ensure the existence of a 
fact before trying to explain it, as social scientific explanations are often provided for 
“things that never were.” To avoid this fallacy, my primary aim in this chapter is to 
establish the existence of a qualitatively new, active, and growing nationwide 
counterpublic sphere in China by studying the development of public opinion there 
between 1949 to 2010.  
My secondary aim in this chapter is to situate this development of public opinion and 
the public sphere over time in the country’s broader historical context, particularly its 
macro-political conditions and institution-building in the media and legal fields. This 
contextualization helps to ground my analysis and points to the necessity of examining 
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how institutional processes in the media and legal fields created the social-cultural 
foundation of the current counterpublic sphere.  
In order to achieve these two aims, I organize this chapter in two parts. In the first 
part of the chapter, I address how to operationalize the notion of a flourishing nationwide 
public sphere in an authoritarian context. I propose that patterns in the state’s response to 
public opinion can serve as a valid indication of such a sphere. Next, I discuss my data 
analysis strategy and the development of public opinion over time. In the second part of 
the chapter, I describe the fluctuation of macro-political conditions and the interplay of 
institution-building processes in the media and legal fields. Finally, I situate the 
development of public opinion in China within these historical contexts.  
2.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE IN CHINA  
2.1.1. Operationalizing a Flourishing Nationwide Counterpublic Sphere in 
Authoritarian Contexts 
Owing to its abstraction, the concept of a counterpublic sphere is very difficult to 
study empirically. In addition, as the state-society relationship varies tremendously across 
political regimes, how “counter” is conceptualized in authoritarian contexts may not have 
the same meaning or analytical utility in other political contexts. In authoritarian contexts, 
the asymmetrical power relation between the state and citizens is presumably the most 
fundamental source of domination, whereas class structure, gender, race, or ethnicity may 
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play a more vital role in other contexts. Since this dissertation studies the rise of a 
counterpublic sphere in an authoritarian country, to reduce unnecessary challenge and 
complexity, I limit my operationalization to authoritarian contexts. 
I operationalize what I call “a flourishing national counterpublic sphere” through two 
steps. First, I relate the concept of the public sphere to public opinion. According to 
Habermas (1996:360), the public sphere is a “network for communicating information 
and points of view,” where information and viewpoints coalesce into bundles of public 
opinion through communication. As such, the public sphere is also a space generated by 
the production and circulation of public opinion. Accordingly, the existence of public 
opinion – collective will formation of citizens – indicates the presence of some kind of 
public sphere.  
Next, I connect the concept of counterpublic sphere in authoritarian contexts to the 
response of the state – specifically, I propose using the type and degree of the state’s 
response to public opinion as an indication of the presence and potential influence of a 
nationwide counterpublic sphere. As Habermas points out, since the political potential of 
the public sphere lies in its political influence, the most critical feature of the public 
sphere is its reflexivity, which means that the effectiveness of public opinion depends on 
the response of its multiple addressees (Habermas 2006). Formation and dissemination of 
public opinion requires resonance from citizens. Moreover, as the public sphere has 
limited capacity and resources to solve problems by itself, it eventually relies upon formal 
political institutions to address problems. As such, the public sphere must be able to 
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thematize and dramatize problems so they are perceived and addressed as such by formal 
political institutions (Habermas 1996:359). Essentially, without studying how public 
opinion is perceived by its addressees, it is impossible to gauge the political influence and 
development of the public sphere.  
In the context of liberal democracy, public opinion may influence the voting 
behavior of citizens and decision-making in parliaments, administrative agencies and 
courts (Habermas 1996:363). As the legitimacy of the government is established through 
voting, citizens’ right to vote buttresses the political influence of the public sphere on 
political institutions. Although they can decide to take an acknowledging, negative, or 
indifferent attitude toward public opinion, elected government officials and legislators 
understand that an improper response to public opinion could have negative consequences 
(Habermas 2006).  
By comparison, in authoritarian contexts, the state has a wider range of choices 
regarding its response to public opinion, and the state’s decision has larger political 
consequences for the state-society relationship. Without de facto voting rights for citizens 
to withdraw legitimacy, the state has broad latitude to decide how it manages public 
opinion. Suppression of public opinion, which can hardly be done in liberal democracies, 
is a common choice for authoritarian rulers. Moreover, precisely due to the lack of 
effective alternative institutionalized channels for citizens to influence formal political 
institutions, the extent to which citizens can influence state decision-making through 
public opinion is all the more consequential – and, thus, in the interests of the state to 
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control (Zheng 2008). The important role of the state in determining the political 
influence of public opinion suggests the value of studying the public sphere through the 
lens of the state.  
I propose that the patterns of the state’s response to public opinion can indicate the 
following four kinds of public sphere as Table 2-1 shows:  
(1) No noticeable public sphere: An authoritarian state can choose to react to or simply 
ignore public opinion. Arguably, if the public sphere was not influential, the state 
would not need to respond to its demands at all. Therefore, an authoritarian state’s 
indifference to public opinion over time indicates the absence of a noticeable public 
sphere. This situation is the first outcome in Table 2-1.  
(2) Non-oppositional public sphere: Conversely, an authoritarian state’s interaction with 
public opinion indicates the political influence of a public sphere. The reaction of the 
authoritarian state indicates not only how quantitatively influential that sphere is, but 
also what kind of political influence it has. When an authoritarian state decides to 
react to public opinion, it can take an affirmative approach, a restrictive approach, or 
both. Examples of an affirmative approach include recognizing public opinion as an 
independent social force and acknowledging a need to understand public opinion. 
Examples of a restrictive approach include attempts to control, manipulate, or 
suppress public opinion, etc. When an authoritarian state frequently takes an 
affirmative approach but infrequently takes a restrictive approach (the second 
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outcome in Table 2-1), its decisions indicate that neither public opinion nor the public 
sphere are perceived as threatening or oppositional to authoritarian rule. 
(3) Weak counterpublic sphere: If an authoritarian state frequently adopts a restrictive 
approach but infrequently takes an affirmative approach, then the public sphere is 
considered antagonistic to the state. Nonetheless, because this counterpublic sphere is 
contained by the state without a need for the state to compromise, its political 
influence is still limited. This possibility is the third outcome in Table 2-1.  
(4) Strong counterpublic sphere: Finally, if an authoritarian state frequently takes both 
restrictive and affirmative approaches (the fourth outcome in Table 2-1), this indicates 
that the state both regards public opinion as threatening, and decides that it cannot 
afford to simply suppress that opinion. In this situation, the existence of a 
counterpublic sphere can be read off of the state’s hostile response to it, and its level 
of influence is revealed when the state is forced to respond positively to its demands.  
In essence, I suggest that when a state simultaneously takes restrictive and 
affirmative approaches to public opinion over a period of time, this indicates the existence 
of an active and influential counterpublic sphere. As mentioned, the premises of this 
dissertation are that a nationwide counterpublic sphere has not only emerged for the first 
time in China, but is thriving. If the above premises are valid, one would expect to find a 
pattern of the Chinese government repeatedly taking both restrictive and affirmative 
approaches to engage with public opinion in recent years – a pattern with no historical 
precedent.      
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TABLE 2-1: The pattern of the state’s reaction to public opinion. 
An authoritarian state’s reaction              
to public opinion 
















2.1.2. Data Analysis Strategy 
Data Sources 
News reports published by the People’s Daily (renmin ribao) between 1946 and 
2010 provide the primary source of data for my analysis. I selected the People’s Daily to 
gauge the Chinese state’s response to public opinion for several reasons. First, the 
People’s Daily is the official mouthpiece of the CCP and a critical instrument for 
diffusing and implementing policies. As the organ of the highest decision-making body in 
the CCP, the People’s Daily accurately reflects the attitude and viewpoints of the central 
leadership. Publicly expressing the attitude and perception of the central state is a vital 
way for the central state to respond to various issues in China, including the rise of public 
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opinion (Wu 1994). Furthermore, since the People’s Daily is a national-level newspaper 
and the core of the state-dominant public sphere, its reporting tends to be very selective. 
Issues that are not considered nationally important are not be addressed in the People’s 
Daily. Thus, the People’s Daily is able to reflect the development of the public sphere in 
China at a national level.  
The second data source for this analysis is eight in-depth interviews with 
experienced journalists. The purpose of these interviews was to develop a coding scheme 
to analyze the response of the Chinese state to public opinion. Therefore, I interviewed 
experienced journalists in newspapers who are knowledgeable about how the Chinese 
government engages with public opinion. Face-to-face interviews took place in 
Guangzhou and Beijing between 2009 and 2011.  
Data Analysis 
I applied content analysis to a data set generated from the People’s Daily. This data 
set contains 3,912 articles with titles containing “public opinion (yulun, yuqing or minyi)” 
between 1946-2010. Using the occurrence of “public opinion” in titles instead of full texts 
as a standard to select articles helps to identify articles that explicitly proposed to deal 
with issues related to public opinion. My research assistant and I read through each article, 
coding data in relation to three themes.
1
 
                                                 
1
 We independently coded each article. We deliberated and made a collective decision on the rare occasions 
when we had different opinions. I calculated Cohen's kappa (Cohen 1960) to assess the interrater reliability. 
The agreement score (0.87) suggests excellent agreement. 
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The first theme concerns the origin(s) of public opinion. Because articles in the 
People’s Daily also engage with public opinion produced outside of China, it is necessary 
to identify where the public opinion being discussed “came from” in order to observe the 
evolution of the public sphere in China.  
The second theme concerns how the Chinese central state responded to domestic 
public opinion. Based on previous literature, my interviews with experienced journalists, 
and my reading of data, I developed a coding scheme with four categories. This coding 
scheme includes three common approaches adopted by the Chinese government to engage 
with public opinion, and one non-applicable category. I describe the three approaches as 
follows: 
(1) Public opinion as something that needs to be controlled: The first approach is a 
restrictive one, treating public opinion as something that needs to be contained. For 
instance, an article published on December 7, 2009 stated that, because the Internet 
had become a place where non-mainstream and irrational opinion circulates, the 
government should recognize the enormous impact of online public opinion, while 
also actively controlling and shaping public opinion. 
(2) Public opinion as something that needs to be understood: The second one is an 
affirmative approach, regarding public opinion as something that needs to be 
understood or addressed. For instance, an article published on June 10, 2003 
suggested that government officials should listen to and understand public opinion 
before making a decision. 
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(3) Public opinion as a check of political power: The third approach is also affirmative, 
seeing public opinion as a check of political power operating on behalf of citizens 
(Chan 2002; Chan 2007; Qian and Bachman 2010). For example, an article published 
on May 21, 2009 stated that the government should make sure that the public can use 
public opinion as a weapon to hold the government accountable.  
The three approaches are not mutually exclusive. For each article, my research 
assistant and I identified one or multiple approaches that described the central state’s 
response to public opinion. If there was no adequate information to make a decision, we 
coded that article as “not applicable.”  
The third theme in the content analysis concerns the actors regarded by the 
government as most relevant in producing public opinion. Identifying types of actors 
helps to investigate the role of institutions in the development of China’s public sphere 
because different types of actors are associated with different types of institutional 
arrangements. For instance, if the Internet had not become a critical part of China’s 
communication system, netizens would not have become a new and distinct category of 
actors. There are four categories in my coding scheme for type of actor(s): (1) journalists 
and news media, (2) ordinary citizens, (3) netizens, and (4) others or no mention. The rise 
of new types of actors over time may indicate a shift in the state-society relationship. As 
journalists and news media are closely monitored and controlled by the state through 
multiple mechanisms, their role in the production and circulation of public opinion may or 
may not be challenging to the state – in some cases, it may actually be interpreted as 
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indicating the state’s success in shaping public opinion (Esarey 2007). In contrast, voices 
of citizens and netizens are more likely to reflect public opinion generated “from the 
bottom up,” so to speak. 
2.1.3. Results of Analysis 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Place of public opinion (n=3912). 
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Figure 2-1 represents analysis of the origins of public opinion. Although the term 
“public opinion” occurred frequently before 1976 in the People’s Daily, analysis of place 
shows that public opinion in this period warranted mention most often when it was 
generated outside of China. Only on a few occasions was domestic public opinion 
reported in the People’s Daily prior to 1976 – and most of these occurred between 1946 
and 1949, before the establishment of the PRC. Furthermore, the instances were ones in 
which the CCP criticized the Kuomintang government for suppressing public opinion and 
freedom of speech by shutting down presses. Following the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1976, reporting of domestic public opinion in the People’s Daily began to 
increase, while articles pertaining to foreign public opinion gradually declined. In 1988, 
one year before the 1989 Tiananmen incident, reports that alluded to domestic public 
opinion reached a peak. A decade of decline followed, and then there was another peak in 
2000. This was one year before China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Reports that mentioned domestic public opinion remained steady from 2000 
onwards, then reached another peak in 2010. Regardless of the Party-state’s approach to 
dealing with domestic public opinion, this upward trend reveals the increasing extent to 
which the government felt the need to engage with public opinion – and with the 
emergent public sphere from which it was generated.   
Next, I explore how the central government tackled domestic public opinion. The 
purpose here is to ascertain the presence of an active counterpublic sphere. In the section 
on operationalization, I listed four kinds of public sphere in Table 2-1, based on the nature 
of the state’s response to public opinion, and argued that the occurrence of the fourth 
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outcome indicates the presence of a strong counterpublic sphere. In this section, I analyze 
change in frequency of the three approaches in the coding scheme and then match the 
patterns of the Chinese state’s response to public opinion to the four kinds of public 
sphere that were listed in Table 2-1. 
The results (as presented in Figure 2-2) show that the Chinese state’s methods of 
responding to public opinion changed drastically over time. Between 1949 and 1986, the 
government seldom acknowledged, let alone dealt with public opinion. This pattern 
indicates the absence of a noticeable public sphere. On the few occasions when public 
opinion was addressed, the government simply saw it as something that needed to be 
controlled. As articles in the People’s Daily in this period demonstrate, the state 
considered public opinion as “counter-revolutionary” and saw a necessity to control it.  
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Figure 2-2: Approaches to public opinion (n=868). 
 
But in 1987, a new trend emerged. The central state took a new, affirmative 
approach to public opinion, re-framing it as a check of political power operating on behalf 
of citizens. An in-depth reading of articles in the People’s Daily reveals that, between 
1987 and the 1989 Tiananmen incident, the CCP leaders not only acknowledged the 
diversity of public opinion, but also endorsed the right of citizens to formulate public 
opinion to ensure that the government operated for the benefit of citizens. Figure 2-2 
shows that public opinion was seen by the state as a check of political power much more 
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frequently than as something that needed to be controlled during this period. This pattern 
reveals the existence of a non-oppositional public sphere. The central government’s shift 
away from a simply restrictive approach to an affirmative approach that saw public 
opinion as a check of political power suggested the existence of an influential national 
public sphere that was not perceived by the central government as threatening or 
oppositional to its authoritarian rule. 
The state’s reaction to public opinion changed once again after the Tiananmen 
incident. In the following decade, particularly between 1993 and 1997, the state 
frequently saw public opinion as something that needed to be controlled, and infrequently 
regarded public opinion as a check of political power. This pattern indicates a public 
sphere considered antagonistic to the state, but generally weak. The influence of this 
sphere was limited insofar as the state did not need to compromise with and/or satisfy the 
demands made within that sphere.  
The period from 1998 to 2004 is characterized by the state’s frequent use of 
affirmative approaches and infrequent use of a restrictive approach. This pattern indicates 
a non-oppositional public sphere, similar to the pattern between 1987 and 1989. As Figure 
2-2 demonstrates, the importance of the restrictive approach slightly decreased in this 
period relative to the period from 1994 to 1997, whereas the importance of the affirmative 
approach that saw public opinion as a check of political power increased. This time, the 
central state’s recognition of public opinion as a check of political power lasted longer 
compared with the situation in the late 1980s. At the same time, as Figure 2-2 shows, the 
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central state also recognized public opinion as something that needed to be understood or 
addressed. Even though this positive approach is not as progressive as the approach that 
sees public opinion as a check of political power, the state at least demonstrated its 
willingness to take public opinion into consideration. Although it still sometimes took a 
restrictive approach to domestic public opinion, the central state gave a much larger space 
to public opinion and did not see public opinion as threatening to its rule. 
As Figure 2-2 shows, a new pattern indicating a strong counterpublic sphere 
emerged in the post-2005 period, when the central state took an increasingly restrictive 
approach to public opinion. The frequency of this negative approach reached its highest 
level in the PRC’s history in 2010. The central state also attempted to downplay the 
affirmative approach that saw public opinion as a check of political power. The decline of 
this affirmative approach and the rise of the restrictive approach were consistent from the 
perspective of the central state, if its aim was to suppress public opinion. Nevertheless, 
although the central state continued to heavily rely on the restrictive approach, it began to 
treat public opinion as a check of political power more frequently from 2008 onwards. At 
the same time, the state continued to see public opinion as something that needed to be 
understood. The importance of the two affirmative approaches also reached a peak in the 
period between 2005 and 2010.  
This period is the only time in the PRC’s history when restrictive and affirmative 
approaches both increased simultaneously and drastically. In the previous section, I 
proposed that when an authoritarian state frequently adopts both restrictive and 
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affirmative responses to public opinion, this serves as a valid indication of the existence 
of an influential nationwide counterpublic sphere. The above evidence shows that 
between 2005 and 2010, the state attempted – often in a somewhat contradictory manner 
– both to control public opinion, but also to acknowledge it as an independent and 
influential force to be reckoned with. In comparison, during the previous periods of 
1987-1989 and 1998-2004, the state approached public opinion positively, but did not 
simultaneously see it as a serious threat to CCP rule. The state was able to adopt a more 
positive response during those earlier periods precisely because it saw such a stance as of 
little consequence; this contrasts to today, when its “positivity” vis-à-vis public opinion 
appears to be much more coerced or begrudging – to the extent that it acknowledges 
public opinion now, it does so because it has to. This new pattern provides powerful 
evidence of something entirely new – a flourishing nationwide counterpublic sphere. I 
summarize my findings of the Chinese state’s response to public opinion in Table 2-2. 
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TABLE 2-2: The State’s Response to Public opinion, 1949-2010. 
The Chinese state’s reaction to public 
opinion 
























Figure 2-3 presents how the central state perceived the relevance of actors in 
producing public opinion over time. The results show the central importance of journalists 
and news media before 2005. Whether the state took an affirmative approach or a 
restrictive approach to public opinion, the state perceived news media and journalists as 
key players generating public opinion. When the state treated public opinion as a check of 
political power, news media and journalists were accorded power to collect public 
opinion from citizens and speak for the people. When the state took a restrictive approach, 
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the state regarded news media and journalists as instruments to inhibit undesirable public 
opinion and redirect it.  
A new trend, however, has unfolded since 2005, as netizens have emerged as critical 
actors producing public opinion. Indeed, since 2009, the government has perceived 
netizens’ role in forming public opinion as even more significant than that of journalists 
and news media. The importance attributed to netizens even outweighs that given to the 
general category of “citizens” now. Juxtaposing Figures 2-2 and 2-3, it can be seen that 
this shift in the state’s perception of netizens as important actors generating public 
opinion coincides with the period when both restrictive and affirmative approaches to 
public opinion climbed. Moreover, 2009 was the year that the central state began to view 
netizens as even more important than news media and journalists, and when it shifted to 
reconsider public opinion as a check of political power. This concurrence strongly 
suggests the rise of grassroots public opinion generated by netizens, and the recognition 
by the state that this public opinion was no longer something it could completely control.  
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Figure 2-3: The most relevant actors to public opinion (n=868). 
 
2.2. SITUATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Having established the development of public opinion in China over time, I now 
situate the results in China’s broader historical context in order to facilitate understanding 
of how the development of public opinion is related to the macro-political environment 
and institutional processes. As I stated in Chapter 1, both macro-level conditions and 
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meso-level institutional processes are indispensable to account for the rise of the 
counterpublic sphere in China.  
Previous literature suggests that macro-political conditions – the broad political 
context in which political actors make their decisions – can impact institution-building, 
the formation of public opinion, and the development of the public sphere (Anderson and 
Paskeviciute 2005; Eley 1992:304-305). Macro-political conditions are influenced by 
domestic and international politics. Even within an authoritarian country, the 
macro-political environment can vary. A more liberal political condition facilitates the 
growth of public opinion. Citizens may be empowered by liberal ideologies not 
previously or widely available, and feel more comfortable to discuss political issues 
(Anderson and Paskeviciute 2005; Eley 1992:304-5). Likewise, government officials in 
such a relatively liberal climate are more likely to see public opinion as inputs to address 
social problems, rather than political threats. Habermas’s analysis of the rise of the public 
sphere in France reveals that it was only after the French Revolution, when the political 
climate drastically shifted, that the public sphere became influential (Habermas 1989: 67). 
Conversely, a conservative political condition discourages the production and 
dissemination of public opinion in general, lowers the likelihood that authoritarian rulers 
will take an affirmative approach to public opinion, but increases the chance that they will 
move to restrict it.  
Nonetheless, considering macro-political conditions alone cannot fully explain a 
paradoxical pattern – specifically, why the state frequently takes both restrictive and 
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affirmative approaches to handle public opinion within the same period of time. This is 
where the effects of institutions become salient. As theorized in Chapter 1, the state’s 
attempt to solve governance problems through institution-building may trigger 
unexpected changes. Of particular relevance to this study, the building of institutions in 
the media and legal fields is critical to the development of the public sphere because these 
fields provide the fundamental infrastructure of the public sphere. Legal institutions 
provide important symbolic resources and a framework for social critique, while actors in 
the media field serve as important mediators in formulating and disseminating public 
opinion (Alexander 2006; Cohen and Arato 1992; Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980; Somers 
1993; Woo and Gallagher 2011). If institution-building does, indeed, facilitate the 
development of the public sphere, then one should see the emergence of such a sphere 
even when the macro-political conditions are not favorable. I argue that this is precisely 
what happened.  
Next, I turn to the fluctuation of China’s macro-political conditions and the 
institutional processes in the media and legal field between 1949 and 2010. To investigate 
shifts in macro-political conditions over time, I referred to the Freedom House Civil 
Liberties Index (1972-2010), official statistics regarding national security and social order 
crime in the Law Yearbooks of China (1996-2009), and important policies and decisions 
of the CCP. To study institutional development, I examined existing literature that 
chronicles how the Chinese state built media and legal institutions (Cai and Wang 2008; 
Peng 2005; Tai 2006; Wu and Liu 2009; Yang 2009; Zhao 1998; 2008). In addition, I 
referred to important reports prepared by top CCP leaders, such as their reports to the 
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Party Congress; these reports summarize institutional development and have a huge 
impact on subsequent institution-building.  
In order to explore the relationship between macro-political conditions and 
institutional development in the media and legal fields, on the one hand, and the 
development of China’s public sphere, on the other hand, I parse the PRC’s history into 
the following five periods: (1) 1949-1976, (2) 1977-1989, (3) 1989-1997, (4) 1998-2004, 
and (5) 2005 -2010. This periodization is based on shifts in the development of public 
opinion, as discussed in the first part of the chapter. I examine the macro-political 
conditions and institutional development in the media and legal fields only insofar as they 
relate to the development of the public sphere in China, so my discussion is necessarily 
schematic. 
2.2.1. Macro-Political Conditions 
1949-1976 
The political climate from 1949 to 1976 was conservative due to both international 
and domestic conditions. Internationally, the PRC was not recognized by the United 
Nations as the legitimate representative of China until 1971.
2
 Domestically, the Great 
Leap Forward movement led to the Great Chinese Famine between 1958 and 1961, which, 
combined, are considered by some historians to constitute one of the nation’s most 
devastating catastrophes given the violent nature of the movement and the millions of 
                                                 
2
 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 25 October 1971. 
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deaths involved (Dikötter 2010). Dissonance within the CCP leadership in the Great Leap 
Forward movement ultimately triggered the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which led 
to the unraveling of established institutions.  
1977-1989 
The political climate shifted in a liberal direction after the end of the Cultural 
Revolution and remained so until the 1989 Tiananmen incident. After that, a more liberal 
political climate did not reappear again until 1998. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee in 1978 shifted the CCP’s focus from class struggle to economic 
reform. Facing corruption, social problems, and periodic economic downturns that 
accompanied the decade-long economic reform, CCP reformist ruling elites saw the 
necessity of political reform and formulated a detailed and progressive proposal in the 
Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. This unprecedented political reform program 
promoted separation of the Party from the state, decentralization of political power, 
reform of government organizations and cadre system, enhancement of institutions to 
build socialist democracy, improvement of legal institutions, and, most relevant to this 
dissertation, the establishment of institutions to facilitate societal negotiation and 
dialogue.  
1990-1997 and 1998-2004 
This bold political reform program was withdrawn from the political agenda in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis, however, as such reform was now considered 
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detrimental to the CCP’s monopoly of power. The Tiananmen incident, the collapse of the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union all 
reminded party leaders of the fatal consequences of losing firm political control 
(Shambaugh 2008:76-77).
3
 Learning from these lessons, the party leadership reached a 
consensus that further advancement of China’s economic development did not require 
commensurate political reform. With the deepening of economic reform and China’s 
remarkable economic growth, the political climate became relatively less conservative by 
1998, but fundamental political reform has yet to be placed on the CCP agenda again 
since 1989.  
2005-2010 
There was a significant shift in macro-political conditions after 2005. The policy of 
the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration became clear after the Fourth Plenum of the 16
th
 
Central Committee in September 2004. To address the widespread social tension and 
unrest that accompanied economic reform, the Hu-Wen leadership proposed an agenda of 
building a harmonious society that sought balance between economic development and 
social stability. On the one hand, the central leadership adopted economic and social 
policies that accentuated the sustainability of economic development and equity, instead 
of simply GDP growth. Similarly, particular attention was accorded to social groups who 
were not benefiting from the economic reform. At the same time, however, instead of 
                                                 
3
 In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, the General Secretary Jiang Zemin said that the political 
transformation in Eastern Europe reminded Chinese leaders that stability is the foremost agenda. See China 
Journalism Yearbook, 1990, pp.2-3.  
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initiating political reform, the Hu-Wen leadership emphasized the critical importance of 
social order and stability,
4
 tightening political control over state and society in order to 
address escalating social conflicts (Cai 2008; Saich 2006).  
In addition to domestic social tension, international political conditions, particularly 
the so-called “color revolutions” in Central Asia during the early 2000s, also contributed 
to Hu-Wen’s political polices and their implementation (Carothers 2006; Saich 2006; 
Shambaugh 2008:88).
5
 Participants in the “color revolutions” protested against 
governments that were considered corrupt or authoritarian. Some of these protests, such 
as those in Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003, led to the resignation of ruling elites. 
The central state connected these revolutions demanding democratization in Eastern 
European countries and considered them contagious. For the Chinese government, these 
international incidents and political influence from the West were seen as threats to 
China’s domestic stability. The state further regarded foreign media as important actors 
who contributed to such revolutionary movements by spreading liberal ideologies. The 
central state believed that the most effective way to prevent China from being influenced 
by these precarious international developments was to increase political control.
6
 This 
logic is consistent with the way in which the CCP leaders tackled the political crisis in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen incident.  
                                                 
4
 People’s Daily, 2 February 2005. 
5
 “Color revolutions” refer to several movements that caused regime change in several post-Soviet countries 
during the early 2000s. In these movements, protesters protest against governments that were perceived as 
corrupt or authoritarian. 
6
 People’s Daily, 3 April 2005 and 21 April 2005. 
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To demonstrate that the Chinese state did implement measures to strengthen political 
control, I collected available official national statistics on national security crimes and 
social order crimes. The Chinese government, similar to many authoritarian states, often 
uses criminal laws to prosecute individuals who are considered threats to the authoritarian 
rule and social stability. The statistics shown in Figures 2-4 and 2-5 clearly show that the 
number of people who were accused of security and social order crimes rose drastically in 
the post-2005 period. The above evidence, as a whole, indicates the deterioration of the 
political climate and the escalation of state political control since 2005.  
  
 




Figure 2-4: Individuals accused of national security crimes. 
Source: Law Yearbooks of China (1996-2010). 
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Figure 2-5: Individuals accused of social order crime. 
Source: Law Yearbooks of China (1996-2010). 
 
2.2.2. Institution-Building in the Media and Legal Fields  
Although the media and law have distinct development trajectories, 
institution-building in both fields was part of the state’s response to the same crisis in the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. In addition, since the central state deliberately 
connected the two institutions, locating their development on the same timeline helps us 
to understand how and why the Chinese state made this connection.    
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1949-1976 
The media and legal fields in China developed little and even degenerated 
significantly between 1949 and 1976. Many newspapers ceased publication during the 
Cultural Revolution. Given that only four national and thirty-eight local newspapers 
operated in the entire country in 1968, it is understandable why scholars have called the 
Cultural Revolution the “the dark age of Chinese journalism” (Zhao 1998:32).
7
 The 
development of the legal field was no better. The National People’s Congress did not pass 
any laws except for the 1975 constitution during the two decades from the 1957 
anti-rightist movement to the end of the Cultural Revolution. Mass mobilization and class 
struggle prevailed over legal principle (Wang 2010:5; Wu and Liu 2009:16). China 
existed in an essentially “lawless” state (Wang 2010:1).  
1977-1989    
In 1978, declaring the extreme concentration of power or “rule of man” to have been  
a major cause of the Cultural Revolution, CCP leaders announced China’s return to the 
rule of law. Moreover, reacting to the crisis and backwardness in nearly every aspect of 
life, the CCP leadership declared the goal of achieving modernization under socialism 
through economic reform and an “open door” policy. This policy shift unleashed China’s 
transition to a market economy. The building of the market economy required the 
                                                 
7
 Chinese Journalism Yearbook, 1982. 
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development of a compatible legal infrastructure and eventually incorporated the agenda 
of media marketization (Zhao 1998:53).   
Between 1978 and 1989, institution-building in the media and legal fields was at a 
preliminary stage. The number of newspapers climbed from 42 to 382 between 1968 and 
1980.
8
 The freedom of the press was the main focus of those in the media field, but 
progress remained limited to theoretical discussion and institution design, such as the 
drafting of the Media Law – the most fundamental law that provides institutional 
protection for media and journalists. Actual institutionalization of press freedom was 
interrupted by the Tiananmen incident (Zhao 1998:45-47). There were, however, several 
important breakthroughs that laid a critical institutional foundation for the development of 
public opinion in the future. In his report at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987, Zhao 
Ziyang, then CCP General Secretary, presented his proposal to establish an institution for 
societal negotiation and dialogue as part of the political reform program. Three elements 
in the proposal were of critical importance. First, the state should inform people of 
important events. Second, important issues should be discussed by people. Negotiation 
and dialogue should be conducted among people, and between people and the government 
at national, local, and grassroots levels. Third, the media should play a critical role in 
mediating societal negotiation and dialogue. In addition, media should support 
“supervision by public opinion (yulun jiandu),” by denouncing the wrongdoing of 
bureaucrats. In short, Zhao was proposing that the media should facilitate the formation of 
                                                 
8
 Chinese Journalism Yearbook, 1982. 
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public opinion and its ability to serve as a check to political power. Importantly, this is the 
very first time “supervision by public opinion” was incorporated into an important 
document by the central state (Xu 2011). 
Legal institutions, including legislation, prosecutors’ offices, and courts, were rebuilt 
between 1978 and 1989. The landmark in this period is the adoption of the 1982 
Constitution, which legally ended the Cultural Revolution and confirmed the economic 
reform and open-door policy (Cai 2010:51). The 1982 Constitution served as the 
foundational infrastructure that aided China’s transition to a market economy. It is 
noteworthy that the development in the legal field was not independent from that in the 
media field. The central government clearly stressed the supportive relationship between 
the two fields by connecting the concepts of “supervision by public opinion (yulun 
jiandu)” and “supervision in accordance with law (falu jiandu),” both of which appeared 
in Zhao Ziyang’s Thirteenth Party Congress report. According to Hu Jiwei, former 
editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, the crux lies in Article 41 of the 1982 constitution, 
which states citizen have the “right of supervision” or “the right to make to relevant state 
organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction 
of duty by any state organ or functionary.” In other words, citizens have the right to watch 
whether the state follows the law. Importantly, CCP top leaders saw media a critical tool 
for citizens to exercise their “right of supervision” for two reasons. First, media helps to 
disseminate legal knowledge and raise legal consciousness. In the absence of legal 
knowledge and consciousness, citizens would not know their rights or whether the 
government was violating any laws. Second, media is essential for formulating and 
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disseminating public opinion that exposes the wrongdoing of the government. This 
exposure helps to trigger legal procedures to correct problems. Essentially, CCP leaders 
thought media would help to deepen the development of the legal field. At the same time, 
the central state also emphasized the need for legislation to ensure that relevant actors, 
especially media and journalists, could safely and properly play their roles in conducting 




The Tiananmen incident did not halt the state-led economic reform and ongoing 
institution-building, though it did contribute to CCP leaders’ insistence on the Party’s 
monopolistic control of political power. As a result, critical institutional design that 
enables autonomy in both the media and legal fields has been lacking. After Deng 
Xiaoping’s influential southern tour in 1992, the economic reform agenda was 
reconfirmed. The Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992 further recognized the concept of a 
socialist market economy and stated its goal of focusing on the development of the 
country’s service industry. Later, the State Planning Commission officially categorized 
the news industry as part of the service industry. Media marketization unfolded rapidly 
after 1992. The demand for media services rose along with the increase in the purchasing 
power of urban dwellers. This led to a tremendous expansion in the number of 
newspapers (Zhao 1998:47-53; 2000b). With the goal of maximizing revenue, it became 
                                                 
9
 People’s Daily, 19 October 1087, 19 November 1987, 2 January 1988, 28 January 1988, 28 July 1988, 28 
September 1988,19 December 1988, 31 January 1989, 25 February 1989, and 29 March 1989. 
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necessary for media to satisfy consumers’ preferences through reporting news that was 
interesting or critical to consumers, such as news related to corruption as well as citizens’ 
private interests and rights. Yet, media still operated within the state apparatus. Journalists 
needed to follow the Party line and the state greatly updated its control mechanisms over 
the press and journalists (Esarey 2005). What should be noted is that, although the central 
state frequently emphasized the need to shape public opinion after the Tiananmen incident, 
the concept of “supervision by public opinion,” surprisingly, remained in Jiang Zemin’s 
reports at the Fourteen, Fifteen and Sixteen Party Congress in 1992, 1997 and 2002, 
respectively.  
The Tiananmen incident did not interrupt the building of China’s legal institutions. 
The central state completed the task of building a basic legal framework in the mid-1990s 
(Wang 2010:44). The completion of this infrastructure was critical for China’s subsequent 
accession to the WTO in 2001. In the 1989 to 1997 period, many procedural and 
substantive laws of direct relevance for ordinary citizens were enacted as well, such as 
Administrative Procedure Law, Civil Procedure Law, Criminal Procedure Law, Law on 
Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, Trade Union Law, Labor law, and Organic 
Law of the Villagers Committees. The media’s reporting of these laws and of cases in 
which citizens fought for their rights and watched over the actions of bureaucrats turned 
the abstract concept of law into something more relevant to ordinary people’s lives, as 
well as to their concrete interests and rights. In addition, the principle of “ruling the 
country in accordance with the law (yifazhiguo)” was endorsed by the Fifteenth Party 
Congress in 1997 and added to the constitution in 1999. 
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 Of particular importance to the development of the public sphere is that, despite the 
Tiananmen incident, top leaders in the legal field, for instance, the Vice 
Procurator-General of Supreme People’s Procuratorate Xiao Yang, still emphasized the 
complementary relationship between legal and media institutions and between 
“supervision by public opinion” and “supervision in accordance with the law.”
10
 Jiang 
Zemin’s speech at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 also mentioned the combination 
of the two types of supervision.  
1998-2004 
Since 1998, media and legal institutions have continued to develop. Three 
developments are critically important. First, despite the state’s continuing political control, 
institutional resources that can be mobilized by journalists and citizens to generate public 
opinion have been increasing. For instance, although a national-level journalism law has 
not been enacted, the concept of “supervision by public opinion” was incorporated into 
local laws in many provinces (Wang 2009).  
The second, arguably even more critical, development occurred in the early 2000s, 
when the Internet became a core component of China’s media field. Although the Chinese 
state connected China to the Internet as early as 1994 and endeavored to enhance the 
Internet infrastructure, Internet media did not attain full development in China until the 
early 2000s, due to the lack of feasible business models and the bursting of the so-called 
“dot-com bubble” (Peng 2005:94). But since 2003, businesses that operate Internet news, 
                                                 
10
 People’s Daily, 7 December 1992. 
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online communities, social media, and blogs have prospered and received tremendous 
revenues from advertisement. To be sure, regulation and control of the Internet has 
remained stringent at the same time. 
The third critical development is China’s accession to the WTO. Two decades 
following China’s economic reform, China completed its WTO negotiations and jointed 
the WTO in 2001. As the WTO framework requires a high-level of institutionalization, 
especially in the legal field, China’s accession reflects the maturity of China’s 
institutional building.  
2.2.3. Macro-Political Condition, Institution-Building and the (Counter)Public 
Sphere 
Macro-political conditions are closely associated with the development of the public 
sphere in China before 2005. The macro-political climate was harsh in the early 
state-building period between 1949 and 1976, due to the PRC’s lack of international 
legitimacy and intense domestic conflicts. As expected, domestic public opinion was 
nearly absent in the People’s Daily during this time. What was reported was foreign 
public opinion that either supported the PRC and its alliances, or criticized “Western  
imperialism” and the Kuomintang before the PRC’s sovereignty was recognized by the 
United Nations. In addition, as Figure 2-1 showed above, the very few occasions 
(1957-1958, 1966-1970, 1976) when domestic public opinion was reported all occurred in 
the context of mass mobilization – the 1957 anti-rightists movement and the Cultural 
Revolution. On these occasions, CCP top leaders used the People’s Daily to combat 
 
   85 
 
“counter-revolutionary public opinion,” seeing public opinion as something that needed to 
be controlled.  
The association between macro-political conditions and public opinion continued 
after the end of Cultural Revolution until 2004. Reports that contained “public opinion” in 
the title increased markedly in two periods when political climate was relatively liberal 
(1977-1989 and 1998-2004). In addition, public opinion was more often seen by the 
central state as a check of political power and less frequently as something that needed to 
be controlled during these periods. In contrast, the period between 1990 and 1997, the 
decade in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, witnessed the decline of the public 
sphere in general and of the state’s affirmative response to public opinion, as well as the 
rise of the state’s restrictive response. The only exception is the year 1992, when Deng 
Xiaoping declared the CCP’s stance on economic reform in his famous southern tour. His 
statement was read by Party elitists and journalists as a signal for continuing 
marketization.  
In addition to macro-political conditions, institution-building also contributed to the 
growth of public opinion in the period from 1977 to 2004. In the decade after the 
Tiananmen incident, although the political climate was conservative, the number of 
reports that addressed public opinion in general or that saw public opinion as a check of 
political power is still higher than that in the pre-reform era and the first half of the 1980s. 
This is because the reformist leaders, on important occasions and in key texts, emphasized 
the media’s role in mediating public opinion to check political power, while also 
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grounding their arguments in accordance with the 1982 Constitution. Reformist leaders’ 
arguments resonated with many journalists. Despite the Tiananmen crackdown and the 
purge of reformists afterward, the reformists’ institutional creation continued to be 
recognized and mobilized. Comparing the two relatively liberal periods – 1977-1987 and 
1998-2004, reveals that the state saw public opinion as not only a check of political power, 
but also as something that needed to be understood and addressed in the latter period, in 
which institutions were more developed.  
In the 2005 to 2010 period, however, macro-political conditions were not closely 
associated with the development of the public sphere. One would expect that a restrictive 
political climate would decrease the production and dissemination of public opinion in 
general and the likelihood that authoritarian rulers would take an affirmative approach to 
public opinion, but increase the chance that rulers would seek to control public opinion. 
Contrary to this expectation, public opinion has continued to grow regardless of the 
political climate. The state has drastically increased its efforts to control public opinion, 
but paradoxically – though perhaps out of necessity – it has also frequently taken an 
affirmative approach when responding to public opinion, revealing the shift towards 
seeing such opinion as a check of political power and something that needs to be 
understood.  
The insufficiency of macro-political conditions in accounting for the rise of the 
counterpublic opinion in the post-2005 period points to the necessity to investigate 
whether and how institutional processes in the media and legal fields contributed to the 
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rise of the counterpublic sphere. At first glance, the adoption and diffusion of the Internet 
seems to be the cause that led to the counterpublic sphere. Figure 2-3 does show that with 
the development of the Internet, netizens began to be seen by the Chinese government as 
the most relevant actors in producing public opinion in 2000, and their perceived 
importance has only increased since 2005. Concurrently, the importance of news media 
and journalists as mediators in producing public opinion has decreased. It is clear that the 
Internet has made it difficult for the government to rely solely on a restrictive approach to 
address public opinion. Nonetheless, as I will demonstrate in detail in the following 
chapters, the Internet did not lead in a simplistic way to the counterpublic sphere. The 
recently emergent counterpublic sphere is actually rooted in pre-existing  
institution-building and non-oppositional public spheres before 2005. Although the 
macro-political conditions have fluctuated over time, the Chinese state’s 
institution-building in the media and legal field has impeded its own efforts to dominate 
the public sphere. Institution-building processes have created the opportunity for critical 
political culture and elite networks comprised of media and legal professionals to grow 
and expand. The Internet further spread the culture and networks to ordinary citizens. 
Even though the role of news media and journalists in mediating the formation of public 
opinion seems to have decreased, they have exerted influence in less noticeable ways. In 
short, the current rise of the counterpublic sphere in China is the result of a series of 
interconnected institutional, cultural, and social processes over time that were accelerated 
and amplified by the Internet.  
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2.3. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have operationalized and empirically examined the abstract concept 
of counterpublic sphere. I have proposed that the pattern of the state’s response to public 
opinion serves as a valid indication of a flourishing national counterpublic sphere. 
Drawing upon content analysis of the People’s Daily between 1946 and 2010, I have 
established the existence of a flourishing nationwide counterpublic sphere and the novelty 
of this phenomenon in the PRC’s history. This is one of the very first efforts that 
systematically traces and analyzes the rise of public opinion and the counterpublic sphere 
in the PRC. I have also situated the development of public opinion in China in relation to 
macro-political conditions and institutional processes in the media and legal fields. I have 
shown that, although shifts in macro-political political conditions explain the 
development of China’s public sphere between 1949 and 2004, it cannot explain the rise 
of China’s counterpublic sphere since 2005, when the Chinese state started to tighten 
political control. The insufficiency of macro-political conditions in explaining the takeoff 
of China’s counterpublic sphere reveals the need to analyze the relationship between 
institutional processes and the development of public opinion. In the following three 
empirical chapters, I will detail how the state’s institution building in the legal and media 
fields contributed to the subsequent development of China’s counterpublic sphere.
 




Disseminating Law to the Populace: From Lawlessness to the Emergence of A 
Nationwide Symbolic Structure Based On Laws and Rights 
In this chapter, I aim to explain the origin and diffusion of the symbolic structure of 
China’s public sphere. Explaining the development of a public sphere requires a 
specification of its medium, understood as the cultural grid of the public sphere, as well as 
an account of where this medium originates from and how this medium is diffused to and 
accepted by actors in the public sphere. This is because the cultural medium plays a critical 
role in constituting publics, as well as structuring communication, conducting persuasion 
and exerting political influence within, across, and beyond publics (Emirbayer and Sheller 
1999). The limited empirical research that has addressed this question in the West has 
shown that this medium, to a large extent, grows from outside the state. Indeed, the state has 
tended to play a marginal role in the process (Alexander 2006; Habermas 1989:56). This 
seems to suggest that the absence of an interventionist state is a critical condition for the 
medium of the public sphere to develop.  
Contrary to this view, I will argue that we need to investigate the role of the state in 
building institutions in order to understand how the symbolic structure of the public and 
counterpublic spheres was established in China. In order to make this argument, I first 
review literature that explains the medium of the public sphere, pointing out its 
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inadequacy in explaining the Chinese case. Then, I suggest that the state can contribute to 
the development of a shared symbolic structure through building legal institutions. Next, I 
review my data analysis strategy. After that, I present the results of my empirical analysis, 
showing why and how the Chinese established a symbolic structure based on laws and 
rights that penetrates society. Finally, I summarize the research findings and discuss their 
contribution to the existing literature. 
3.1.   THEORIZING THE CULTURAL MEDIUM OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
In this section, I review the literature that explains the cultural medium of the public 
sphere, arguing that the marginal role of the state outlined in previous literature does not 
fit the Chinese case. Next, I contend that although previous studies suggest the critical 
role that law could play as a penetrative and integrative medium in the public sphere, they 
are still inadequate to explain the Chinese case given their failure to also take media into 
consideration. Therefore, I suggest paying particular attention to how the Chinese state 
used media to develop the legal field, thereby shaping the cultural medium of the public 
(counterpublic) sphere. 
3.1.1. Relationships between Market, Society, State, and the Medium of the 
Public Sphere 
In Habermas’s historical study, rational-critical argument is the medium of the 
classic European public sphere. Habermas argues that the conjugal family, which 
emerged in the transition from feudalism to capitalist economy, produced rational agents 
who believed in their own independence, credited the autonomy of market, and came to 
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value the non-instrumental aspects of life. These private people were simultaneously 
property owners in the market and common human beings in the public sphere. Owing to 
cultivation in the conjugal family, private people acquired rationality and capability to 
conduct rational and critical argument in public forums (Habermas 1989:46-47). In his 
analysis, Habermas does allude to the state in the development of the European bourgeois 
public sphere. The state created private law to ensure that private persons could control 
their property and freely engage in transaction. Private law thus guaranteed that private 
people could pursue their affairs free from impositions of the state (Habermas 
1989:74-75). In essence, with the emergence of the market and the withdrawal of the state, 
the conjugal family was able to establish and diffuse the medium of the public sphere.  
Many scholars of the public sphere consider Habermas’s treatment inadequately 
sociological. They are unsatisfied with Habermas’s reliance on the rise of rationality to 
explain the emergence of the public sphere and his later use of an idealized theory of 
communication to generalize the existence of rationality. These scholars advocate a 
cultural approach grounded in the new cultural sociology and cultural history to study the 
milieu of the public sphere. They contend that recognizing the analytic autonomy of 
culture in the study of the public sphere is important because culture is not only the 
context of action, but also exerts independent causal force in shaping action (1992b; 1993; 
Alexander 1989; Calhoun 1992b:34; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Somers 1995; 
2008:193).  
One of the most prominent examples of this approach is Jeffery Alexander’s study of 
the “civil sphere” in the United States. Alexander (2006:53-57) argues that a set of binary 
codes that classify motives, relationships, and institutions into “civic” and “anti-civil” 
 
   92 
 
categories are the bedrock of this sphere, which sustains solidarity while also justifying 
the exclusion of those who are classified as “uncivilized.” According to Alexander 
(2006:56), this culture grid is the historical sediment of “a long and diverse series of 
nitty-gritty movements in social, intellectual and religious life – of classical Republican 
ideas, of Judaism, Christianity, and Protestantism, of Enlightenment and liberal thought, 
of the revolutionary, socialist, and common law tradition.” By mobilizing these shared 
binary codes, American people formulate concrete discourse of liberty and repression. 
This discourse exerts political influence through the mediation of institutions such as 
mass media, voting, and law. In comparison with Habermas’s study of Europe, the role of 
the market is less central in Alexander’s study, but we again see the presence of a robust 
civil society and the absence of an intrusive state.  
Since the structural conditions examined by Habermas and Alexander have not 
existed in China, their analysis of the medium or cultural grid of the public sphere may 
not be entirely generalizable to the Chinese case. Similar to countries in Europe, China 
experienced a transition to a market economy. In addition, the Chinese state made many 
private laws, albeit post-1978, to enable and expedite this transition. The crucial 
difference, however, is that the Chinese state did not take a non-interventionist approach. 
In comparison with the American case as described by Alexander, the Chinese state has 
not left much space for intellectual and religious life. Indeed, intellectuals have generally 
been repressed or cajoled by the state, and are considered a treacherous group by the state 
for their deep involvement in previous unrests (Unger 2006). Religious groups have 
always been targets of suppression (Potter 2003; Tong 2002). As a result, there was 
inadequate chance for the formation of a nationwide cultural structure from the bottom-up. 
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Nonetheless, this does not preclude the possibility that a cultural grid could be imposed 
unilaterally from the top by the state, and then become a medium that aids individuals to 
find commonality, constitute a community, and address common concerns. As Sewell 
(2005:56) reminds us, centralized and wealthy institutional actors, especially the state, are 
cultural actors with remarkable resources to order meanings, even as they have varying 
success in controlling the coherence of cultural practice. In short, the omnipresence of the 
state in the Chinese case demands an explanation of the symbolic structure of the public 
sphere that takes the role of the state into consideration and that considers outcomes the 
state may or may not have intended.   
3.1.2. The Possibility of Law  
Although Habermas’s and Alexander’s studies are not entirely generalizable to the 
Chinese context, it is worth noting their shared observation that the development of the 
legal system may have important consequences for the public sphere. In both of their 
analyses, law is perceived as a factor that impacts how the medium of the public sphere 
developed. For Habermas, private law ensured market operation and private autonomy in 
Europe, making it possible for rationality to be cultivated in the private sphere. Habermas 
broadened this analysis in his later scholarship, arguing that law specializes in social 
integration. He states that “the language of law brings ordinary communication from the 
public and private spheres and puts it into a form in which these messages can also be 
received by the special codes of autopoietic systems and vice versa” (Habermas 
1996:353-354).  
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For Alexander, the common law tradition influenced the cultural medium of American 
society. Law, as opposed to power, is classified as a “civil” institution with universal “civil 
force” (Alexander 2006:59). On the one hand, law is an artifact that reflects universal 
solidarity; on the other, law universalizes things and morality through its stipulation and 
case-by-case application (Alexander 2006:153). Alexander also points out the penetration 
of law in each sphere of life. He cites Lawrence Freeman’s finding in Total Justice 
(1985:33), that “the legal system [had become] part of the general culture, the general 
political system, the general economy.” This observation is shared by other American law 
and society scholars (Rosenberg 1991; Scheingold 1974). Although these scholars have 
divergent views on the impact of law and rights on social change on the ground, they 
agree that the American legal tradition has produced a widespread “myth of rights” 
among Americans, who believe they have inalienable rights and that everyone is equal 
under the law. 
Margaret Somers’s (1993; 1994) studies of citizenship rights provide perhaps the 
most insightful and concrete analysis of the relationship between law, citizenship rights, 





 centuries in England suggests that the legal revolution initiated by the English 
crown created both national and local public spheres as well as a national political culture 
based on rights with local variations. According to Somers, in the pre-modern 
state-building process, the English crown created a national legal infrastructure by 
establishing a new territorial-wide public law (common law) from the top and 
appropriating pre-feudal local juridical and administrative bodies from below. These local 
bodies became public spheres – sites of participation, negotiation, and contestation, in 
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which local rules and conventions were reapplied to local communities through local 
administrators who became accountable to the crown. The result of this institutional 
revolution was the creation of a hybrid political culture which mingled national and local 
rules and practices. Inclusion in such a legal infrastructure meant having rights to access 
the public legal system and thus be free from the private power, particularly manors. This 
early state formation process and the theory of natural rights and property rights in the 
17
th
 century lead to the myths of the “free-born Englishman” and the ideology of the rule 
of law (Somers 1994). Somers’s (1993) study of eighteenth-century England also 
demonstrates the indispensability of national law and legal infrastructure in producing 
citizenship claims that constituted public spheres. 
The above literature suggests that law could play a potentially critical role vis-à-vis 
China’s emergent public and counterpublic spheres due to its integrative and penetrating 
capacity. The emerging counterpublic sphere in China is characterized by discourses and 
collective actions based on a variety of legal claims and forms of rights talk. In addition, 
scholars of Chinese studies have observed the rise of legal and rights consciousness 
amongst the Chinese people in recent years (Gallagher 2006; Goldman 2005:201; Lee 
2002; Lee 2007; O'Brien and Li 2006). Though valuable, existing studies remain too 
narrowly focused on certain social groups, mostly aggrieved workers and peasants, as 
well as on specific grievances. As such, they are insufficient to give a general account on 
the role of law in the development of China’s public sphere. 
Importantly, the integrative and penetrating capacity of law is not guaranteed. The 
work of Habermas, Alexander, and Somers all suggest that this capacity depends to a 
certain extent on law’s foundation outside the state. In medieval England, the penetration 
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and integration of the legal infrastructure relied heavily on rules, conventions, and the 
existing apparatus of local communities. As Somers states, the revolutionary feature of 
English legal institutions was their incorporation of local bodies and practices that were 
intact throughout the period of privatization under manoralism. Participation of non-state 
actors was also a critical characteristic of the English legal infrastructure. With these 
features, the English legal system was more likely to penetrate and integrate local 
communities (Somers 1994). According to Habermas (1989:75-6), codifications of civil 
law in seventh- and eighteenth-century continental Europe were not only in the interests 
of civil society, but also were often made after the deliberation of private people, despite 
the absence of parliaments at that time. In the contemporary context of liberal democracy, 
the political regime makes it more possible that law is not only a coercive regulation 
imposed and enforced by the state, but also a cultural and moral norm generated from the 
society (Alexander 2006:152; Habermas 1996). Given China’s authoritarian regime, the 
state’s imposition of a legal structure from the top, and the state’s dominant role in the 
legal system, where does law’s capacity come from? An adequate explanation of the 
Chinese case thus needs to address what makes law penetrative and integrative.  
3.1.3. The Mediating Role of Media in Creating a Legal Community  




 centuries is 
most similar to the Chinese case, as the active role of the English crown resembles that of 
the Chinese state. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the two cases. In 
the medieval English case, people interacted with each other in public spheres that were 
physically situated in local communities. By contrast, the Chinese case exists in the era of 
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“community without propinquity” (Calhoun 1998), in which communication institutions 
play a critical role in creating “imagined communities”(Anderson 1983). This critical 
difference requires us to examine the role of media in the Chinese case, in order to 
understand how law develops as a penetrative and integrative medium. Specifically, I argue 
that the media has played a key role, furthering the cultural capacity of law in China, 
despite the fact that the Chinese the legal system was imposed from the top by an 
authoritarian state without much social foundation from below. As Alexander (2006:191-2) 
remarks, law is subjected to interpretation not only in the legal system, but also in and 
through communication institutions, which often “stimulate and reflect the public’s opinion 
in an uneven, fragmented, and continuously shifting ways.”  
A number of scholars have studied the impact of media on legal institution. For 
instance, in the context of the United States, Haltom and McCann (2004:11) find that media 
reports about law often profoundly reshape or distort legal policymaking and ordinary legal 
practice. Scholars studying the Chinese context are divided. Stockmann and Gallagher 
(2011), for example, argue that, as the state’s mouthpiece and market players, Chinese 
media effectively disseminate law to citizens by conducting “positive propaganda” that 
touts the positive aspects of the Chinese legal system. Conversely, Liebman (2005) finds 
that media commercialization in China has resulted in incentives for the media to broaden 
the scope of critical reports, to challenge the Propaganda Department content regulations, 
and to influence court decision-making. My study operates at a different level, asking not 
whether the media is a pawn or a critic of the Chinese state, but how the media in China 
serves to diffuse and interpret law, effectively transforming it into a medium that integrates 
Chinese citizens and constitutes them as publics. 
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3.2. DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
Data Sources 
The major data sources that I analyzed in this chapter include:  
(1) Yearbooks and other official documents: I examined Chinese Journalism Yearbooks 
between 1983 and 2008, Law Yearbooks of China between 1987 and 2010, gazetteers 
published by local governments, and Party Congress reports. 
(2) Speeches and anthologies of CCP leaders: I examined speeches and anthologies of 
CCP leaders to investigate their actions and their rationales regarding how to address 
the crisis following the Cultural Revolution and rebuild China’s legal institutions.  
(3) Newspapers: I examined one national newspaper, the People’s Daily (1949-2010), 
and eleven local newspapers (2000- 2010) listed in Table 3-1. I selected the eleven 
local newspapers according to types of newspaper and geographical areas to make sure 
that I covered three main types of newspaper and newspapers in different geographic 
areas. “Daily newspapers” (ribao) are usually the official newspapers (i.e., mouthpieces) 
of local Party organs. They are obligated to disseminate CCP policies. Although they 
similarly belong to local Party organs, “evening newspapers” (wanbao) and 
“metropolis newspapers” (dushibao) tend to be more market oriented and to have more 
private subscribers (Zhao 2000b).
1
 Since available electronic archives of local 
                                                 
1
 “Evening newspapers” have long been more popular among citizens. A survey conducted in Beijing in 
1982 shows that the Beijing Evening News was the most popular newspaper in Beijing. 40.1% of the survey 
respondents reported that they liked the Beijing Evening News. In comparison, only 20.6 % survey 
respondents reported that they liked the Beijing Daily. See China Journalism Yearbook, 1982, p.277. In 
addition, 99.04% of the Beijing Evening News’s subscribers were individuals. In comparison, only 7.9% of 
the Beijing Daily’s subscribers were individuals in 1985. Although the surveys were conducted at different 
times, they show that “evening newspapers” were far more popular among ordinary citizens than “daily 
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(4) In-depth interviews: I also interviewed ten experienced journalists, as well as six legal 
scholars and lawyers. The purpose for these interviews was to understand the 
development of the legal field and its relationships with the development of the media 
field. Face-to-face interviews took place in Guangzhou and Beijing between 2009 and 
2011. 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
newspapers.” The latter heavily relied on organization subscribers. See China Journalism Yearbook, 1987, 
p.28. 
2
 Because of the availability of data, I cannot perfectly match my selection of newspapers according to type of 
newspaper and geographical areas. Nevertheless, the data still covers three types of newspapers in Beijing and 
Guangdong. 
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Beijing Daily (beijing ribao) Beijing 380,100  
Jiefang Daily (jiefang ribao) Shanghai 398,000  
Southern Daily (nanfang 
ribao) 
Guangdong 800,100  
Sichuan Daily (sichuan ribao) Sichuan 313,300 Sichuan has a large 
rural area.  
Beijing Evening News (beijing 
wanbao) 
Beijing 780,100 One of the four largest 
evening newspapers. 
Xinmin Evening News (xinmin 
wanbao) 
Shanghai 1,290,300 One of the four largest 
evening newspapers. 
Yangcheng Evening News 
(yangcheng wanbao) 
Guangdong 1,520,100 One of the four largest 
evening newspapers. 
Jin Evening News (jin 
wanbao) 
Tianjin 569,900 One of the four largest 
evening newspapers. 
Beijing Morning Post 
 (Beijing chenbao) 
Beijing 250,100  
Southern Metropolis Daily  
(nanfang dushibao) 
Guangdong 506,800  
The Strait Metropolis Daily 
(haixia dushibao) 
Fujian 172,900  
 
Data Analysis 
I read through yearbooks and other official documents, speeches and anthologies of 
CCP leaders, and interview notes and transcripts carefully to understand why and how the 
Chinese state established a symbolic structure based on laws and rights. To increase the 
validity of my analysis, I constantly compared different categories of data and interview 
data from different subjects. When areas of divergence occurred, I conducted follow-up 
interviews via telephone or e-mail to clarify and deepen my understanding of the data. 
                                                 
3
 China Journalism Yearbook 2001, p. 411-416. 
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Through this process of repeatedly analyzing and triangulating data, I was able to 
construct a narrative about how a symbolic structure based on laws and rights emerged in 
China and penetrated Chinese society. 
In order to ascertain the diffusion of discourses about law, I conducted content 
analysis for articles in the People’s Daily and the eleven selected local newspapers. I also 
retrieved news reports from the WiseNews data set. I used key words and synonyms of the 
keywords to select relevant news reports. One powerful feature of WiseNews is its 
integrated thesaurus. This feature allows for a comprehensive search by keywords. I then 
counted the number of reports.  
3.3. THE FORMATION OF A SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE BASED ON LAWS 
AND RIGHTS IN CHINA 
 In this section, I present the results of my empirical analysis, showing why and how 
the Chinese state established a symbolic structure based on laws and rights that penetrates 
society. Drawing on literature on the state, I make a case for starting the analysis at a 
critical moment in history, the end of the Cultural Revolution, because this was when 
CCP leaders began to rebuild the nation and reconstruct the state from what was 
essentially a lawless situation. I explore how and why law became a solution to the state’s 
crisis, and how a discourse of rights was diffused effectively in an authoritarian nation 
where law was previously abandoned and the concept of rights was foreign to the 
majority populace.  
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3.3.1. Crisis, the Structural Transformation of the State, and the Building of Legal 
Institutions 
Although China was essentially “lawless” in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution 
(Hu 1999:90; Wang 2010:5; Wu and Liu 2009:2), China began actively building its legal 
institutions in 1978. In 1999, PRC codified in the constitution both the principle of 
governance in accordance with law, and the goal of making China a socialist country 
under rule of law. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 demonstrates that China’s legal 
institutions are sophisticated enough to meet the demanding requirement of the WTO 
membership. Why did the CCP rulers decide to move from the “rule of man” or 
lawlessness toward “rule by law”? What is the nature of this legal institution-building 
project? British political scientist Colin Hay’s (1999) theorization of crisis and the 
structural transformation of the state helps to explain and understand this critical shift. 
Hay (1999:317) argues that crisis should be conceptualized as not only “a moment of 
fragmentation, dislocation or destruction,” but also as “a moment of decisive intervention.” 
In the process of narrating a structural crisis, a disaggregated state is reconstituted as a 
more unified and centralized agency, which constructs a new project of restructuring itself 
to address the crisis. This project sets a new developmental trajectory for the state and put 
the state in transition. Although Hay prudently restricts his analysis to crisis in the context 
of liberal democracy, his theorization of crisis explains very well China’s reform in the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, including its legal reform. His theorization also 
highlights the importance of the critical moment of crisis in order to understand the 
structural transformation of the Chinese state and the implications of such transformation. 
Hay outlines three scenarios in which a narration of crisis is likely to emerge; two of these 
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occurred in China with the end of the Cultural Revolution, when both social and political 
order were jeopardized. In addition, economic failure also imperiled the legitimacy of the 
state. During the critical time from October of 1976 to 1981, leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) continuingly constructed a narrative of a crisis acceptable to the 
core leadership.  
The CCP elites collectively constructed a narrative of crisis that was organized around 
the principles of stability (anding), unity (tuanjie), and modernization (xiandaihua). The 
first component of the narrative is the presence of a crisis. Although the “Gang of Four” – 
the most prominent political faction and the major “counter-revolutionary forces” during 
the Cultural Revolution–was smashed by the CCP leaders, a crisis still existed in the form 
of unstable leadership, a disrupted social order, and a plunging national economy. Yu Qiuli, 
the Vice Prime Minister, summarized the perceived precarious scenario well in October 
1977, when he charged that the “Gang of Four” had usurped political power, sabotaged 
production, and damaged the national economy. As a result, the national economy was at 
the edge of collapse, which could lead to the resurgence of capitalism. Meanwhile, the CCP 
also lost its great leader Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai in 1976. Everybody was 
anxious about the fate of the Party and the nation, as well as how to deal with the declining 
national economy.
4
 In a critical Party resolution, Party elites admitted that Party 
organizations at all levels were either partially or entirely paralyzed because of the 
pervasive class struggle during the Cultural Revolution.
5
 Deng Xiaoping emphasized the 
                                                 
4
 People’s Daily, 25 October 1977. 
5
 The title of the document is “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the 
Founding of the PRC”; it was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the CCP 11 Central Committee on 
June 27, 1981. Retrieved 31 December 2010 from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/04/content_2543544.htm. 
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negative consequences of the crisis on Chinese people’s material life, China’s economic 
and scientific development, modernization, and the power of the Chinese nation.
6
 In his 
speech in celebration of the 30
th
 anniversary of the PRC’s founding, Ye Jianying, the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, described the 
Cultural Revolution as a period of havoc, division, and bloody terror, and framed it as the 
most severe setback.
7
 It became a consensus among the CCP elites in 1981 that the 
Cultural Revolution was a period of domestic turmoil that brought the most severe 
catastrophe to the Party-state and Chinese people.
8
 The editorial of the People’s Daily in 
1978 explicitly framed the crisis as a threat to the PRC’s legitimacy and rule.
9
  
The second component of the collective narrative concerned the cause of the crisis and 
why this nasty, brutal, and nationwide “war of all against all” could not be prevented or 
rectified at an earlier stage. The appraisal of the cause was necessary but formidable. 
Proposing effective solutions rested upon a valid causal analysis, but a causal analysis 
inevitably required imputing blame and considering whether the crisis was inherent to the 
nature of socialism. At first, the Hua Guofeng government attempted to eschew the 
question of what caused the Cultural Revolution and who should bear political 
responsibility, lest any blame or repercussions fall on Hua himself. At the central working 
conference that aimed to prepare for the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
Committee in 1978, Hua instructed Party elites to discuss economic issues only. 
                                                 
6
 People’s Daily, 22 March 1978. 
7
 Retrieved 31 December 2010 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/05/content_2549765.htm.  
8
 “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the PRC.” 
9
 People’s Daily, 25 December 1978 
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Nevertheless, the meeting deviated from Hua’s plan, with influential Party elites 
demanding to discuss the Cultural Revolution. These CCP elites asserted that, without 
addressing critical historical and political issues, it would be difficult to consolidate Party 
members and the nation, as well as to concentrate on the task of achieving economic 
development and modernization. Hua could not reject this request (Cheng, Wang, and Li 
2008:165-170). It took CCP leaders almost five years from the end of the Cultural 
Revolution to negotiate a consensus on its causes. Eventually, the CCP leaders decided to 
follow a precedent established in 1945, forming and documenting their consensus through a 
highly formal format – adopting the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our 
Party since the Founding of the PRC” (hereafter the 1981 Resolution) at the CCP Central 
Committee in 1981.
10
 This treatment of sensitive historical issues was a powerful 
expression and indication of a consensus and a unified CCP leadership (Hu 1999:32). 
Party leaders concluded that the calamity of the Cultural Revolution was the 
conjunction of leadership errors and complex social, political, and historical conditions. 
Importantly, the crisis was not caused by the nature of socialism, but by theories and 
practices that deviated from Marxism-Leninism and from Mao Zedong’s earlier thinking – 
thinking from which Mao himself was thought to have had mistakenly strayed. According 
to the 1981 Resolution, the direct cause of the Cultural Revolution was Mao’s erroneous 
appraisal of class relationships and of the political situation in China. Mao asserted that the 
contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie remained the principal 
                                                 
10
 Although the CCP leaders discussed the Cultural Revolution in the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee and the central working conference held prior to this session in 1978, they did not come 
up with a full narrative of the Cultural Revolution, especially regarding its cause, until 1981. It is 
noteworthy that the CCP only adopted two resolutions, the 1946 and the 1981 ones, to address fundamental 
historical issues since its founding in 1949. This shows the critical importance of the 1981 Resolution in 
PRC’s history.   
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contradiction, so there was a need for class struggle against the revisionist line, i.e., a 
continued revolution. Nevertheless, Party elites contended that there was neither an 
economic nor a political basis for such a revolution because the exploiters as a class were 
eliminated after China’s socialist transformation. They also agreed that the 
counter-revolutionary forces capitalized on Mao’s “left error” and expanded class struggle 
to an extreme.  
Importantly, the 1981 Resolution identified two critical structural conditions as 
indirect causes of the Cultural Revolution. The first condition was China’s short history as a 
socialist nation. Owing to inadequate experience and misunderstanding of socialist theories, 
people still tended to identify as class struggle new contradictions and problems that did not 
actually constitute class struggle. In other words, Chinese people waged class struggle in 
situations where class struggle did not exist. Then, when dealing with actual class struggle 
under new conditions, Chinese people were inclined to address those issues with an 
outdated strategy of mass mobilization. Therefore, class struggle tended to be waged at a 
large scale, dividing a unified Party leadership and nation. The second condition was weak 
institutionalization. Party elites believed that, due to the long-lasting impact of feudalism, 
China failed to institutionalize inner-Party and nationwide democracy. It also failed to build 
legal institutions. Weak institutionalization led to the over-concentration of power, the 
arbitrary “rule of man,” and the rise of the cult of personality. Few individuals were able to 
replace collective leadership and abolish the constitution and law (Hu 1999:90, 113).  
The third component of the narrative concerns the solution to the crisis. In the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in late 1978, CCP leaders agreed that the 
solutions to the crisis were to resume the disrupted task of achieving socialist 
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modernization, particularly economic development, as well as to secure long-term stability 
and unity. The former was perceived by CCP elites as the only way to secure the CCP rule 
and the latter was seen as an indispensable condition for the realization of the former (Hu 
1999:11).
11
 The leaders agreed that only through restructuring the state and economy, 
particularly through building an advanced legal system, could they remove the structural 
conditions that produced the crisis. In an interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, 
when asked how to avoid tragedies like the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping (1994:348) 
responded that this issue should be addressed by restructuring institutions, especially 
establishing socialist democracy and socialist legal institutions. In their effort to learn from 
the Cultural Revolution, CCP leaders rediscovered the instrumental utility of law, seeing it 
now as an institutionalized instrument to achieve stability, unity, and modernization – that 
is, an instrument to rescue and strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP (Deng 1994:189, 
381).
12
 A new constitution was enacted in 1978, recovering some of the citizenship rights 
that were removed from the 1954 Constitution. It also restored the public security organs, 
procuratorial organs (prosecutor offices) and people’s courts, which were partly smashed 
by the “Gang of Four.” The 1978 Constitution was then overhauled in 1982 to reflect Party 
elites’ consensus in the 1981 Resolution. The embrace of law as a means to enhance the 
economy and to govern the nation was documented in the Communique of the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11
th
 Central Committee:  
                                                 
11
 Deng Xiaoping also mentioned this point at the New Year reception held in Beijing by the National 
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on January 1st 1980. See People’s 
Daily, 2 January 1980. 
12
 Jiang Hua, the President of the Supreme People's Court between 1975 and 1983, also advocated this view. 
People’s Daily, 15 December 1980. 
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The rights of ownership by the people’s communes, production brigades and 
production teams and their power of decision must be protected effectively by the laws 
of the state…. The constitutional rights of citizens must be resolutely protected and no 
one has the right to infringe upon them. In order to safeguard people’s democracy, it is 
imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy is systematized 
and written into law in such a way as to ensure the stability, continuity and full 
authority of this democratic system and these laws; there must be laws for people to 
follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be strict and law breakers 
must be dealt with. From now on, legislative work should have an important place on 
the agenda of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. 
Procuratorial and judicial organizations must maintain their independence as is 
appropriate; they must faithfully abide by the laws, rules and regulations, serve the 
people’s interests, keep to the facts; guarantee the equality of all people before the 
people's laws and deny anyone the privilege of being above the law.13 
3.3.2. Defining the Nature of Law  
As Habermas (1995) states, political authority is usually exercised in forms of law 
regardless of political regime, so it is important to explore how Chinese leaders defined the 
nature of law when they initiated China’s legal reform. Although Party leaders did not 
develop a systematic theory of law, important Party documents and speeches of leaders 
reveal how top CCP leaders defined the nature of law at this critical juncture.  
Law as a partial substitute for class struggle  
Class struggle constituted the dominant symbolic structure in China before the end of 
the Cultural Revolution. Accordingly, CCP leaders rectified the “left errors” of the Cultural 
Revolution and the Hua Gofeng leadership by redefining the relationship between class 
struggle/class relationship and law. Class relationship and law constitute distinct but 
interrelated symbolic structures, which are different in two major ways. First, class 
relationship is simple, composed of binary and antagonistic categories: the proletariat 
                                                 
13
 Peking Review, 15 December 1878. 
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(people) vs. the capitalist (enemy). In comparison, the structure of law is much more 
sophisticated and precise as positive laws define each element and the relationship between 
elements in law to reduce ambiguity and unpredictability. Second, class struggle is often 
waged through mass mobilization and political campaigns without any reliable procedure 
to ensure the validity of a claim, whereas procedural rules and legal professions raise the 
probability that a claim is properly addressed.  
During the Cultural Revolution, class struggle and class relationship trumped law 
because Mao emphasized the continued existence of class struggle. As Mao’s secretary Hu 
Qiaomu (1999:112-113) recalled, Mao initiated the cause of “bombarding the capitalist 
headquarter” in 1966. Suddenly, Mao accused Liu Shaoqi, the second Chairman of the PRC, 
of being counter-revolutionary; moreover, Mao abruptly pointed out the existence of two 
headquarters – the capitalist headquarter and the proletariat headquarter – in China, 
although there was no justification and evidence for the existence of “the capitalist 
headquarter” or for why people were classified in certain ways. Statements and judgments 
were made arbitrarily. “Various fundamental principles in the constitution and law became 
useless,” Hu (1999:113) commented. Slogans of class struggle created by Mao constituted 
the dominant symbolic structure and guided Chinese people’s practice. As Gao Xingjian, a 
Chinese-born Nobel laureate in literature, recalled his experience in the Cultural 
Revolution:  
I admit that I was like a gambler and a mobster. It was because I needed to oppose 
against repression. But whose slogans did people use to oppose repression? Those 
were Mao’s slogans. Those who repressed others and those who opposed repression 
used exactly the same language. Were you able to resist using Mao’s slogans? Those 
slogans as such were violence. They were naked violence and the most fascist 
violence…. If you didn’t participate in the struggle, you would be singled out 
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immediately. Objectively, everyone was a ruffian. You were either a victim or a 
mobster. You were not able to play any other role.
14
 
CCP leaders tried to solve the problem of “over-application of class struggle” through 
adjusting the jurisdiction of the two sets of symbolic structures. Drawing on Mao’s talk in 
1957 to correct Mao’s own mistake, Party elites accentuated the necessity to distinguish 
two types of contradiction – contradictions between the enemy and the people, and 
contradictions amongst the people. According to CCP leaders, law governs both types of 
contradiction, whereas class struggle is only applicable to contradictions between the 
enemy and the people (Deng 1994:175). To rectify numerous mistakes of wrongly waging 
class struggle, CCP leaders redressed such injustice in accordance with law. CCP leaders 
pointed out that although China could not relax class struggle against a small handful of 
counter-revolutionary members and criminals who attempted to undermine socialist 
modernization, such struggle should be conducted in accordance with the procedures 
prescribed by the Constitution and the law.
15
 The 1978 Constitution was revised in 1982 
because it over-emphasized class struggle.  
Nonetheless, the CCP leadership’s return to law should not be read as the complete 
subordination of class struggle to law. Instead, the symbolic structure of class relationship 
still constrains how law is applied when a class struggle is initiated. According to Deng 
Xiaoping (1994:266-267), the reform architect, the CCP does not tolerate 
counter-revolutionary members to enjoy the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, or  
association. Similarly, when clarifying the difference between “socialist democracy” and 
                                                 
14
 Chen Jun’s interview with Gao Xingjian. See China News Digest. Retrieved 31 December 2010 from 
http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK00/cr84.hz8.html. 
15
 The Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee. People’s Daily, 25 October 
1977. 
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the “bourgeois democracy,” Hu Qiaomu (1999:143), the main drafter of many important 
Party documents, emphasized that “socialist democracy” does not allow enemies to have 
freedom. When dealing with enemies, the CCP should not only punish them according to 
law, but also inform the Chinese people that the conflict constitutes class struggle (Hu 
1999:199-200). 
Law as a pragmatic instrument to achieve stability, unity, and modernization  
As Williams Alford (1990; 1999) states, CCP leaders regard law as a “tool of state 
administration,” instead of an end itself. This conception of law reflects the pragmatic 
thinking of the reform architect, Deng Xiaoping. When rebuilding China’s legal system, 
CCP leaders defined law as an instrument of the state to achieve stability, unity, and 
modernization. The 1981 Resolution is clear on the instrumental value of law. It said: “We 
must turn the socialist legal system into a powerful weapon for protecting the rights of the 
people, ensuring order in production, work and other activities, punishing criminals and 
cracking down on disruptive activities of class enemies.”
16
 
Although protecting the rights of people was mentioned in the 1981 Resolution, it is 
law’s nature as a weapon to maintain stability and unity that was accentuated most by Party 
leaders at the critical moment of establishing China’s legal institution. In one of his 
important talks in 1980, Deng Xiaoping (1994:253) asserted that Party cadres and members 
should “learn to use and master the weapon of law” to combat criminals, as being 
benevolent to criminals would merely damage the interests of the people and the 
                                                 
16
 The 1981 Revoluton. Retrieved 31 December 2010 from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/04/content_2543544.htm. 
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undertaking of socialist modernization. Deng further instructed that the state should enact 
law and regulation to secure stability and unity. Specifically, the state should promulgate 
law to require a mediation process before strikes, demand permission for demonstration, 
outlaw connections between individuals across organization units or regions, and prohibit 
illegal organizations and publication (Deng 1994:271). Through emphasizing the role of 
law in maintaining stability and unity, Party leaders distanced the socialist legal system 
from the views of both leftists and rightists. Party elites accused both camps of producing 
turbulence. They particularly condemned participants in the 1978-1979 Xidan Wall 
democratic movement for mistakenly promoting bourgeois democracy and demanding 
freedom of speech (1981:233, 252). Party leaders’ crackdown on this democratic 
movement and their use of the category of counter-revolutionary crime to punish dissidents 
demonstrated the leaders’ conception of law as a weapon to maintain social order.  
Party leaders also saw law as an instrument to advance modernization, particularly 
economic development. In an important talk in 1978, Deng Xiaoping urged the government 
to accelerate law-making so that economic activities could be conducted in accordance 
with law. In the realm of the economy, Deng especially pointed out the need to enact civil 
law, labor law, and law on foreign investment. He argued for using law to define the 
relationships between businesses and the state, amongst businesses themselves, and 
between businesses and individuals (Deng 1994:146-147). Deng was very concerned with 
whether Chinese laws were able to attract foreign investors or not (Deng 1993:79-80). 
CCP leaders’ instrumental approach to law is different from the principle of “rule of 
law” in liberal democracies and jurisprudence. “Rule of law” usually means that ordinary 
citizens and the state authority are equally subjected to laws (i.e., the will of citizens) which 
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are enacted through democratic procedures to protect citizens’ fundamental rights 
(Habermas 1995). Although CCP leaders did emphasize that Party members and cadres 
should abide by law and Deng Xiaoping alluded that law-making should go through some 
kind of democratic process (Deng 1994:146), they did not elaborate on what constitutes 
“democratic process” and how to ensure that law systematically reflects the will of ordinary 
citizens. On some occasions, Party leaders stated frankly that law is made by CCP leaders 
without belaboring the law with the “democratic process.” Hu Qiaomu’s view of law 
illustrates the Party leadership’s perspective; Hu participated in the drafting of the 1954 
Constitution and was appointed as the General Secretary of the Constitution Revision 
Committee in 1980. He was also the main drafter of the 1981 Resolution and the 
Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee (Cheng 2011). 
When commenting on the obligation of Party cadres and leaders to follow the constitution 
and law, Hu said that the constitution and law were enacted by Party leaders. If Party 
leaders themselves do not follow the law, why would ordinary citizens want to obey the law? 
If Party leaders think law is inappropriate, they should just change instead of violating the 
law (Hu 1999:109, 126). Essentially, Party leaders have the monolithic power of 
law-making. 
As I will demonstrate in the following section, Chinese leaders’ strategies of law 
dissemination correspond well to their concepts of law – but, crucially, the diffusion 
process has also produced unintended consequences as more and more actors within and 
outside of the state apparatus have joined the diffusion process.  
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3.3.3. Dissemination of Law: From “Knowing and Abiding By Law” to “Rights 
Protection” 
As mentioned, China’s legal reform was a solution proposed by the central 
government to address the crisis situation in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. 
Whether the “weapon of law” created by elites in the central government was able to 
achieve stability, unity, and modernization depended on how well law was disseminated 
and accepted by the Chinese populace. This prerequisite was a daunting task in the late 
1970s and 1980s, considering China’s huge population and territory, low literacy rate,
17
 
and the demolition of law and extensive practice of class struggle during the Cultural 
Revolution decade. The general unfamiliarity with law among the Chinese populace was 
manifest in an emergent term called “legal illiterate (famang)” – those who did not know 
law or have a sense of legality – in the late 1970s. This term first appeared in the People’s 
Daily in October 1979. It was used to talk about how peasants without legal knowledge 
were empowered through learning the newly enacted Criminal Law.
18
 Another People’s 
Daily article in December 1979 advocated using education to reduce the number of “legal 
illiterates.” The author pointed out that the rise of the “Gang of Four” led to huge number of 
“legal illiterates” in China. The old generation did not study law. The young generation, 
who grew up in a lawless situation, never heard of the law and lacked a sense of legality.
19
 
                                                 
17
 The World Bank defines the adult literacy rate as “the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, 
with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.” According to the 
World Bank, the adult literacy rate in China in 1982 was 66%. In 1990, 2000, and 2009, the adult literacy 
rate in China was 78%, 91%, and 94%, respectively. Retrieved 31 December 2010 from 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/china.  
18
 People’s Daily, 6 October 1979. 
19
 People’s Daily, 1 December 1979. 
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The term “legal illiterates” became increasingly popular from 1979 onward. This 
phenomenon reflected the difficulty that Chinese leaders faced of how to “deliver law to 
people.” Nevertheless, the Chinese government successfully “placed the law in the hands 
of the masses of people” within three decades since the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 
the beginning after China’s return to law, the Party-state stressed “knowing law and 
abiding by law.” Then the discourse about law shifted to rights protection, which turned out 
to be effective in spreading law to Chinese people. China’s accomplishment in law 
dissemination can be shown by the Rule of Law Index. In 2011, China is ranked by the 
World Justice Project as number 22 out of 67 countries in terms of how well laws are 
publicized and widely accessible. It is the second best among the “non-free” countries and 
even better than Germany. In the evaluation of how the laws are comprehensible to the 
public, China is ranked as number 11 out of 67 countries, more highly ranked than Austria, 
Norway, Canada, United States, and many other liberal democracies.
20
  
Discourse of knowing law and abiding by law  
Soon after CCP leaders decided to return to law, the dissemination of law became an 
imperative, as CCP leaders thought that Chinese society was still in turmoil.
21
 It was often 
reported that China remained disordered after the Cultural Revolution due to serious crimes 
and the 1978-1979 Xidan Wall democratic movement.
22
 Chinese leaders believed that only 
when the majority of people knew and spontaneously obeyed the law, and when cadres 
                                                 
20
 The Rule of Law Index 2011 report. Retrieved 31 December 2010 from 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/index-2011. 
21
 According to Zhou Yu, the Minister of Justice from 1983 to 1988, Chinese central and local governments 
began to disseminate law actively since 1979. People’s Daily, 17 June 1985. 
22
 People’s Daily, 9 December 1979. 
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understood and could enforce the law, only then could the desired social order and stability 
be attained. Chinese leaders thus stressed the importance of educating people so that they 
would be disciplined and obedient to law. For instance, at the Eighth National People’s 
Judicial Working Conference in 1978, Party leaders urged that courts at all levels should 
regularly disseminate law and strengthen legal education to prevent illegal behavior and 
crime.
23
 Deng Xiaoping (1993:267) stated that the essence of rule by law is that everybody 
understands, obeys, and safeguards the law. And the key lay in legal education, which 
should begin from toddlers and extend to the entire society (Deng 1993:163). The CCP 
General Secretary Hu Yaoban endorsed the same view.
24
 The importance of education to 
create disciplined and law-abiding citizens was later written in Article 24 of the 1982 
Constitution: “The state strengthens the building of a socialist society with an advanced 
culture and ideology by promoting education in high ideals, ethics, general knowledge, 
discipline and legality.” 
To make law penetrative, when the Chinese government spread the discourse of 
knowing law and abiding by law, it also stressed the necessity of suppressing crimes and 
spreading details about harsh punishment to the public as part of legal education. This 
practice of publicizing crimes and imposing stigma reflects Chinese leaders’ concepts of 
law as an instrument to maintain stability, and as a partial substitute for class struggle. In 
1979, the Party-state proposed a strategy called “comprehensive governance” (zhonghe 
zhili) to maintain social security and order. Two measures were of critical importance. First, 
the central government said it tolerated no leniency, requiring police, courts and prosecutor 
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 People’s Daily, 28 May 1978. 
24
 People’s Daily, 2 September 1982. 
 




to punish criminals severely. The symbolic structure of class relationship was 
brought to bear by the government to define criminals as class enemies. The Party-state 
demanded police and judicial agencies to punish criminals who destroyed social order as 
harshly and swiftly as possible. This policy was adopted formally in the 1983 anti-crime 
(yanda or Strike Hard) campaign. Second, the Party-state required all organizations to 
disseminate law, particularly criminal law. It demanded courts to disseminate law through 
announcing sentence in the form of mass gathering. The purpose was to induce 
deterrence.
25
 This form of law dissemination, which was reminiscent of mass mobilization 
during the Cultural Revolution, was widely practiced in the 1983-1985 anti-crime 
campaign.
26
 As Liu Fuzhi (1998:179-80), the Minister of Public Security in 1983-1985, 
recalled, Deng Xiaoping insisted that mass mobilization was an indispensable means to 
crack down on criminal activities and a critical form of legal education, despite the CCP’s 
promise of no more mass mobilization, as well as disagreement inside the Party.  
The policy of the central government was executed by local governments. According 
to People’s Daily reports and local gazetteers, local governments in both rural and urban 
areas actively spread the law beginning in late 1978. They aimed to inform citizens and 
cadres of the law, and to ensure their compliance with it. Local police offices, courts, and 
other agencies held diverse law dissemination campaigns in government and party 
                                                 
25
 People’s Daily, 9 December 1979 and 22 June 1981. The strategy of “comprehensive governance” was 
later written as the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Intensifying 
the Improvement of Social Security by Taking Comprehensive Measures” in 1991.  
26
 People’s Daily, 7 June 1984. Also, some local gazetteers mentioned how local governments enforced the 
policy in the 1983-1985 anti-crime campaign. For instance, in Suzhou, the local government arrested 1,572 
people in the campaign. To enforce measures in comprehensive governance the local government 
publicized selected cases to disseminate law. Retrieved 31 December 2010 from 
http://www.dfzb.suzhou.gov.cn/zsbl/442527.htm. 
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organizations, schools, factories, people’s communes, streets, etc. These law dissemination 




At the same time as the central government continued to enact laws, officials sensed a 
continuing lack of legal knowledge amongst citizens. To increase the law’s penetrative 
reach into society, the central government determined to initiate a social engineering 
project that mobilized the entire society to accelerate dissemination of law. In June 1985, 
the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee (or the Publicity Department) 
and the Ministry of Justice jointly announced a five-year plan of disseminating law. This 
plan detailed methods, steps, and organization for disseminating law. The law 
dissemination campaign aimed to acquaint citizens with basic knowledge of the law within 
five years, so that each citizen would know and abide by law.
28
 Between 1985 to 2010, five 
five-year plans of law dissemination have been implemented.   
Discourse of rights 
Although ensuring that citizens’ knew and obeyed the law was the main focus when 
the central government began to rebuild China’s legal institution, the foci of legal 
dissemination eventually became more diversified. Gradually, the discourse of protecting 
rights became increasingly widespread in both legal dissemination campaigns and other 
occasions when law was mentioned to the public. I show this trend in Figure 3-1, which 
plots the numbers of the People’s Daily articles with “rights” and “abiding by law” in the 
                                                 
27
 People’s Daily, 3 April 1983. 
28
 A five-year plan of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee and the Ministry of Justice 
announced the goal of acquainting citizens with basic knowledge of law (June 1985). 
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title each year from 1949 to 2010.
29
 Since the title of a newspaper article usually reveals its 
main thrust and contains important information to grab readers’ attention, how often “rights” 
and “abiding by law” appear in newspaper titles indicates the visibility of the two 
discourses in the public forum.
30
 Figure 3-1 indicates that discourse of knowing and 
abiding law slightly increased since 1985, when the 1985 law dissemination campaign was 
initiated, but then gradually declined. Although this discourse did not totally disappear, its 
visibility remained very limited. In comparison, the discourse of rights, not originally the 
part of the main focus of the early law dissemination programs, started rising after 1979 and 
then climbed drastically around 1999. The gap between the two discourses became wider 
over time.  
                                                 
29
 I used “quanli,” “qunyi,”and “weiquan” to search for articles with “rights” in titles and used “shoufa” to 
search for articles with “abiding by law” in titles. 
30
 It should be noted that I did not include cases when articles addressed non-domestic issues. As the Chinese 
government sometimes employed the discourse of rights to address international relation issues and criticize 
the status of rights protection in other countries, including those cases here would have wrongly inflated the 
visibility of such rights discourse vis-à-vis domestic issues. 
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Figure 3-1: Numbers of People’s Daily articles with “rights” or “abiding by law” in 
the title, 1949-2010. 
 
Figure 2 shows that, in general, the discourse of rights gained prominence over time, 
while the discourse of knowing and abiding by law remained sporadic over time across 
types of newspaper and geographical areas. Importantly, the discourse of rights expanded 
particularly during the period from 2000 to 2005 – before the rise of the nationwide 
counterpublic sphere – in most of the local newspapers that I examined.  
In addition to the overall surge of the discourse of rights, two observations are worth 
mentioning. First, there is a lag between the time when the discourse of rights became 
prevalent in central forums and the time when it became salient in local forums. The 
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discourse of rights was already salient in the People’s Daily in 2000 and 2001, but still 
quite invisible in local forums such as the Sichuan Daily, the Beijing Daily, and the 
Yangcheng Evening News. This affirms that the dissemination of discourse proceeded from 
the central government to local forums. Second, certain forums – the Southern Daily and 
the Southern Metropolis Daily – stand out from the rest. Comparing the graphs of the 
Southern Daily, the Southern Metropolis Daily, and the Jiefang Daily in Figure 3-2, it can 
be found that although they are all forums in which the discourse of rights circulated in 
early days, the discourse of rights climbed drastically in the Southern Daily and the 
Southern Metropolis Daily but grew smoothly in the Jiefang Daily. Clearly, the Southern 
Daily and the Southern Metropolis Daily are the forums where the discourse of rights 
gained most visibility among the 11 local newspapers. I will explain this variation and its 
implication on the evolution of China’s counterpublic sphere in Chapter 4.  
  
 

















Figure 3-2: Numbers of articles with “rights” and “abiding by law” in the titles of 
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Increasing the penetration of law by disseminating the discourse of rights 
To be sure, the language of rights was not novel in PRC’s law, but the concept of 
rights was foreign to most Chinese people and had little meaning in their everyday lives. 
Before the Cultural Revolution, the language of rights was used in PRC’s first constitution 
(1954) and Marriage Law (1950). The question is why the discourse of rights became 
dominant with the development of China’s legal system, given the efforts of the CCP 
leaders to promote the discourse of obeying law, and not necessarily the discourse of rights.  
First, there were calls for fixing problems in law dissemination campaigns and using 
the discourse of rights, rather than the discourse of abiding by law, in order to disseminate 
law inside the Party-state since the mid-1980s. For instance, an article in the People’s Daily 
written by a law professor, Kong Qingming, in 1985 criticized that the discourse of obeying 
law as reflecting an outdated concept of law rooted in China’s feudal and patriarchal 
tradition, in which an individual had absolute obedience to authority but no rights, and in 
which law was a synonym of punishment and vice. Kong contended that this outdated 
concept of law made law seem irrelevant to Chinese people’s lives. As long as they were 
not breaking the law, it had very little to do with their lives. Citing PRC’s constitution, 
Kong argued against this outdated concept of law, and for raising Chinese people’s rights 
consciousness and disseminating law from the perspective of rights protection. He believed 
that a concept of law centering on rights would provide citizens with incentives to 
understand and engage with the law.
31
 Another People’s Daily article published in 1988 
also stated that local law dissemination campaigns overemphasized the discourse of 
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obeying law and citizen’s obligations, without advocating citizen’s rights and raising 
citizen’s rights consciousness. The author argued that legal education and law 
dissemination campaigns should discard the concept of law based on Chinese feudalism, 
which aimed only to govern the populace. Instead, the government should raise Chinese 
people’s law and rights consciousness so that people would know how to use the weapon of 
law to protect their own rights.
32
 Similar reflection upon the law dissemination campaigns 
appeared in academic journals starting in the late 1980s. Scholars proposed deepening law 
dissemination through raising rights consciousness. Some articles even anticipated and 
addressed the state’s potential concerns of how to deal with citizens who develop strong 
rights consciousness. They argued that the government should not worry about rising rights 
consciousness among citizens because such citizens would only be more rational and 
respective of law (Cheng and Zhang 1988; Zhou 1999). 
The second, more important factor leading to the prevalence of the discourse of rights 
was the central government’s increasing emphasis on law’s utility in constructing the 
socialist market economy. Although the CCP leaders still regarded law as an instrument for 
maintaining stability, their goal of developing the economy also required them to 
emphasize its role as an instrument to enable and advance the “commodity economy,” later 
termed the “socialist market economy” by Deng Xiaoping. To enable this transition from a 
socialist planned economy to a socialist market economy, and to join the global market 
economy, the Party-state enacted civil laws – the general part of private law – and 
economic laws in order to delineate properties, while also governing market transactions. 
As the Minster of the Propaganda Department Deng Liqun said at a law dissemination 
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conference in 1985, over half of the laws enacted between 1978 and 1985 in China 
concerned the economy.
33
 These civil and economic laws differ from criminal law in two 
important aspects. First, the operation of the former requires actively engaging with law 
(e.g., making a contract) instead of simply avoiding its violation. Second, not only 
obligation but also rights (e.g., contractual rights and property rights) are essential elements 
in laws that govern economic activities.  
When China decided to join the global market economy in 1978, it lost the ability to 
make its own civil and economic laws without considering consequences on foreign 
investment and international trade. As a result, basic elements of China’s civil and 
economic laws were forced to align with those in other countries and it became impossible 
for the government to avoid talking about rights vis-a-vis civil and economic laws. In 
comparison, the concept of rights is not absolutely necessary when dealing with criminal 
law. How foreigners’ concept of rights influenced law-making in China can be seen from 
an interview with Jiang Ping, a prominent law professor who participated in constructing 
some of these laws. According to Professor Jiang, foreign investors did not want to invest 
in China in 1978 because they always asked what their rights were and how their rights 
were going to be protected. Ye Jianying, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, were very anxious about this. As a result, China borrowed 
very much from foreign laws during its own law-making process, in order to ensure 
foreigners that their rights would be protected under Chinese law.
34
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The urgent need for foreign capital and the impact of the global economy on China’s 
domestic legislation is illustrated in the enactment of the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures (1979) and the Administrative Litigation Law (1989). The former was 
passed within only three years of the end of the Cultural Revolution and around seven 
months after the decision of the economic reform. Distinct from its counterparts in other 
countries, the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures set not an upper limit, but a 
lower limit or floor for the proportion of foreign investment in joint ventures, signifying 
that China welcomed and needed foreign investment. The Administrative Litigation Law is 
widely considered as a progressive piece of legislation, as it enables Chinese people to sue 
the authoritarian state. Nonetheless, this law was passed, in fact, because of the 
consideration about foreigners. As one core participant in the law-making process recalled, 
this legislation encountered tremendous opposition from the leftists in the Party-state for 
ideological reasons, and from Party elites who worried about the negative consequences of 
this law on policy implementation and economic development. Local government officials 
in many provinces sent hundreds of letters to the central government, asking the central 
government to cease the legislation process. Despite such opposition, CCP top leaders 
insisted on passing the Administrative Litigation Law, as they believed it would be very 
difficult to attract foreign investment without administrative litigation.
35
  
The actual diffusion of the discourse of rights in China depended on the enactment of 
laws that are closely related to ordinary citizens’ economic lives, and that draw on the 
language of rights. This condition was not satisfied until the mid-1990s, owing to the 
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   127 
 
Party-state’s development strategy and the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Due to lack of capital 
and technology, China’s development model relied heavily on foreign investment. To 
attract foreign investment, the Chinese state concentrated on enacting laws related to 
foreign investment during the first stage of economic reform.
36
 After a couple years of 
economic expansion, economic and political problems, such as inflation, arbitrage, and 
corruption, became salient in China’s transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy. These problems triggered the 1989 Tiananmen incident. The political turmoil 
and the opposition of the leftists inside the Party-state toward the economic reform made 
law-making difficult and the path of economic reform became very uncertain.
37
  
The situation changed after Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” in 1992, in which Deng 
coined the term “socialist market economy” and decisively announced the plan to 
accelerate China’s economic reform. In the mid-1990s, the National People’s Congress 
finally passed several laws concerning ordinary Chinese citizens’ economic life, 
particularly in the commodity, labor, and real estate markets. Important laws, such as the 
Law on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests (1993), the Product Quality Law 
(1993), the Corporation Law (1993), the Labor Law (1994), the Law on Urban Real Estate 
Administration (1994), and the Law on Township Enterprises (1996), acknowledge 
Chinese citizens’ rights as real estate owners, as consumers to purchase qualified products 
and service, as labor providers to receive remunerations, and as business owners. In short, 
after Deng’s Southern Tour, China sped up its law-making. Since the mid-1990s onward, 
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rights have been embodied in concrete laws that thoroughly infiltrate and govern citizens’ 
economic lives, instead of remaining an abstract concept at the level of the constitution. Of 
course, it took time for these laws to be disseminated from the central government to 
ordinary citizens and to be practiced by ordinary citizens. 
The role of law as an instrument to advance the economy also became salient in law 
dissemination campaigns with the deepening of economic reform. When reporting to the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 1986 on the implementation of 
the five-year plan, although the Minister of Justice, Zou Yu, still talked about the need to 
combine the law dissemination campaigns with the “comprehensive governance” program 
to prevent crime, he accentuated the link between law dissemination campaigns with 
citizens’ material live and their participation in the commodity economy. Tian Jiyun, the 
Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, further 
associated law dissemination with citizens’ rights and the development of the market 
economy. In his talk to journalists on law dissemination in 1993, Tian said that journalists 
should diffuse law to the public so that citizens would be able to protect their own rights in 
the market economy.
38
 The Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Justice increased 
the visibility of rights in their plans (Table 3-2). Since the second five-year law 
dissemination plans, the central government began emphasizing that it expected ordinary 
citizens to use law and to exercise their rights in accordance with law. Both the discourse of 
obeying law and the discourse of rights were circulated in the law dissemination 
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 To make law work, the government needed to educate its citizens that they 
have rights according to law and that the law is their weapon.  





Expectation on ordinary 
citizens  
New emphasis in the 
plan 
The first five-year 
plan 
1986-1990 
Citizens are expected to know 





Citizens are expected to have 
basic understanding of laws 
that are closely related to their 
work, production, and life. 
Citizens are expected to 
exercise their rights and fulfill 
their obligation in accordance 
with law. 
Combing the 
principles of learning 
and using law (xuefa 
yunfa). 
The third five-year 
plan 
1996-2000 
Citizens are expected to know 
law, abide by law, protect law, 
and protect their own lawful 
rights and interests in 





Citizens are expected to abide 
by law, protect their own 
lawful rights and interests, and 
develop consciousness of 
democratic participation and 





canyu and minzhu 
jiandu) 
The fifth five-year 
plan 
2006-2010 
Citizens are expected to study 
law and respect the authority of 
law, as well as to exercise 
rights and fulfill obligation in 





social conflicts; and 
strengthening the 
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 It is noteworthy that the central state rebalanced the weights of the two discourses in the fifth five-year plan 
(2006-2010). As I stated in Chapter 2, the political climate became more conservative after the Hu 
Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration proposed the agenda of building a harmonious society in the Fourth Plenum 
of the 16th Central Committee in September 2004. The fifth five-year plan elevated the discourse of abiding 
by law, strengthening the role of law as an instrument to sustain social stability. 
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Analysis of the People’s Daily articles for 1976-2010 confirms that laws governing 
the economic life of ordinary citizens contributed to the rise of the discourse of rights. I 
analyze articles in the People’s Daily with “rights protection (weiquan)” in the title and 
examined the kind of rights or interests that each article was addressing. Most of these 
articles introduce laws and rights, provide information about legal assistance, or report how 
rights are strengthened, protected or not realized in concrete cases. Figure 3-3 shows that 
68.4% of the 342 articles with “rights protection” in their title address issues of labor rights 
(34.2%), consumer rights (24.7%), and economic loss (9.5%). I further stratify cases into 
two groups, 1976-2000 and 2001-2010, to see when this trend became salient. Figure 3-4 
indicates that there were only 59 cases with “rights protection” in their title in 1976-2000; 
in addition, rights related to economic life were not dominant in these articles. The situation, 
however, became very different in 2001-2010 (Figure 3-5). Articles with “rights protection” 
in their title rose from 59 to 401. In total, 75.1% of these articles address issues of labor 
rights (38.3%), consumer rights (26.6%), and economic loss (10.2%). It is clear that with 
the enactment of laws closely related to ordinary citizens’ economic lives, the discourse of 
rights rose tremendously. 
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Figure 3-3: Category of rights in the People’s Daily (1976-2010). 
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Figure 3-5: Category of rights in the People’s Daily (2001-2010). 
 
The emergence and widespread acceptance of a symbolic structure based on laws and 
rights in China is also associated with an absence of strong competitors. Scholars often 
point out that a dominant ideology has been lacking since the demise of the communist 
ideology (Goldman 2005; Pei 2006:42, 157-8; Zhao and Lin 2008:95-98). Indeed, 
communist ideology seems to have become increasingly weakened since Chinese leaders 
adopted the market economy to rescue the CCP’s legitimacy. In addition, national 
sentiment cannot be mobilized to deal with most of the domestic problems that upset 
Chinese citizens, although such sentiment does sometimes emerge in China’s public 
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forums. In such a context where a dominant ideology is absent, the symbolic structure 
based on laws and rights has become the only platform and shared medium or language for 
public dialogue.  
3.3.4. The Role of the Media in Disseminating the Discourses of Law and of Rights   
It was leaders in the central state who decided China’s return to law, rebuilt China’s 
legal institution, and initiated law dissemination campaigns; however, it was the media that 
was the most important actor in truly making law and the concept of rights part of the public 
discourse and imagination. Media and news outlets are a critical part of Chinese people’s 
daily life. A representative survey conducted in Shanghai in 2002 shows that 72% of 
respondents said that the major topics in their everyday chat were related to news 
disseminated by the media; in comparison, only 13.2%, 5.1% and 4.0% of their topics of 
conversation were derived from what they heard from their family and friends, from their 
working units, or from their neighborhoods, respectively.
40
  
As I mentioned, several laws closely related to the economic life of ordinary citizens 
were passed in the mid-1990s. But importantly, the period between 1992 and1998 was 
marked not only by the Chinese state’s accelerated law-making, but also by the 
government’s restructuring the media field and marketization of Chinese media. The 
purpose was to strengthen media’s capacity in making revenues without relinquishing the 
state’s control over them. When the Chinese government completed the task of 
restructuring Chinese media, especially the press, in 1998,
41
 the Chinese government 
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owned media which were good at not only making profits but also conducting propaganda. 
The co-maturation of China’s legal and media systems around 1998 was not a coincidence; 
rather, it was the conjoined result of the Chinese state’s efforts to join the WTO in 2001 and 
to prepare for the challenge in the post-WTO era.   
 As both market players and propaganda organs, Chinese media have managed to 
satisfy the demands of both the authoritarian state and consumers. On the one hand, since 
the Chinese state has firmly controlled the media by monitoring journalists, media 
organizations and content, media cannot survive without meeting the political demand of 
the state. On the other hand, media could not continue to exist without making revenues 
once the Party-state pushed them into the “cultural commodity market” and asked them to 
be responsible for their own finance (Zhao 2000b). Although the demands of the market 
and of the Party-state are not always congruent, most media in China manages to satisfy 
market demand without stepping out of the political safety zone (Lee 2000; Stockmann and 
Gallagher 2011; Zhao 2004).  
The Chinese state demands that the media disseminates law as part of their 
propaganda work. Peng Zhen, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Sixth 
National People’s Congress, told journalists in 1984 that helping people know, understand, 
and abide by law is media’s mission.
42
 Indeed, the five-year law dissemination campaigns 
since 1985 were jointly supervised by the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of 
Justice. The former is the highest Party organ that administers ideology, enforces 
censorship, and regulates media. The Propaganda Department has repeatedly demanded 
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that media disseminate law in innovative ways to catch the audience’s attention and 
effectively place law in the hands of the populace.  
Chinese citizens have also expressed a demand for information related to law and legal 
issues. Media practitioners have been well aware of this demand and have attempted to 
satisfy it. In fact, the Chinese media began probing the demand of readers and audience in 
the early 1980s, partly due to the call for media reform and partly due to the pursuit of 
advertisement revenue.
43
 Chinese media started to use survey methodologies 
systematically to gauge the needs and interests of its readers and audience since 1982.
44
 
Surveys show that access to media was already quite high in the early 1980s. In Beijing, 
96.9%, 92.3% and 81.1% of the residents above 12 years old listened to radio, watched TV, 
and read newspaper, respectively, in 1982.
45
 In Zhejiang, where 77.9% of the residents 
were peasants, 96.5%, 75.1% and 67.3% of the residents above 12 years old listened to 
radio, watched TV, and read newspaper, respectively, in 1983.
46
 Surveys that were 
conducted by Chinese media from the mid-1980s to 2000s consistently find that readers 
have a keen interest in and demand for news reports that uncover corruption and other 
illegal practices, speak on behalf of citizens about their problems and concerns, spread legal 
knowledge, and report legal cases.
47
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Direct diffusion of law and the concept of rights in the form of positive propaganda  
The demands of the Chinese state and Chinese citizens on media are similar but not 
identical. As Stockmann and Gallagher (2011) point out, the Chinese state emphasizes 
propagandizing positive aspects of the legal system, that is, the accomplishment of the state 
in protecting citizen’s rights. The CCP leaders learned an expensive lesson about the 
detrimental consequences of watchdog journalism on the CCP’s rule from the 1989 
Tiananmen incident. Party leaders accused journalists and reformists in the Party who 
promoted press freedom and watchdog journalism of being counter-revolutionary.
48
 The 
Party-state accentuated the imperative of “positive propaganda” after the Tiananmen 
incident.
49
 As reports on legal issues were sometimes associated with negative aspects of 
the society, the central government issued a notice to newspapers specializing in legal news 
in 1995, requiring journalists to abide by the principle of “positive propaganda” and focus 
on dissemination of legal knowledge.
50
  
To fulfill the task of law dissemination, as desired by both the state and their audience, 
media disseminate legal knowledge and the concept of rights by explaining laws in lay 
terms, reporting real legal cases, providing information about legal aid, and answering 
readers’ questions. Chinese media at both national and local levels have produced many 
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popular legal columns and programs.
51
 Media also pay attention to the effect of their law 
dissemination. As mentioned, there were criticisms inside the Party-state about the 
overemphasis on criminal law and neglect of law’s relevance in everyday life. Media 
outlets recognized this problem and shifted more weight to legal knowledge closely related 
to the commodity economy, so that citizens could learn how to participate in the emerging 
market economy using law.
52
 Studies of Chinese people’s legal consciousness based on 
survey data show that the media (TV, newspaper and radio) is the primary means through 
which Chinese people know and understand law. Media’s significance is much higher than 
activities organized by the governments in law dissemination campaigns, and higher than 
information received from acquaintance or from legal education at school (Zhao 2006; 
Zheng 2007).
53
 In addition, scholars find that Chinese media is effective in propagandizing 
citizens’ legal experiences through producing convincing and sophisticated news. Readers 
thus see law as a realm for dispute resolution and rights protection (Stockmann and 
Gallagher 2011).  
Representative survey data results also show that Chinese people’s legal 
consciousness has been strengthening over time, and is higher than public legal 
consciousness in many other East Asian countries. Although China was still in a lawless 
situation in 1976 and has been governed by an authoritarian state, Chinese people now 
strongly demand the state to follow the law. In a survey that asked respondents’ opinion 
about whether the government can disregard the law for policy consideration, 33.02 % of 
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Chinese respondents expressed disagreement in 2006 (the 2006 Chinese General Social 
Survey). The rate of disagreement rose to 55.2 % in 2008 (the 2008 Asian Barometer). By 
comparison, only 33.5 %, 36.4 %, 42.6 %, and 53.2 % of respondents in Thailand, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and Cambodia, respectively, disagreed that government can disregard 
the law to handle difficult situations. Among the 9 countries in the 2005-2008 Asian 
Barometer survey, only Taiwan (68.1%), Indonesia (68.4%), and the Philippines (60.7%) 
have a higher disagreement rate than China. The evidence presented in this and the previous 
paragraphs thus suggests that a symbolic structure based on laws and rights has penetrated 
the Chinese society through the media’s diffusion legal knowledge and the concept of 
rights. 
Indirect diffusion of law and the concept of rights in the form of mild “supervision by 
public opinion” 
Media diffuses law directly through “positive propaganda,” but it also diffuses law 
and the concept of rights indirectly in the form of mild “supervision by public opinion,” 
which is the Chinese version of watchdog journalism officially created by CCP General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang in 1987. When exercising mild “supervision by public opinion,” 
media use laws and exercise rights to criticize illegal practices or question the 
non-fulfillment of rights.
54
 This type of law diffusion is beyond media’s task in the law 
dissemination campaigns and is mainly a response to citizens’ demand. As I have stated, 
surveys conducted by Chinese media consistently find that audiences want news that 
uncovers illegal practices, particularly corruption, and that reflects citizens’ problems. At 
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the same time, however, this demand for problem-detecting and problem-solving has been 
problematic for Chinese state given the state’s demand for “positive propaganda” and its 
concerns about “supervision by public opinion” in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident.  
As stated in Chapter 2, the term “supervision by public opinion” first appeared in the 
official discourse after CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang emphasized its importance as 
part of his political reform agenda at the 1987 Thirteen Party Congress. Zhao’s emphasis on 
“supervision by public opinion” and his initiation of political reform was a response to 
over-concentration of power and widespread corruption in China’s transition to market 
economy. The CCP’s reformists derived the concept of “supervision by public opinion” 
from the first sentence of the Article 41 of the Constitution, which states that “citizens of 
the PRC have the right to criticize and make suggestions regarding any state organ or 
functionary.” Article 41, as a whole, is referred to as the citizens’ “rights of supervision.” 
Along with other forms of supervision, citizens’ “rights of supervision” are designed to 
check the Party-state.
55
 By “supervision by public opinion,” Party reformists mean that 
citizens formulate public opinion through the mediation of media and thereby exercise their 
“rights of supervision.”
56
  In 1987, the former Vice Secretary-General of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, Wang Houde, said that media should 
combine facts and law when conducting “supervision by public opinion.”
57
 Since media is 
operated by the Party and “owned” by Chinese people, “supervision by public opinion” is a 
check of the state on behalf of both the Party and Chinese citizens. Critical aspects of 
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“supervision by public opinion” include watching whether legislative organs properly enact 
law, whether the state follows the law, and whether citizens’ rights are protected.
58
  
After reformist Zhao Ziyang stepped down in wake of the Tiananmen incident, his 
political reform agenda was abandoned by the newly constituted Party leadership. Yet, 
party leaders were not able to negate Zhao’s formulation of “supervision by public opinion” 
and the practice of critical reports, given their grounding in the constitution and the CCP 
tradition.
59
 Instead of denying “supervision by public opinion” and critical reports, CCP 
leaders have asserted that journalists should not conduct incorrect or inappropriate critical 
reports and “supervision by public opinion.”
60
 Ultimately, it is CCP leaders, not journalists 
or citizens, who retain the power to determine what is correct and appropriate.  
The central state began to promote “supervision by public opinion” around 1998, after 
it completed the dual tasks of restructuring media by concentrating the market, and of 
making regulations to manage journalists, media organizations, and media content.
61
 A 
concentrated market structure composed of regional conglomerates made it easier for the 
government to regulate market players, and to defend the encroachment of foreign capital 
in the post-WTO era (Zhao 2000b). With disciplined and centralized media, the central 
government officials felt that they were able to capitalize on the political and economic 
benefits of “supervision by public opinion” without losing the state’s control. Politically, 
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the central government still needed media and citizens to watch the corrupted local officials. 
In addition, the idea of “supervision by public opinion” remained popular among the people. 
And economically, the government profited when media attracted an audience. At the 
Fifteenth Party’s Congress in 1997, CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin asserted the need 
to integrate inside-Party supervision, supervision of law, and supervision by citizens, as 
well as the need to strengthen “supervision by public opinion” in order to prevent abuse of 
power. In 1998, the President of the Supreme People’s Court, Xiao Yang, and the Premier, 
Zhu Rongji, all encouraged “supervision by public opinion.” When talking to the 
editors-in-chief of several core newspapers at a conference in 1998, the Vice Minister of the 
Propaganda Department, Xu Guangchun, expressed that the Party used to be concerned 
about “supervision by public opinion,” but now encouraged it. Media should strengthen 
democratic supervision and use law, regulation, and Party policy as the standard to conduct 
such supervision.
62
 Thus, as long as journalists follow the Party-state’s policy and do not 
threaten the Party-state’s control, they can conduct “supervision by public opinion.” 
Facing consumers’ demand and the state’s qualified approval, as well as possible legal 
liability such as libel, most media practitioners produce only mild critical reports and 
“supervision by public opinion,” in keeping with the instruction of the government. 
Furthermore, in most situations, journalists do not specify wrongdoers. When the objects of 
“supervision by public opinion” are singled out, they are more likely to be ordinary citizens 
than cadres, private businesses than government agencies, and lower-level cadres than 
higher-level ones. Additionally, the cases are more likely to be non-local than local ones 
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(Chan 2002; Zhao 2004).
63
 Yet, media do attempt to identify unlawful practices and 
problems with rights protection, within safe limits. In 1999, there were already more than 
60 TV programs and 31 newspapers conducting “supervision by public opinion.”
64
 
“Topics in focus” (jiao dian fang tan) of the China Central Television (CCTV) is an 
exemplar. It has been among the top three most popular TV programs in China.
65
 Letters 
from audience members have provided important sources of information for journalists to 
uncover illegal practices and non-fulfillment of rights.
66
 Disputants who have trouble 
addressing their problems using administrative or judicial channels often appeal to media to 
restore their rights.
67
 Some media even have “rights protection journalists” specifically in 
charge of citizens’ disputes and complaints.
68
 The term “cost of rights protection” emerged 
among local newspapers around 2000.
69
 It was then spread to the People’s Daily – the most 
important national-level newspaper – in 2002.
70
 The phrase is used critically by journalists 
to refer to the difficulty, especially the unaffordable costs, for citizens to recover their rights. 
Most criticisms consider the hardship that workers, consumers, and home owners face in 
the long journey to realize their rights. News reports also point out the obstacles for 
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ordinary citizens to sue the government.
71
 Another new term, “Chinese style of rights 
protection”, appeared in a few newspapers in 2004. This term was coined by a Chinese 
citizen and used by journalists to generalize the painful experience that Chinese citizens 
have when trying to pursue their rights. These experiences often include being kicked out of 
a variety of government agencies.
72
  
Law, rights, and a sense of the public  
Most scholars of Chinese media tend to evaluate the political implications of media 
marketization in China conservatively, due to the firm control of the Chinese state and 
media’s continuing role as the state’s mouthpiece (Chan 2002; Lee 2000; Zhao 2000b). I 
argue, however, that the media has made two significant contributions in establishing 
China’s public and counterpublic spheres. First, media has made Chinese law a penetrative 
medium. It is through the media’s dissemination of law and the concept of rights to Chinese 
citizens that a newly established symbolic structure based on laws and rights has been 
established within only three decades since the end of the Cultural Revolution. The 
top-down and one-directional law dissemination process has familiarized citizens with the 
language of law and rights, and led to the rise of legal and rights consciousness. So that, 
regardless of how the law might actually operate in reality, citizens feel, nonetheless, that 
they have rights according to the law and that even the government is subjected to law.   
Second, media has made Chinese law an integrative medium. By formulating public 
discourse in terms of correcting unlawful practices and enhancing the protection of citizens’ 
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rights, the media reveals the public relevance of law and rights. This indirect dissemination 
of law and the concept of rights is two directional. Chinese media not only diffuse a 
top-down legal order that bestows citizens with individual rights, but also reflect common 
problems on the ground in a standardized language based on laws and rights. As I will 
demonstrate in Chapter five, when the media discusses various societal problems using the 
language of law and rights, the symbolic structure based on laws and rights established by 
the central government gives Chinese citizen similar expectations for their lives, and serves 
as a medium for them to develop a sense of the public or the collective. The standardized 
language of law, disseminated by media, facilitates Chinese citizens’ ability to see the 
commonality of their ostensibly unrelated individual experiences and problems.  
3.4. DISCUSSION 
To summarize, the establishment of a nationwide symbolic structure based on laws 
and rights in China is the result of a decisive state intervention to address the CCP’s 
legitimation crisis in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. To attain stability, unity, 
and modernity, the Chinese state, to a large degree, replaced the symbolic structure based 
on class relationship and class struggle with a new structure based in law. Since this 
intervention was conditioned by the global market economy, Chinese law related to the 
economy, both on the books and in practice, was linked with its counterparts in other 
countries, and shaped by international law, in which the concept of rights is a critical 
element. To make law work, the Chinese state diffused law and the concept of rights 
through two overlapping mechanisms – political campaigns and media communication. 
Chinese media diffused law and the concept of rights to fulfill their obligation as the 
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state’s mouthpiece and to satisfy their audience’s demand for legal knowledge. Chinese 
media also responded to market demand for critical reports by conducting mild 
“supervision by public opinion,” which was institutionalized by the reformist leaders who 
stepped down due to the 1989 Tiananmen protests. While operating within the 
politically-designated safe zone, media nonetheless formulated public discourse to 
criticize illegal practices and the non-fulfillment of rights, standardizing variable 
problems in the shared language of law and rights. The media’s role – that which was 
mandated as part of the law dissemination campaigns, and that which went beyond such 
campaigns – not only served to diffuse the symbolic structure based on laws and rights, 
but also created a sense of the public among China’s citizenry.   
Juxtaposing the Chinese case with the European cases and the U.S. case, we see 
variable relationships between market, society, state, and the medium of the public sphere. 
In the United States, where the best-known weak state governs, the robust society played 
the most critical role to the development of the cultural grid in the public sphere. 
According to Habermas’s finding, market and family contributed most to the medium of 
the public sphere in the European cases. When we move away from contexts in which a 
weak or a non-interventionist state governs, the consequences of overlooking the role of 
the state vis-à-vis the public sphere is problematic. Therefore, as Eley (1992:19-20) 
suggests, there is a need to draw upon literature on the state in order to complement a 
Habermasian framework, particularly when expanding our gaze to non-Western contexts. 
Drawing on Colin Hay’s theory of crisis and the structural transformation of the state, 
I illustrate an alternate relationship linking market, society, state, and the medium of the 
public sphere. I show that an authoritarian state can contribute to the emergence of the 
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public and counterpublic spheres, by establishing a symbolic structure based on laws and 
rights that penetrates society. Precisely because the Chinese state is a capable authoritarian 
state, it can build a legal system that would take much longer to develop in other contexts.
73
 
It can also mobilize the state apparatus to increase the penetrative power of law. The 
reconstituted and highly unified CCP leadership after the end of the Cultural Revolution did 
not intend to rebuild China’s legal system for the purpose of establishing a public sphere. 
Law was meant to be used as an instrument for the state to achieve stability, unity, and 
modernization. 
Nevertheless, as Sewell (2005:56) has noted, even centralized and able institutional 
actors may not be able to control coherence in cultural practice. The Chinese state became 
less unified and more porous with the unfolding of economic reform and the accumulation 
of contradictions in the reform process. The state was also subjected to new constraints by 
its own creation of the market and its pursuit of market profits. The emerging interstices 
within the state apparatus over time and its increasingly diverse goals transformed the law 
beyond the mere instrument meant to achieve the state’s original purposes. For instance, 
disagreement within the Party-state over the focus of law dissemination campaigns aided 
the spread of the discourse of the rights. To construct and facilitate the market economy, the 
state needed to educate citizens that the law is a tool to protect their rights. Also, the 
institutional creation of the CCP reformist leaders in the late 1980s produced a condition 
for law and rights to play a central role in formulating public opinion, even after some of the 
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reformists were purged for being “counter-revolutionary.” In addition, despite being a 
mouthpiece of the state, Chinese media were also thrust into the emerging “cultural 
commodity market” and thus subject to market logic and the demands of an audience 
hungry for information about the law and its relevance to their lives. Though still 
constrained by the state, journalists now had more motivation and room to uncover illegal 
practices and to criticize the non-fulfillment of rights protection. When law has become not 
only a weapon of the state, but also a weapon of the people potentially against the state, 
how the state can use the law to solve legitimation crises presents a dilemma. If the state 
does follow the law, it will lose part of its monopoly on power; but if it does not follow the 
law, it will arouse public criticism. 
The Chinese case also illustrates the role of law vis-a-vis the public sphere. In the 
European cases, private law ensured private autonomy, thus enabling private people to 
develop the capacity to conduct rational-critical argument. As I have shown, the Chinese 
state constructed its market economy partly by codifying laws related to the economy. The 
reason that these laws have contributed to the emerging public and counterpublic spheres in 
China is not because they bracket off the intervention of the state and guard private 
autonomy. Rather, it is because the growing body of laws made the state responsible for a 
variety of problems that stem from the failure of these laws. And laws related to the 
economy – in which rights play a critical component – have given Chinese citizens a sense 
of entitlement and rights consciousness, and raised their expectation that the state should 
ensure the enforcement of law and the realization of rights.  
Moreover, the Chinese case also demonstrates how and why “undemocratic law,”  
imposed from the top, with little foundation from the bottom, can nonetheless become a 
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penetrative and integrative medium that constitutes public and counterpublic spheres. In the 
Chinese case, several conditions make law penetrative and integrative. The first condition 
is the component of rights in law, because such law induces a sense of entitlement and 
rights consciousness. As stated, China’s decision to join the global market economy made it 
almost impossible for Chinese law to avoid rights as a component in law. The second 
condition is that the state enacts many laws that are related to critical aspects of life for 
ordinary citizens, particularly the economy. Few Chinese people care about political rights, 
and even fewer would like to become political dissidents, but most of them are concerned 
with their economic self-interests. The third condition is effective law dissemination, which 
tells citizens about the law and their rights. As the Rule of Law Index shows, the Chinese 
government performed excellently in this respect. The fourth condition is a widely 
perceived failure of law enforcement or rights protection. The condition is often satisfied 
when communication institutions are able to broadcast such failure. The first three 
conditions have led to a Chinese version of the “myth of rights,” despite of the lack of a 
prevalent concept of natural rights in China. The fourth condition has been met now that 
law and rights have become a standardized language for citizens across strata to talk about 
important problems in China. It has also made citizens recognize that many of their 
problems are not individual, but systematic, and that the state has a responsibility to deal 
with the promises made by the discourse of law. In the 2011 Rule of Law Index conducted 
by the World Justice Project, China was ranked the 27th out of 67 as an “open government,” 
but it was ranked the 44th in terms of legal enforcement, and 65th in terms of protection of 
fundamental rights. The disjuncture between rights promised and rights protected may not 
necessarily constitute a threat to regime stability, but it does provide a language and a 
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framework for citizens to generalize beyond their individual experiences to broader societal 
problems. The Chinese case thus demonstrates that “noncivil purposes and effects of law 
do not exhaust what law is about” (Alexander 2006:152), even in an authoritarian context.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the coexistence of the above four conditions is far from 
guaranteed. The second and third conditions may not be satisfied in authoritarian countries 
without capable states, such as in many African and Latin American countries. The third 







Freeing the Press: How Field Overlap Explains Critical News Reporting in China 
In Chapter 3, I detailed why and how the Chinese state established a symbolic 
structure based on laws and rights that penetrates Chinese society. In this chapter, I 
examine how unintended consequences of this process facilitated the production of 
critical news reports – reports that identify fundamental societal problems, analyze their 
causes, and search for solutions
1
– and the formation of social networks associated with 
critical news reporting. As I stated in Chapter 2, despite the Tiananmen incident, with the 
deepening of economic reform, China’s political climate became relatively less 
conservative in the period between 1998 and 2004, though the fundamental political 
reforms considered in the late 1980s have yet to return to the CCP agenda. The less 
conservative political conditions and the process of media marketization gave Chinese 
media the opportunity to produce critical reports examining people’s economic rights and 
the state’s failure to fulfill them. In this chapter, I will show how a few newspapers were 
able to appropriate this opportunity to produce critical news reports that discussed even 
more fundamental societal problems in China and promoted political rights and agendas, 
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despite ongoing state censorship. Understanding the production of critical news reports is 
important for two major reasons. First, critical news reporting is indispensable for an 
effective public sphere. Second, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Five, political culture 
and social networks associated with critical news reporting have greatly influenced the 
structure of China’ emerging online sector, as well as the emerging oppositional discourse. 
This chapter thus aims to explain critical news reporting in China.  
In normative theories of democracy, the news media are expected to produce critical 
news reports because such reports facilitate the function of an effective public sphere 
(Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Habermas 1989; 1996; 2006; Peters 2008). In liberal 
democracies, scholars and the general public often demand critical news reports so that 
citizens are able to discuss shared problems and participate in politics effectively (Graber 
2003). This public deliberation and participation helps to strengthen civil society and 
deepen representative democracy. In authoritarian contexts, the news media are often 
expected by scholars to constitute counter publics, spur political transformation, and 
reshape the state–society relationship (Ojo 2007; Olukotun 2002). Indeed, this 
relationship between media and the public is considered by many to be at the heart of 
democracy and democratization.  
In reality, however, a gap often exists between the media’s normative role and its 
actual practices, even in developed democracies. Media practices are often unduly 
influenced by political and economic power. Even in advanced democracies where 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press are protected, the media do not always report 




to purse social movements and advance social change. Thus, in such democratic contexts, 
scholars and commentators often criticize the media for failing to advance deliberation 
and deepen democracy (Bourdieu 2001; Fallows 1996; Gans 2003; Habermas 1989; Mills 
1956).  
Not surprisingly, this situation is exacerbated in authoritarian contexts. Here, 
pointing out the systematic roots of problems is often considered to be threatening and 
oppositional to the state. Faced with censorship and other forms of political control, 
media professionals in authoritarian contexts take huge personal and political risks even 
when they attempt to discuss certain social problems, let alone when they explicitly 
criticize the government. It is not uncommon for journalists in authoritarian countries to 
be punished by the government for engaging in critical news reporting.  
China exemplifies an authoritarian country with unfavorable conditions for critical 
news reporting. China is consistently ranked as one of the countries with the least freedom 
of press and freedom of speech by Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders.
2
 
With pervasive censorship, critical news reporting is often discouraged, if not completely 
suppressed, in China. After the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the government highly 
restricted reports that referred to systematic problems because Chinese leaders argued 
such news was to blame for sparking the Tiananmen protests and threatening the 
Party-state’s legitimacy. In addition to denouncing such “negative” reports, the Chinese 
state strengthened its request for “positive propaganda,” whereby journalists were asked 
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to report the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and to emphasize the 
“bright side” of the news.
3
 Furthermore, similar to their counterparts in liberal 
democracies, Chinese media are subjected to economic pressures as well. With the 
expansion of China’s market economy, scholars find that economic power has corrupted 
the country’s news content. Individuals and businesses can use money to forestall 
unfavorable coverage and obtain favorable coverage instead (Zhao 1998; 2000c). Thus, 
Chinese media are described as remaining “aloof to the democratic impulse in the society” 
(Pan 2010:185) and attempting to “avoid a critical interrogation of the broader social and 
economic structure” (Zhao 2004:63).  
Yet, despite these overwhelming pressures, some Chinese news media do manage to 
produce critical news reports. In an article comparing Chinese and Western media, for 
example, Zhao and Lin (2008) call attention to the democratic role of Chinese media. 
Despite the unfavorable political environment, certain Chinese media, especially 
newspapers, have attempted to resist state control and produce critical news reports – 
sometimes provoking, in turn, a government crackdown (Qian 2008). Such reporting is 
still relatively infrequent, however, and unevenly distributed within the country, 
prompting the question that this chapter aims to address: When and why are some media 
in China able to produce critical news reports?  
So far, there have been only limited efforts to examine when and why Chinese news 
media differ with regards to critical news reporting. Existing studies point out the 
existence of two exceptional Chinese news media famous for investigative practices: the 
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China Central Television (CCTV), the national state television broadcaster; and the 
Southern Weekly, a weekly newspaper based in Guangdong. Scholars suggest that two 
factors explain why these media are or were able to report on problems. First, these media 
individualize and localize problems without delving too deeply into their roots. As such, 
these forums avoid linking said problems to the failure of the regime or the central 
leadership in any way. Second, these news media are or were sheltered by certain 
government agencies. CCTV is affiliated with the central government and, thus, permitted 
to criticize local governments and private businesses, while the Southern Weekly was 
protected by provincial government officials (Pan 2010; Zhao 2000c; 2004).  
Despite their merits, existing studies leave many questions unanswered. First, the 
question of whether Chinese news media are totally silent on fundamental problems 
remains contested, even in existing studies. Second, little data exists about how journalists 
resist political logics of the authoritarian state at the micro-level. Existing research has not 
investigated, for example, where journalists obtain resources for critical news reporting, 
beyond a few state agencies. Most news media do not have CCTV’s privilege. In addition, 
even when individual officials sympathetic to journalists do exist, the tenures of those 
officials are unpredictable, and there are always other government officials who are more 
likely to retaliate against critical reporting. Third, we still know little about how 
micro-level media resistance is enabled and constrained by structural conditions. Fourth, 
with a paucity of data about news media other than CCTV and the Southern Weekly, it is 
difficult to examine and explain differences among news media. These limitations make 




chapter pursues through a comparative study of five newspaper organizations in four 
localities in coastal China. 
The study examines newspapers rather than other media for two reasons. First, 
newspapers play a crucial role in critical reporting. Despite the existence of other media 
and various technological advances favoring competing forms, newspapers remain an 
important source for citizens to access information and analysis about social problems in 
China. As print media, newspapers have more space to analyze societal problems and 
discuss solutions in depth than television and radio. Newspaper reports are also widely 
disseminated on the Internet. And while the process of "printing" newspapers has 
increasingly moved exclusively online, the popularity of news sites speaks to the 
continued demand for textually-based coverage.
4
  
Second, the complexity of the newspaper field also renders the study of Chinese 
newspapers fruitful for investigating the relationships between structural conditions and 
critical news reporting. Despite the turmoil that followed the 1989 Tiananmen incident, 
the Chinese government accelerated the process of media marketization since 1992. In the 
past, newspapers were subsidized by the state and expected simply to serve as 
mouthpieces of state propaganda. In 1992, the Chinese state officially categorized the 
news industry as part of the service industry. The government also began drastically 
reducing its funding of newspapers, forcing newspapers to rely on advertising and sales to 
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survive (Lee 2000; Zhao 1998). As a result of this process of media marketization, 
although newspapers are still state agencies responsible for propaganda, they are also (and 
increasingly) market actors that must attract readers. Furthermore, the marketization of 
newspapers has spurred the growth of a professional journalist community in China, even 
though the profession as a whole is still far from independent (Hassid 2011; Pan and Chan 
2003). As a consequence of these developments, political, market, and professional power 
and logics all influence news production. Importantly, newspaper organizations, 
regulatory agencies, and the journalist community are situated differently in relation to 
one another across localities (Lee, He, and Huang 2007; Zeng and Huang 2012). This 
heterogeneity provides a rich setting for exploring critical news reporting through 
comparative study of newspaper organizations. 
Building upon the literature on field overlap (Edelman et al. 2010; Evans and Kay 
2008; Thornton and Ocasio 2008), field theory, and law and resistance, my comparative 
study of five newspaper organizations reveals the importance of field overlap between the 
newspaper and legal fields to critical news reporting. With the Chinese state’s shift to law 
as a new mode of domination, the legal field became a critical site providing valuable 
resources for journalists to produce critical news reports. The Chinese state’s use of media 
to disseminate law further forged a bridge connecting the newspaper and legal fields. I 
argue that those newspapers that capitalized on this institutional field overlap and more 
effectively utilized network mechanisms to access resources in the legal field were the 
most likely to produce critical news reports. This ability, however, was also conditioned 




In order to make this argument, I begin with a review of the literature on field 
overlap, law and resistance, and field theory, drawing on the most insightful elements to 
develop a theoretical framework to explain critical news reporting in China. Next, I 
consider case selection and data analysis strategy, then I present the results of my 
empirical analysis in two parts. Using content analysis, I first establish the variation 
among five selected local newspapers in terms of critical news reporting. Then I draw on 
analysis of in-depth interview data to explain this variation. In the last section, I 
summarize the research findings, discuss their contribution to the existing literature, and 
consider the broader implications of the findings. I end this chapter by discussing the 
limitations of the research and giving recommendations for further research. 
4.1. A FIELD ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL NEWS REPORTING 
In this section, I develop a theoretical framework from the perspective of field 
analysis to address when and why Chinese media produce critical news reports. I begin by 
discussing how a conventional theoretical framework might present the configuration of 
political, economic and professional power as influencing news production. Drawing on 
theories of field overlap, I argue that the conventional framework is unsatisfying as it 
does not consider the ways in which journalists might mobilize resources outside the 
media field for critical news reporting. Accordingly, I discuss why and how field overlap 
mechanisms can facilitate political contention. Then, I consider which fields can provide 
journalists in authoritarian contexts with valuable resources for resisting political pressure. 
Drawing on literature on law and resistance, I argue for the critical importance of the legal 




aspects of field overlap, theorizing how structural conditions in the media field can impact 
the process and effects of field overlap.  
4.1.1. The Conventional Framework of News Production   
Existing studies outline the architecture of the media field and explain news 
production according to the structural conditions within that field (Benson 2006; Benson 
and Neveu 2005; Bourdieu 2005; Habermas 1989). According to these studies, the main 
players in the field are journalists, media organizations, state agencies, advertising buyers, 
and readers. These actors interact with one another based on a set of common 
understandings regarding the purposes of the media field, the relationships between actors, 
and the rules in the field (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011).  
In this conventional framework, news production is influenced by professional, 
market, and political logics. As members of a professional community, journalists are 
subject to professional norms, but they also need to consider the state’s regulatory power 
and media organizations’ revenues from advertisers and readers. When journalists make 
decisions about news production, different logics may contradict one another and 
influence news content. Political and market logics often compete with professional logics 
and constitute obstacles to critical news reporting. Institutional factors, such as ownership 
structure, could impact which logics prevail in news production (Benson and Saguy 2005; 
Bourdieu 2005; Champagne 2005; Gans 2003; Habermas 1989; 2006; Zhao 1998). In 




situated in relation to other actors – impacts the configuration and influence of 
professional, market, and political logics and, therefore, the content of news. 
4.1.2. Field Overlap and Resistance 
The above framework of field analysis provides an insightful tool for analyzing news 
production, but its focus on the dynamics within the media field implicitly assumes the 
irrelevance or insignificance of other fields on news production. The emerging literature 
on field overlap, however, suggests the importance of analyzing the intersection of the 
media field with other fields, as the latter may provide critical resources, or what 
Bourdieu called capital, that enable journalists to resist the undue influence of political 
and market logics (Edelman et al. 2010; Evans and Kay 2008; Thornton and Ocasio 
2008). 
Field overlap is a critical structural condition that facilitates political mobilization 
and contention. When two fields intersect, actors in one field have an opportunity to 
access and utilize material and symbolic recourse in the other field, thus having more 
leverage to resist dominant logics and bring about change. Meanwhile, actors and logics 
in the latter field can have cross-boundary influence on the former field (Edelman et al. 
2010; Evans and Kay 2008; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). In this aspect, theories of field 
overlap echo the contributions of research that points out the structural advantage of 
boundary-bridging organizations in creating innovative discourse and practice (e.g., 




Building on field overlap theories, I suggest that fields overlap through two kinds of 
non-mutually exclusive mechanisms: institutional mechanisms and network mechanisms. 
As one of the earliest sociological studies to explicitly theorize “the architecture of field 
overlap,” Evan and Kay’s work (2008) illustrates four field overlap mechanisms: 
rulemaking, alliance brokerage, resource brokerage, and frame adaptation. These 
mechanisms can, ultimately, be boiled down to institutional and network mechanisms. In 
the instance of rulemaking, actors in one field can influence the political landscape in 
another field by making rules that operate in the latter field. Such cross-boundary 
influence derives from institutional arrangements. In fact, institutions can connect fields 
in many ways. For instance, institutions can justify the participation of actors in multiple 
fields. Institutions also define what can be counted as resources or capital and therefore 
determine the relationship between fields (Bourdieu 1994). Alliance brokerage, resource 
brokerage, and frame adaptation in Evan and Kay’s study all operate through the same 
type of mechanism – namely, social network mechanisms. Actors in one field access and 
employ material and symbolic resource in other fields by forming and using social 
networks. Importantly, the formation of social networks that bridge fields is a selection 
process. Actors tend to seek complementary partners that share similar goals, views, or 
opponents (Jensen 2004; Rucht 2004). Bourdieu’s field theory (1985) suggests actors that 
occupy dominated positions in their respective fields are likely to form alliances to 
challenge incumbents. 
The main advantage of the more parsimonious classification offered here is that it 




mechanisms (Evans and Kay 2008). Institutional and network mechanisms have 
important differences. Field overlap through institutional mechanisms is a global 
condition, applying to actors that are bounded by an institution. In comparison, actors 
have more agency to decide whether they want to bridge fields through network 
mechanisms. But, despite their differences, institutional and network mechanisms are 
interdependent. They can shape each other and jointly impact the outcome of field overlap. 
On the one hand, as institutions provide the rules and incentives for action, institutional 
mechanisms influence where actors can find resources and how they form social 
relationships to mobilize those resources. Therefore, identifying institutional mechanisms 
helps to illuminate the formation of social relationships. On the other hand, networks 
provide a context through which institutional processes unfold. Network mechanisms can 
transform the institutions that bridge fields as varying configurations of networks can 
impact how institutions are understood and operated (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008; 
Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2000).  
4.1.3. The Legal Field and Resistance  
Given that field overlap can give journalists leverage and impact news production, 
the next question to consider is which fields overlap with the media field and provide 
journalists in authoritarian contexts with critical resources for news reporting. I argue that 
in China, the legal field plays this critical role. In the legal field, the main actors are 
lawyers, their professional associations, law firms, legal official, state agencies, and 
ordinary citizens; the main agenda is the interpretation and application of law (Edelman et 




resources to thematize problems and challenge the government given law’s multiple 
institutional characteristics (Bourdieu 1987; Burstein 1991; Edelman et al. 2010; Ewick 
and Silbey 1991; Habermas 1996; Hunt 1990; McCann and March 1995). 
The relevance of the legal field to critical news reporting partly derives from the 
institutional characteristic of law as a common medium to discuss a variety of issues in 
society. As Habermas (1996:353-354) pointed out, law is a critical institution that 
facilitates the operation of the public sphere and the integration of society, as it serves a 
common language for citizens to identify and talk about problems across different spheres 
of life. Discussions of social problems and solutions are thus often translated into 
contestation over the interpretation and application of legal texts and principles (Balkin 
2009). As critical reports aim to address societal problems and law is a common language 
for discussing these problems, the media and legal fields are closely related.  
The importance of the legal field to critical news reporting also derives from law’s 
institutional nature as a symbolic resource against the state’s power and political logics. 
The state’s use of law as an instrument of domination endows law with this property. 
Existing research has pointed out the paradoxical and mutually constitutive relationship 
between domination and resistance. As Merry (1990:7) has stated, “the dominating 
ideology itself establishes the terms for acts of resistance.” Using codified law to govern 
is a quintessential example of symbolic domination, through which the state imposes a 
common set of coercive norms (Bourdieu 1987; 1994; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:112). 
But, importantly, symbolic domination is not without cost. The dilemma facing the state 




subject itself and its political logics to the same symbolic order of law (Bourdieu 1987; 
Bourdieu 1994)1994). Furthermore, the state does not have complete control over how 
other actors interpret and employ the law. Law’s cultural characteristic as a plastic 
medium allows actors to develop alternative discourse and thus facilitates political 
contention. The costs of symbolic domination using law are especially high when law 
creates or acknowledges citizen rights over the government; hence, law’s Janus-faced 
nature as both a threat and a promise (Alexander 2006; Balkin 2009; Somers 1993; 1994; 
Thompson 1975). Indeed, existing studies show that when authoritarian state begin to use 
law to govern the populace and recognize citizens’ rights, citizens respond by learning 
how to mobilize law to negotiate and contend with the state (Lee 2007; Moustafa 2007; 
O'Brien and Li 2006).  
The above institutional characteristics of law urge investigation into the overlap 
between the media and legal fields, and this investigation, in turn, can help to understand 
the paradoxical relationship between domination and resistance. Although the literature 
points out that the institutional nature of law as an instrument of domination also renders 
it an instrument of resistance, little attention has been paid to how legal institutions 
influence the formation of social relationships, especially cross-cutting social networks. 
This neglect is unfortunate. Since the formation of social relationship is often a selection 
process, the pattern of social relationship can impact how actors engage with the law and 
whether law is used as an instrument of resistance. In essence, analyzing field overlap 




mechanisms can deepen understanding of the social and cultural processes that translate 
legal institutions into resistance. 
4.1.4. The Contingent and Heterogeneous Aspects of Field Overlap 
In the above section, I addressed the importance of field overlap between the legal 
and media fields for critical news reporting. In this section, I consider the contingency and 
heterogeneity of field overlap processes and integrate these factors into my theoretical 
framework. Even when theories recognize the significance of field overlap, they do not 
adequately attend to the contingent and heterogeneous aspects of the phenomenon. 
Because institutions in contemporary society are complex and interconnected, field 
overlap through institutional mechanisms is not an unusual phenomenon (Edelman et al. 
2010; Friedland and Alford 1991). Theoretically, actors bounded by an institution can all 
utilize the structural opportunities created by the institution. Actors can also emulate 
successful strategies of using networks to access various resources (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). However, not all actors can use these structural opportunities to pursue their 
agendas successfully in reality.  
Certain literature on field theory indicates that variation in individual ability to 
conduct strategic action is an important factor in explaining divergent outcomes in a field 
(Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011), but I suggest that the structural conditions 
within a field can also impact the use of field overlap mechanisms. To be sure, the 
differential abilities of individual and collective actors to articulate interests, shape 




mechanisms. Yet, the strategies of actors also depend on their position in the field in 
relation to other actors. How actors can use their resources to wield power and propagate 
their logics hinges on the distribution of resources or capital among all relevant actors 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:114). Accordingly, investigating the distribution of 
resources or capital in the field is indispensable for understanding the power structure and 
how actors can make use of field overlap mechanisms. This emphasis on the within-field 
power structure is consistent with the prevailing analytical framework on news production 
with which I began this discussion, as that framework highlights how the configuration of 
political, economic, and professional power can impact news production. 
To be more specific about how the distribution of power within the media field 
impacts the use of field overlap mechanisms, I suggest that when political and economic 
power is less concentrated and when professional power is strong in the media field, 
journalists are more likely to use field overlap mechanisms to resist the undue influence 
of political and economic logics, and vice versa. In her study of eighteenth-century 
England (1993), Somers finds that varying political, economic, and social power 
structures explain why villagers in two regions differed in their ability to use national law 
to claim citizen rights. In the region where few landholders monopolized political and 
economic resources, villagers were not able to develop a strong community. As a result of 
this power structure, villagers failed to leverage national law for citizenship claims. In 
contrast, in the region where multiple landholders existed, no single powerful lord could 
fully control the village, and villagers were able to develop a more cohesive community. 




allowed villagers to turn the law to their advantage. In a similar vein, in a study of 
Shanghai media, scholars have found that the distribution of local political and economic 
power influences the submissiveness of media. Since political resources are concentrated 
in a single propaganda agency and the market is monopolized by few players, it is easy for 
the Shanghai government to control the local media (Lee et al. 2007). Essentially, the 
distribution of political, economic, and professional power in the media field can 
moderate the extent to which journalists are able to use field overlap mechanisms to 
produce critical news reports.  
In sum, building upon the conventional framework of news production, I have 
developed a theoretical framework that considers how field overlap between the media 
and legal fields can facilitate critical news reporting, and how field overlap mechanisms 
are conditioned by the distribution of political, economic and professional power in the 
media field. 
4.2. CASE SELECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
To explain when and why some newspapers in China are able to produce critical 
news reports, I conducted a comparative study of five newspaper organizations in four 
cities in coastal China: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Fuzhou. The five newspaper 
organizations are listed in Table 4-1. In the paragraphs below, I describe the selection of 







TABLE 4-1: Selected newspapers. 
 






per day in 
2005* 
1 Beijing Times (jinghua shibao) Beijing 2001 380,000 
2 Shanghai Morning Post (xinwen 
chenbao) 
Shanghai 1999 461,900 
3 Southern Metropolis Daily  
(nanfang dushibao) 
Guangzhou 1997 1,400,000 
4 Yangcheng Evening News 
(Yangcheng wanbao) 
Guangzhou 1957 1,210,000 
5 The Strait Metropolis Daily 
(haixia dushibao) 
Fuzhou 1997 247,000 
6 People’s Daily 
(renmin ribao) 
National 1948 1,926,400 
NOTE.—* China Journalism Yearbook 2006, pp. 618–21. 
 
4.2.1. Case Selection 
The goal of case selection was to find comparable newspaper organizations that 
would allow me to examine the relationships between field overlap, structural conditions 
in the newspaper field, and critical news reporting. In order to investigate how structural 
conditions – configuration of political, economic and professional power – moderate field 
overlap mechanisms and influence critical news reporting, I selected comparable 




Case selection was based on analysis of secondary literature and 38 preliminary 
interviews with journalists and scholars knowledgeable about the Chinese press. I 
conducted these preliminary interviews between 2009–2010 in China and the United 
States. There were three stages to the case selection process. I first selected the region to 
study, then chose specific localities within the region, and finally chose newspaper 
organizations from the selected localities. This selection process allowed me to select 
comparable newspaper organizations embedded in different structural conditions. I will 
discuss each of these three steps in turn.  
First, I chose to study China’s coastal urban region. China is a huge country with 
spatially heterogeneous economies. The geographical inequality of coastal versus inland 
provinces and the urban–rural divide is well documented (Xie and Hannum 1996). As the 
level of economic development in the urban coastal region is relatively homogenous, I 
decided to focus on this region to control for this element. Readers in areas with different 
levels of economic development could arguably have distinct demands with regard to 
news content that would, in turn, further impact news production. Focusing on newspaper 
organizations in areas with relatively comparable economic development makes the task 
of comparison more viable, although this strategy inevitably restricts the generalizability 
of the argument.  
Second, I selected the four coastal region cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
and Fuzhou because the structural conditions – specifically, the way in which the 
professional community of journalists is situated in relation to state agencies and the 




journalists’ professional community in each location according to the extent to which 
journalists behave as spokespersons for the public and fight for professional autonomy. I 
examined the structure of state agencies in order to measure the distribution of political 
power (Chan 2003; Lee et al. 2007; Somers 1993; Zeng and Huang 2012). Newspapers 
are regulated by the Propaganda Department, but the Propaganda Departments at different 
administrative levels do not necessarily have congruent standards and interests. When 
multiple-level Propaganda Departments co-exist in a locality, the political power is more 
fragmented. I analyzed the distribution of market power according to the level of market 
competition. When the market is more competitive, a newspaper organization has less 
power over consumers and is under more pressure to consider readers’ demands.  
My analysis suggests that political, market, and professional power configures in 
three distinct ways across the four cities. In Guangzhou, a strong journalist community is 
situated in relation to less unified state agencies and a highly competitive newspaper 
market. In Beijing and Fuzhou, a moderately strong journalist community is positioned in 
tandem with less unified state agencies and a moderately competitive newspaper market. 
In Shanghai, a moderately strong journalist community is situated alongside a more 
unified state apparatus and a moderately competitive newspaper market. I summarize 
these results in Table 4-2. These variations allowed me to tease out the relationships 





TABLE 4-2: Configuration of political, economic, and professional power in the 
newspaper field. 
 
Guangzhou Beijing and Fuzhou Shanghai 
A strong journalist 
community is situated in 
relation to less unified state 
agencies and a highly 
competitive newspaper 
market. 
A moderately strong 
journalist community is 
situated in relation to less 
unified state agencies and a 
moderately competitive 
newspaper market. 
A moderately strong 
journalist community is 
situated in relation to a 
more unified state apparatus 






Third and finally, I selected five comparable newspaper organizations. In order to do 
this, I selected five local, commercially oriented newspaper organizations that attempt to 
attract urban readers in the four cities. I first excluded non-comparable organizations from 
the selection pool (see Methodological Notes). Then I made a final selection from the 
three most popular commercial newspaper organizations in each location.  
As discussed earlier, field theory suggests that ability to conduct strategic action may 
impact organizational performance in a field (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 
2011). In terms of using network mechanisms, whether a newspaper organization has 
preexisting relationships with actors beyond the newspaper field can impact whether they 
are able to form collaborative networks. In this aspect, no noticeable difference existed 
among the top three local newspapers in Beijing, Shanghai, or Fuzhou in the early 2000s. 
None of these newspapers had noticeable relationships with actors beyond the newspaper 
field. Due to this lack of variation, I randomly selected one newspaper organization from 




In comparison, there was significant variation among the top three Guangzhou 
newspaper organizations. One of the newspapers, the Southern Metropolis Daily, had 
more connections beyond the newspaper field. The Southern Media Group, the newspaper 
conglomerate that operates the Southern Metropolis Daily, also publishes the Southern 
Weekly, a weekly newspaper that has circulated in many Chinese cities since 1984. The 
Southern Weekly has been influential among intellectuals and has a national reputation. 
Since the Southern Metropolis Daily and the Southern Weekly are both operated by the 
Southern Media Group, the Southern Metropolis Daily had a greater capacity to form 
cross-cutting collaborative networks than other local newspapers. To increase variation, I 
selected the Southern Metropolis Daily and randomly selected one newspaper from the 
other two newspaper organizations in Guangzhou.  
4.2.2. Data Analysis Strategy 
My empirical analysis was comprised of two parts. I first established the variation 
among the five selected local newspapers in terms of critical news reporting. Then I 
examined the relationship between field overlap, structural conditions, and critical news 
reporting across the five selected newspaper organizations in order to address my research 
question. In this section, I begin with an introduction of the two primary data sources that 
I drew on to conduct empirical analysis: news reports and in-depth interviews. Then I 





News reports published by the five selected local newspapers and the People’s Daily 
between 2003 and 2006 provided the first source of data for this study. In addition to the 
five selected local newspapers, I also analyzed the reports of the People’s Daily since the 
comparison of People’s Daily’s content and news reports published by the five selected 
local newspapers helps to foreground the relationship between domination and resistance. 
As the central Party-state’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily’s content serves as the 
yardstick of dominant official discourse. Analysis of this content helps to understand how 
and when critical reports depart from official discourse. Just as revealing, however, is an 
analysis of what is missing altogether, as People’s Daily’s content provides a sense of what 
news the central government is avoiding and, thus, what content, if covered by other 
publications, would challenge the state. I decided to analyze news reports produced 
between 2003 and 2006 because the newspaper and legal fields were already highly 
developed and remained stable in this period. Additionally, the influence of the Internet 
and social media on news production was still limited at this stage, so there was less 
concern about how journalists were connected with one another and other actors via the 
Internet.  
The second data source for this study was 64 in-depth interviews. I conducted two 
waves of interviews. The first-wave consisted of 38 preliminary interviews with 28 
journalists and 10 scholars knowledgeable about the Chinese press between 2009 and 
2010. I conducted face-to-face interviews in China and the United States. Each first-wave 




conducted the second-wave interviews in 2011 with three groups: Chinese journalists who 
work or have worked in the selected newspaper organizations; lawyers and legal scholars; 
and communication studies scholars. The distribution of these subjects is provided in 
Table 4-3. To better understand how and why newspapers have historically used field 
overlap mechanisms in news production, I chose to interview journalists who have been in 
the field for at least five years and have regular interactions with other state agencies. Many 
of these journalists have also taken leadership positions at their newspaper organizations. I 
conducted face-to-face interviews in Guangzhou and Beijing. I conducted phone 
interviews with the journalists who were working in Shanghai and Fuzhou. Each 
second-wave interview lasted about two to two and half hours. E-mails were exchanged 
when further information was required.  
TABLE 4-3: Distribution of interview subjects in second-wave interviews. 
 
 Interview subjects Numbers 
1 Beijing Times journalists 3 
2 Shanghai Morning Post journalists 2 
3 Southern Metropolis Daily journalists 6 
4 Yangcheng Evening News journalists 3 
5 The Strait Metropolis Daily journalists 2 
6 People’s Daily journalists 2 
7 Lawyers and legal scholars  6 
9 Communication studies scholars 2 
 Total 26 
 
 
Two-part Empirical Analysis 
The first part of the empirical analysis establishes the level of variation among the 




what constitutes critical news reports, I inductively developed a six-dimensional scheme 
based on the 64 in-depth interviews. I asked subjects what kinds of problems and 
solutions to problems journalists would and should report due to their importance to 
Chinese society if external pressures were not a consideration. Their answers are captured 
as six dimensions listed in Table 4-4 (see Methodological Notes). I briefly explain the six 
dimensions below. 
TABLE 4-4: Dimensions and keywords for content analysis. 
 
 Dimension Keywords 
1 Unconstitutionality 违宪 
2 The state’s infringement 
of rights and other illegal 
behavior  
(侵害人民) or (侵害公民) or (侵害民众) or (政府违
法) or (干部违法) or (官员违法) or 腐败 
3 Rights of marginal or 
disadvantaged groups and 
discrimination thereof 
(弱势群体 and 权利) or (边缘群体 and 权利) or (边
缘人群 and 权利) or (歧视 and 权利) 
4 Systematic evaluation of 
compulsory acquisition of 
land and property 
(拆迁) 
5 Citizenship rights, civil 
society, and political 
participation 
(公民社会 and 权利) or (公民意识 and 权利) or (公
民参与 and 权利) or (政治参与 and 权利) 
6 Judicial independence or 
reform 
(法院 and 独立) or (司法 and 独立) or (司法 and 
改革) or (法院 and 改革) 
 
 
The first dimension is unconstitutionality. My interviewees pointed out that 
unconstitutionality is a critical issue as the government uses unconstitutional laws and 
regulations to deny or even impinge upon citizen rights. The government wants citizens to 
comply with laws unconditionally without questioning the content of those laws. News 
reports that allude to unconstitutionality remind readers of the danger of taking law’s 




The second dimension examines the state’s infringement of rights and illegal 
behavior. There was a consensus among my interviewees that many serious problems in 
China are caused by the government's infringing upon citizen rights, government 
corruption, and other illegal behavior. This dimension looks at the extent to which 
newspapers point out that government agencies are, in fact, the cause of societal 
problems.  
The third dimension investigates the rights of marginal or disadvantaged groups and 
discrimination against them. This dimension relates to inequality – the unequal 
distribution of de facto rights. Increasing inequality is a serious problem in China, 
occurring in every critical aspect of life, such as education, health care, and opportunity to 
work. News items that frame these such in terms of the rights of marginal or 
disadvantaged groups, instead of as individual anecdotes, represent an effort to emphasize 
the social importance of said issues. 
The fourth dimension examines the systematic evaluation of the compulsory 
acquisition of land and property. Compulsory acquisition of land and property – the 
Chinese version of the enclosure movement – often triggers serious collective action and 
fanatical resistance. My interviewees stated that instances of land grabbing are often 
described as individual cases, and that journalists should make a greater effort to identify 
the widespread nature of the problem and its roots instead.  
The fifth dimension—citizenship rights, civil society, and political participation—is 




interviewees that broadening citizenship rights, civil society and political participation is 
key to addressing fundamental societal problems.  
The sixth dimension examines judicial independence or reform. Many subjects see 
the Chinese judicial system as problematic. As the functioning of the courts impacts the 
realization of a variety of rights, my interviewees reported a belief that judicial 
independence or reform is another necessity to solving problems in China.  
After identifying these six dimensions of critical news reports, I began to analyze 
news content to determine how often these elements appeared in the selected newspapers. 
I retrieved news from WiseNews, a professional digital news archive. I first used the 
keywords listed in Table 4-4 for the preliminary selection of news reports. These keywords 
are common terms that are used to describe and discuss issues related to the six 
dimensions outlined above. Next, my research assistant and I decided whether each article 
actually discussed the relevant dimension. I then counted the number of reports per 
dimension for each newspaper. Finally, I standardized the numbers of articles for each 
newspaper using z-scores along each dimension to facilitate comparison. Details about 
context analysis are presented in the Methodological Notes.  
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I examined the relationship between 
field overlap, structural conditions, and critical news reporting in order to develop an 
explanation of my research question. The primary data source that I drew on in this part 
of the analysis was in-depth interviews, although I also drew on the results of my content 
analysis to enhance my understanding of interview data. I read through interview notes 




the position of a specific newspaper organization in the newspaper field, the conundrums 
that journalists were facing, journalists’ strategies to address these problems, and the 
interaction between macro-level conditions and micro-level practices in news production. 
To increase the validity of my analysis, I constantly compared interview data from 
different subjects to determine areas of agreement and divergence. When areas of 
divergence occurred, I conducted follow-up interviews using telephones or e-mails to 
deepen my understanding of data. Furthermore, I asked certain interviewees to read and 
comment on my analysis of interview data and news content in order to enhance the 
validity of the study. Through this process of repeatedly analyzing and triangulating data, 
I was able to construct a narrative explaining why and when some newspapers were able 
to produce critical news reports. 
4.3. EXPLAINING CRITICAL NEWS REPORTING IN CHINA 
In this section, I present the results of my empirical analysis. I first establish that the 
five selected newspapers differed considerably in terms of their respective amounts of 
critical news reporting. Next, I explain why some of the newspapers produced more 
critical news reports than others. In order to do this, I outline the process by which the 
Chinese state’s actions led to institutional overlap between the legal and newspaper fields, 
which, in turn, created opportunities for journalists to access resources in the legal field. 
By then examining how this field overlap and creation of opportunities unfolded 
differently in Guangzhou, Beijing and Fuzhou, and Shanghai, I show how the 




journalists in each site were able to utilize network mechanisms to produce critical news 
reports. 
4.3.1. Variation in Critical News Reporting  
The results of my content analysis indicate that although China is ruled by a 
single-party authoritarian state well-known for censorship, that censorship has not 
completely silenced critical voices within the media. As explained above, I developed a 
six-dimensional scheme to measure the amount of critical news reports. Each dimension 
represents a category of problems or solutions to problems that my interview subjects 
identified as issues that journalists should and would report on if external pressures were 
not a consideration. Table 4-5 presents the number of critical news reports by dimensions.  
To facilitate comparison, I standardized the numbers of articles for each newspaper 
using z-scores along each dimension (i.e., each row in Table 4-5). For example, for the 
dimension of “unconstitutionality,” the first row in Table 4-5, I calculated the population 
mean and the population standard deviation from six raw scores (i.e., the numbers of 
articles on “unconstitutionality” for the six newspapers, respectively). Then I calculated 
the z-score for each newspaper by subtracting the population mean from the raw score 
and then dividing the difference by the population standard deviation. In this way, I 
obtained six z-scores for the dimension of “unconstitutionality.” I then repeated the same 
procedure to calculate z-scores for the other dimensions (i.e., rows).  
Table 4-6 presents the z-scores. The higher the z-score, the more critical news 




Figure 4-1. As the scheme is six-dimensional, each newspaper has six z-scores. I 
connected the six z-scores for each newspaper, so that each is represented by a hexagon 
showing the relative amount of critical news reports it produced in comparison with other 
newspapers. This visualization allows me to demonstrate differences and commonalities 
among newspapers parsimoniously. As Figure 4-1 shows, considerable variation exists 
among the five selected newspapers in terms of numbers of critical news reports, and this 
variation is associated with the distribution of political, market, and professional power in 
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Among the five selected newspapers, the newspapers in Guangzhou – the city with a 
strong journalist community vis-à-vis less unified state agencies and a highly competitive 
market produced the largest numbers of critical news reports. Each of the two Guangzhou 
newspapers had more articles that qualify as critical according to the six-dimensional 
measure than did each of the other three newspapers. Unlike the other newspapers, the two 
Guangdong newspapers were not silent on any of the six dimensions. They often 
extrapolated from single cases and framed issues as manifesting systematic problems. 
Furthermore, the Southern Metropolis Daily, the newspaper with the highest ability to 
form cross-cutting collaborative networks, had the most articles in each dimension among 
the five newspapers.  
As indicated by the almost overlapping hexagons representing the Beijing Times and 
the Strait Metropolis Daily in Figure 4-1, the Beijing and Fuzhou newspapers are similar 
in terms of their moderate attention to societal problems and solutions. Both newspapers 
had moderate amounts of critical news reports on all dimensions, except for the systematic 
causes of the compulsory acquisition of land and property. As I have mentioned, Beijing 
and Fuzhou were also similar in terms of the structural conditions in their respective 
newspaper fields. In both cities, a moderately strong journalist community coexisted with 
less unified state agencies and a moderately competitive newspaper market. 
The results of the content analysis for the Shanghai newspaper conform more to the 
conventional impression of media in authoritarian countries – namely, that it is uncritical. 
In Shanghai, we found a moderately strong journalist community and a moderately 




apparent interest in critical news reporting and rarely pointed out the problematic aspects 
of the government, with only a handful of reports addressing unconstitutionality, the 
state’s illegal behavior, political participation and judicial independence. There were no 
reports covering the systematic causes of the rampant problem of land grabbing. The 
disparity between the Shanghai Morning and the other newspapers is striking given that 
all of the selected cases aim to attract the same readership – urban middle class readers in 
the most prosperous areas in China. 
Next, I turn to the comparison between the selected local newspapers and the 
People’s Daily, as this comparison helps to highlight the paradoxical relationship between 
the critical news reports in local newspapers and the central state’s official discourse. In 
comparison with the hexagons that represent the five local newspapers in Figure 4-1, the 
hexagon that represents the People’s Daily bears the least resemblance to a regular hexagon, 
since the People’s Daily did not emphasize certain dimensions of problems or solutions at 
all. On the one hand, similar to the Guangzhou newspapers, the People’s Daily devoted 
considerable attention to the state’s illegal behavior, judicial independence or reform, and 
citizenship rights. In order to counter the impression that the Chinese authoritarian state 
does not intend to rule the nation in accordance with law, the People’s Daily strongly 
emphasized the institutional supremacy of law and its regulation of state agencies. But as 
my interview subjects pointed out, this is precisely because, as the mouthpiece of the 
central state, the People’s Daily has the political privilege to criticize and admonish the 
illegal behavior of government officials on behalf of the central government. In 




Nonetheless, the People’s Daily’s reporting of critical issues does create some space, 
albeit limited, for local newspapers to adopt similar framings and produce critical reports. 
On the other hand, unlike some of the local newspapers, the People’s Daily was 
completely silent on critical problems related to unconstitutionality and the structural 
causes of compulsory acquisition of land and property. My interviewees at the People’s 
Daily pointed out that this is because the central state does not want citizens to challenge 
the legitimacy of law or associate social problems with China’s political regime.  
The hexagon that stands for the People’s Daily can be perceived as representing the 
permissible or desirable area of discourse from the perspective of the Chinese state. Among 
the five local newspapers, only the Shanghai Morning avoided stepping outside of that 
area. The other four local newspapers remained within acceptable boundaries to a certain 
extent, but they also transgressed those boundaries to a certain extent. This partly 
converging and partly diverging relationship in news content between local newspapers 
and the People’s Daily reveals the paradoxical role of the central state in both 
constraining and enabling critical news reporting.  
To summarize, my content analysis establishes that the five local newspapers differ 
greatly in terms of critical news reporting and that this variation maps onto the structural 
conditions in the newspaper field. These findings are important for two reasons. First, 
these findings deviate from the conventional wisdom that Chinese media universally 
avoid reporting on fundamental and structural problems (Pan 2010; Zhao 2004). Second, 




suggests the need to further examine how exactly the conditions in each location 
facilitated or limited the production of critical news reports. 
4.3.2. Institutional Mechanisms of Overlap between the Newspaper and Legal 
Fields 
Having established the variation among the five newspapers in terms of critical news 
reporting, I turn now to explaining it. In this section, I show how the Chinese state’s shift 
to law as a new mode of domination bridged the newspaper and legal fields, thus opening 
up a space for journalists to use network mechanisms that facilitated critical news 
reporting.  
It may seem paradoxical to consider the significance of law in an authoritarian state, 
but, in fact, the Chinese state relies heavily on legal institutions to strengthen its 
legitimacy and govern the country. It is essential here to understand the relatively recent 
embrace of law by the Chinese state following the Cultural Revolution. China was 
essentially “lawless” during the Cultural Revolution. The state shifted to law as a new 
mode of domination in 1978, in order to address the legitimacy crisis the Cultural 
Revolution had engendered and to facilitate the transition to a market economy (Wang 
2010:5).
5
 In building the country’s legal infrastructure, the government subjected itself to 
international laws and borrowed heavily from laws in other countries (Peerenboom 2006; 
                                                 
5
 During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, both social and political order was jeopardized. Even 
Chinese leaders themselves saw the Cultural Revolution as a nasty, brutal, nationwide war of “all against all.” 
In addition, the national economy was at the edge of collapse by 1976, and thus the Chinese government was 




Potter 2004). As a result, Chinese legal institutions today generally resemble their 
counterparts in liberal democracies, where the concept of rights is a fundamental element. 
The state also recognized law as a critical form of symbolic capital and the highest form 
of order in the nation. This set the Chinese state up to be, itself, susceptible to the force of 
law and – importantly for the purposes of this analysis – to challenges based on different 
conceptions of law. 
But the Chinese state’s adoption of law was by no means uncomplicated or 
unqualified. From the moment it initiated the shift, the state took an instrumental approach 
that belied its intention to develop the liberal democratic rule of law (Alford 1990; 
Peerenboom 2002; 2006). Pragmatic Chinese leaders saw law as an institutionalized 
instrument to achieve stability, unity, and modernization (Deng 1994:189, 381) – that is, an 
instrument to rescue and strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP. The leaders set aside 
fundamental questions regarding the rule of law, such as how to justify the coercive 
nature of law and how to fulfill rights promised by law. The instrumental nature of their 
approach is evidenced by the People’s Daily’s emphasis on only certain legal stories, such 
as individual officials’ illegal behavior, compared with its complete silence regarding 
other aspects of law, such as whether certain laws are unconstitutional and why the 
regime fails to solve systematic land-grabbing issues across China. 
Chinese leaders believed that the success or failure of the transition to a new legal 
order hinged on how well law was disseminated to the Chinese populace. The desired 
order could be attained only if the majority of the populace knew and spontaneously 




participate in the emerging market economy. Yet, determining how to disseminate this 
kind of understanding and a normative relationship to the law proved to be a daunting 
task in the 1980s, considering China’s huge population and territory, and the very paucity 
of law during the Cultural Revolution. The general unfamiliarity with law among the 
Chinese populace was exemplified by the emergence of the term “legal illiterate (famang)” 
in the late 1970s, referring to those who did not know law or have a sense of legality.  
In order to make law work and to reap the benefits of symbolic domination, the 
Chinese state diffused law and the concept of rights through political campaigns and 
media communication. In 1985, the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Justice 
jointly announced a five-year plan to disseminate law to the public. This plan detailed 
methods and organizational strategies. The dissemination campaign aimed to acquaint 
citizens with basic knowledge of the law within five years, so that each citizen would 
understand and abide by the law. Between 1985 and 2010, five five-year plans of law 
dissemination were implemented. Importantly, these campaigns relied heavily on the 
media to do the actual work of dissemination as part of their service to state propaganda. 
Peng Zhen, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s 
Congress, told journalists in 1984 that helping people know, understand, and abide by the 
law was media’s mission.
6
 The Propaganda Department repeatedly demanded that media 
use innovative means that would capture the audience’s attention and effectively place 
law in the hands of the populace. And, as evidenced by the Rule of Law Index, the 
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government’s plan was largely successful, insofar as laws were made widely accessible 
and comprehensible to the Chinese populace.
7
 
Most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the central state’s shift to law 
as a new mode of domination – and especially its use of the media to disseminate law – 
created a new bridge between the legal and newspaper fields, bringing about new 
opportunities for actors in the latter, in particular. Given the Chinese state’s usual effort to 
prevent connections across organizations in order to forestall the rise of competing 
political power (Deng 1994:271), this institutional intersection created a novel and critical 
condition for the formation of cross-cutting networks. The transformation of the legal 
field also elevated the potential impact of such institutional field overlap.  
As the process of legal reform unfolded, the legal profession became more 
established and diversified over time. Legal professionals’ ability to interpret and apply 
law improved over time. Though the state retained overall control, the expanding legal 
service market allowed the legal profession to have more independence (Peerenboom 
2002). Furthermore, how legal professionals identified themselves in relation to the state 
and society gradually changed. Many legal professionals in China no longer view 
themselves as mere servants of the state anymore (Peerenboom 2002:351). Although the 
majority of legal professionals are still focused on making money, some have begun to 
see themselves as guardians of citizenship rights, as indicated by the emergence of public 
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interest lawyers and “rights protection lawyers.” This transformation has impacted how 
legal professionals engage with the law (Feng 2009; Fu and Cullen 2008; Liu and Halliday 
2011).  
Essentially, the overlap between the legal and newspaper fields through institutional 
mechanisms brought about opportunities for journalists to access resources in the legal 
field and to resist the state’s political logics. But as I will demonstrate below, precisely 
how this institutional field overlap played out and what its consequences were hinged on 
structural conditions in the newspaper field across locations. 
4.3.3. How Structural Conditions Moderate Field Overlap Mechanisms   
The institutional overlap of the newspaper and legal fields granted journalists access 
to resources in the legal field, but the structural conditions in the newspaper field – that is, 
the distribution of political, economic, and professional power – influenced whether 
journalists could seize such opportunities for critical news reporting through collaborating 
with the legal profession. In this section, I show how the structural conditions of the 
newspaper field moderated the use of network mechanisms and impacted critical news 
reporting in (1) Guangzhou, (2) Beijing and Fuzhou, and (3) Shanghai. I find that in 
Guangzhou, the structural conditions allowed journalists to produce a considerable 
amount of critical news reports through robust collaboration with legal professionals; in 
Beijing and Fuzhou, structural conditions partly hindered collaboration and limited the 
amount of critical news reporting; and in Shanghai, critical news reporting was even more 




Guangzhou: Robust Collaboration 
The influence of market demands and professional norms on critical news 
reporting.—Guangzhou, the capital of the Guangdong province, is well-known for its 
vehemently competitive newspaper market. This competitive market is due, in part, to the 
fact that Guangdong is where China’s economic reform first unfolded. In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, the Chinese people began to demand more information about the social 
problems engendered by the country’s transition to a market economy. Though many 
newspapers were interested in investigating these problems and possible solutions, critical 
reporting was rare due to government censorship. At the same time, however, the highly 
competitive market for news in Guangzhou forced newspapers to take consumers’ 
demands more seriously. This created a situation in which newspapers needed to make a 
choice between conflicting political and market logics. 
The intensifying market demand for critical news reports in Guangzhou fit nicely 
with the norm among journalists in that city to see themselves as spokespersons for 
citizens. Similar to the legal profession, the media profession transformed greatly with the 
unfolding of media marketization in the 1990s. An older set of professional norms 
positioned journalists as mere mouthpieces of the state, but with media marketization, 
norms viewing journalists as ordinary wage workers and/or as spokespersons for citizens 
emerged (Hassid 2011; Lee et al. 2007; Pan and Chan 2003). Journalists who saw 
themselves as mouthpieces of the state tended to follow the instructions of Propaganda 
Departments, and journalists who viewed themselves as ordinary wage workers were 




journalists who saw themselves as spokespersons for the public were more likely to report 
on social problems, fight for professional autonomy, and resist the undue intervention of 
political and market logics. This view influenced journalists in Guangzhou much earlier 
than journalists in other areas due to Guangzhou’s proximity to Hong Kong, where this 
professional norm was strong. Guangzhou journalists were thus relatively more likely to 
view themselves as serving the interests of citizens.
8
 Such professional norms attracted the 
most ambitious and talented journalists from around the country to pursue their 
professional careers in Guangzhou.  
Intensive market competition gave public-minded journalists enough leverage to 
persuade managerial cadres to take more political risks. As one journalist at the 
Yangcheng Evening News recalled: “Our pursuit of professional ideals was consistent with 
newspapers’ pursuit of market profits. Although the managerial cadres were concerned 
about political risks, they understood that we would lose the market share if we could not 
satisfy the demands of readers” (June 2011, Guangzhou). In essence, the market logics 
and the prevailing professional norms in Guangzhou worked together to demand more 
critical news reports, despite the political risks. 
Collaboration as a solution to hurdles.—When Guangzhou journalists attempted to 
satisfy market demands and enact their professional ideals, they encountered two hurdles. 
The first difficulty was political risk. Even though Party leaders in the central government 
occasionally encouraged reporting on social problems and emphasized rule of law, this 
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was mere lip service and stood in stark contrast to the actual practices of state agencies. In 
particular, critical news reports were seen as challenging the Propaganda Department’s 
policy of promoting reports on the Party-state’s achievements (“positive propaganda”) 
and restricting reports on social problems (“negative reports”). Furthermore, since critical 
news reports might affect the political career and private benefits of individual 
government officials, these officials and their powerful associates often retaliated against 
outspoken journalists and newspapers.  
The second hurdle that journalists encountered when they decided to produce more 
critical news reports was a technical one: Guangzhou journalists found that their training 
was inadequate for analyzing emerging societal problems. This was due partly to the 
unfolding legal reforms, which translated societal problems into legal issues. As many of 
my interviewees pointed out, the best and safest way to frame a phenomenon as a problem 
is to demonstrate its deviation from legal texts or principles. But most journalists did not 
know much about the legal system that had been so rapidly introduced to enable the new 
market economy, let alone how to use law as an analytical tool or as a weapon of 
self-defense. A former editor-in-chief at the Southern Metropolis Daily described the dire 
need for legal expertise:  
We found that readers demanded news reports that uncover corruption and other illegal 
practices, speak on behalf of citizens about their problems, and publicize legal 
knowledge. Readers became more demanding as they were no longer content with 
being presented with only facts. Instead, readers expected journalists to discuss and 
analyze the underlying causes of problems…. Law became the yardstick to discuss 
problems after the legal reform. These demands created new problems for us as we are 
not legal experts. Traditional investigative reports, albeit still important, became 




This quote reflects the enormous need among journalists for legal proficiency to produce 
critical news reports. 
To overcome the political and technical hurdles, journalists began to collaborate with 
legal professionals. Journalists in the Southern Media Group, including both the Southern 
Metropolis Daily and the Southern Weekly, sought assistance from lawyers and legal 
scholars. Legal experts could not only help journalists to investigate and analyze societal 
problems, they could also assess the political and legal risks that critical journalists might 
encounter.
9
 As one journalist said, “Lawyers know the art and skill of resistance. They 
can better calculate the cost of resistance and prepare for battles” (June 2011, Guangzhou). 
Importantly, this collaboration was not politically implausible. Although the CCP tended 
to forestall regular interactions between individuals across organizations and fields, the 
interaction between journalists and the legal profession seemed appropriate, given that the 
government was asking journalists to publicize legal knowledge. The Southern Weekly’s 
national reputation and popularity among intellectuals brought the Southern Metropolis 
Daily many collaborators, including nationally-renowned legal scholars and lawyers, as 
well as a small number of open-minded government officials in the legislative and 
judicial branches. The Southern Media Group’s strategy was also mimicked by other 
Guangzhou newspapers, including the Yangcheng Evening News. These newspapers 
successfully collaborated with local legal scholars and lawyers in Guangzhou. 
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While collaboration between journalists and the legal profession helped the former to 
address new problems and demands, the relationship also benefited certain legal 
professionals – specifically, political liberals who were committed to protecting citizens’ 
rights and to advancing a “genuine” rule of law.
10
 Similar to journalists, the legal 
profession is subject to the arbitrary power of the authoritarian state. When legal 
professionals pressure the government to follow the law and protect citizens’ rights, they 
run the risk of retaliation from government officials. Since publicizing the wrongdoing of 
government officials may prevent such retaliation, support from journalists can help legal 
professionals to protect themselves while influencing government decisions (Liebman 
2005; Liu and Halliday 2011). Furthermore, for legal professionals interested in 
advocating a “genuine” rule of law, newspapers provide a good medium for their ideas. 
As a result, legal professionals who identified themselves as guardians of citizens’ rights 
and journalists who saw themselves as spokespersons for the people made natural allies. 
In short, the collaboration between these two professions was mutually beneficial as it 
helped actors in both professions to pursue their agendas safely and more effectively.  
In this process of collaboration, public-spirited journalists and legal professionals not 
only pursued their own respective agendas, but also developed the common goal of 
cultivating a civil society, and critical news reporting was seen as an important means of 
achieving that goal. Actors in both fields also shared a common understanding of China’s 
critical historical events and its current problems that motivated them to purse 
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socio-political change. The 1989 Tiananmen protests, for example, loomed large in the 
memories of both groups. As Zhao (2000a) explains, “The movement was suppressed, but 
people did not forget. Much of Chinese politics since then has centered on the ghost of the 
movement and its aftermath.” Most of my interviewees in the Guangzhou collaborative 
networks mentioned how the Tiananmen incident tremendously impacted their career 
choices and linked their professional goals to specific political agendas.
11
 These 
interviewees also alluded to the influence that the CCP’s former General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang had on them. Zhao was put under house arrest until his death as punishment for 
his perceived leniency in dealing with the protesters, and he is still designated as part of 
the unspoken history of the CCP. But his political reform agenda and increasing 
disenchantment with the communist regime greatly impacted many journalists and legal 
professionals in the Guangzhou collaborative networks.
12
 These professionals perceived 
the current single-party rule as the root of China’s problems. Many of them described how 
they had become disillusioned with the CCP over time and frankly expressed their 
opposition to it. These professionals sought to advance the development of a genuine rule 
of law and civil society in China, something they thought could bring about the country’s 
democratization.
13
 As they saw it, critical news reporting would help Chinese citizens 
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become politically self-conscious, forcing the government, in turn, to become accountable 
to its citizens. A journalist at the Southern Metropolis Daily described the evolving nature 
of such collaboration:  
The alliance turned out to be like a loosely connected, informal political party. We 
collaborate because our political views are similar in critical aspects and we want to 
bring about political and social change. Political liberals who highly value citizens’ 
rights and genuine rule of law are much more motivated to cultivate such collaborative 
relations. There are a variety of ways in which journalists and lawyers can live their 
lives. Journalists and lawyers who see themselves as wage laborers, or who are fine 
with the dominant official discourse and practices, are not motivated to do these extra 
and risky things. They can just follow ordinary routines and live a satisfying life. (June 
2011, Beijing) 
Understanding the political nature of this collaboration is important as it reveals why 
many journalists and legal professionals associated with collaborative networks in 
Guangzhou have persisted in producing critical news reports, despite potential and actual 
political repression.  
Collaboration and critical news reporting.—By allying with legal professionals, 
journalists in Guangzhou gained valuable resources for critical news reporting. Legal 
professionals assisted journalists in three non-mutually exclusive ways. First, they 
provided expert advice. Second, legal professionals actually wrote articles for newspapers 
at times at the request of journalists. Third, legal professionals participated in news topic 
selection, investigation, and framing. Many journalists pointed out in their interviews that 
lawyers were among the most knowledgeable critics of social problems. With the rapid 
spread of legal knowledge and the concept of rights in China, social conflicts were 




localities rendered them critical commentators on social problems. Therefore, lawyers were 
able to provide journalists with suggestions regarding news topics and analyses. In some 
instances, lawyers even sent their employees to help investigate stories. These various 
forms of assistance greatly aided critical news reporting. 
One important consequence of these alliances was that journalists were able to 
broaden the “gray area” of reporting. Although certain topics are absolutely forbidden in 
China, a gray area does exist (Lin 2008). At times, legal professionals were able to stretch 
the permissible boundaries of this gray space by articulating potentially sensitive 
problems using language that appeared acceptable to the central government. A lawyer 
who has worked with the Southern Metropolis Daily said:  
We know how to frame problems properly in accordance with law. There is an old 
Chinese proverb, “Set your own spear against your own shield.” It means that we refute 
somebody with his or her own argument. If we want to criticize the government and 
uncover problems, we need to frame the problems according to the official language, 
that is, law. (June 2011, Beijing) 
In short, precisely because legal professionals were experts in the government’s new form 
of symbolic domination, they were also uniquely situated to turn that symbolic order into 
an instrument of resistance.  
In addition to providing resources for critical news reporting, collaboration between 
the two professions also empowered journalists to decrease their own self-censorship. As 
a journalist at the Yangcheng Evening News explained: “Propaganda Department officials 
are not interested in reading every piece of news. The real power of censorship and 




worked with lawyers, we know we are righteous….We become much more confident and 
less constrained by censorship” (June 2011, Guangzhou). Compelling journalists to 
self-censor was one of the most effective means through which the government enforced 
censorship; thus, when journalists gained new confidence as a result of their collaboration 
with the legal profession, it created a hole in the censorship system.  
By collaborating with liberal-leaning actors in the legal profession, journalists in 
Guangzhou were able to get around some censorship issues and produce more critical 
reports – an outcome that deviated from and even undermined the original purpose of the 
government’s law dissemination programs. A former chief editor of the Southern 
Metropolis Daily explained, “We have been implementing the task of law dissemination 
as required by the government. We just use this opportunity to diffuse ideas about 
genuine rule of law and talk about problems in Chinese society” (June 2011, Beijing). 
Importantly, however, it must be noted that even though they received assistance from 
legal experts, journalists were still under constant regulation by state agencies. But 
fortunately, as the next section will discuss, the fragmented structure of regulatory 
agencies in Guangzhou meant there was still leeway for critical news reporting. 
Fragmented political power as an opening.—The structure of state agencies in 
Guangzhou is such that political power there is relatively fragmented. Since Guangzhou 
city is the provincial capital of the Guangdong province, both provincial- and city-level 
Propaganda Departments are located there. Provincial-level and city-level Propaganda 
Departments directly supervise provincial-level and city-level newspaper organizations, 




allows newspaper organizations to bypass political control through two complementary 
mechanisms. 
First, since newspaper organizations are part of the state apparatus, they can exploit 
their political power in the official hierarchy to produce critical news reports. For 
newspaper organizations in Guangzhou, the golden rule is that one must never directly 
criticize the central government, the communist regime, or one’s own local government 
officials. Newspapers can, however, report on problems that are apparently unassociated 
with their specific local government or the central government. The Southern Media 
Group, including the Southern Metropolis Daily, is well-known for utilizing its political 
position in the government hierarchy to produce critical news reports (Wang 2009). As a 
newspaper organization incorporated into the Guangdong provincial government, the 
Southern Metropolis Daily avoids criticizing the Guangdong provincial government and 
the central government directly. When reporting on problems, it often targets lower-level 
officials in Guangdong or local governments outside Guangdong.
14
 At the same time, it 
can still imply that problems in China are not local or individual but systematic. As a 
journalist in the Southern Metropolis Daily explained: 
When writing a critical news report, we often write in a tone that sounds as if we were 
the central government. We criticize local governments and individual officials for 
breaking the law. Of course, we know that the central government should be held 
accountable as well, so we do try very hard to suggest to readers that many societal 
problems in China are systematically rooted in China’s institutions and political regime. 
(June 2011, Guangzhou) 
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Second, newspaper organizations can produce critical news reports based on 
published news reports. In Guangzhou, the Southern Metropolis Daily’s outspoken 
reporting benefits newspapers in lower positions of the government hierarchy. As one 
journalist at the Yangcheng Evening News explained, “If Southern Metropolis Daily has 
already reported on a problem, we can continue to report it, given that the news is already 
released and we are not the first newspaper to stir up trouble. The existence of multi-level 
newspaper organizations and government agencies in a city actually benefits all of the 
parties involved” (June 2011, Guangzhou). In essence, the fragmented political structure 
in Guangzhou made political domination more penetrable.  
Of course, the fragmented political structure did not fully shield Guangzhou 
newspapers from political repression. Critical news reports produced by Guangzhou 
newspapers can and did trigger repression, and battles between journalists in Guangzhou 
and regulatory agencies have been common since the late 1990s.
15
 Though periodic 
crackdowns obviously thwart the autonomy of newspapers, Guangzhou journalists – 
nourished by politically-oriented collaborative networks – are still able to pursue critical 
news reporting and advance socio-political change. 
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Beijing and Fuzhou: Partial Collaboration 
The narratives about critical news reporting in Beijing and Fuzhou are closely related 
to that in Guangzhou, but show a different pattern of unfolding. Although newspapers in 
Guangzhou were often targets of repression, they were still relatively successful in several 
respects. Guangzhou newspapers gained market revenue, resisted political pressure, and 
earned the respect of readers and journalist communities throughout China. As a result, 
the strategies and practices of Guangzhou newspapers were often emulated by 
newspapers in other localities. My interviewees in Beijing and Fuzhou said that 
journalists there adopted the same collaborative practices with legal experts as had 
journalists in Guangzhou. However, due to different configurations of political, economic, 
and professional power, the newspapers in Beijing and Fuzhou were not as successful in 
their efforts to produce critical news reports.  
Similar to the situation in Guangzhou, the structure of state agencies in Beijing and 
Fuzhou meant that the political power structure was fragmented and, thus, susceptible to 
political resistance. Multi-level Propaganda Departments and newspaper organizations 
coexist in Beijing and Fuzhou. Since Beijing is a municipality and the national capital, 
both national- and provincial-level Propaganda Departments and newspaper organizations 
reside there. And like Guangzhou, Fuzhou city is the provincial capital of the Fujian 
province, so both provincial- and city-level Propaganda Departments and newspapers 
reside in Fuzhou. As I have stated, newspaper organizations are incorporated into the state 




organizations that are comparable to them in the official hierarchy, and this division of 
labor can create problems. 
The multi-level, bureaucratically fragmented Propaganda Departments in Beijing 
and Fuzhou cannot censor every critical news report coherently. Departments of 
Propaganda usually have ex post review
16
 and rely on newspapers to censor themselves, 
but how that self-censorship is enforced varies across newspapers. My interviewees at the 
Beijing Times and the Strait Metropolis Daily mentioned that the institution of ex post 
review and inconsistent monitoring by the fragmented government structure increase the 
likelihood that media and legal professionals in Beijing and Fuzhou will be able to 
critically report the news. “The government cannot function without division of labor,” a 
journalist with the Strait Metropolis Daily told me, “but cracks often emerge from the 
division of labor” (August 2011, phone interview). When conducting ex post review, 
different Departments of Propaganda do not necessarily have consistent standards and 
need time to coordinate their efforts. By the time that regulatory agencies agree that a 
news report is problematic, the story has often already been published and circulated. My 
interviewees at the Beijing Times and the Strait Metropolis Daily said that this lag is 
beneficial, as certain issues and framings are acceptable when and if those issues or 
framings have already appeared in other newspapers.  
But even though journalists can take advantage of the fragmented political power 
structure in Beijing and Fuzhou and produce critical news while sidestepping censorship, 
such actions were not as common in these sites as they were in Guangzhou due to other 
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structural conditions. First, the less competitive markets for news in Beijing and Fuzhou 
gave newspaper organizations greater power over readers and public-spirited journalists. 
Journalists for the Beijing Times and the Strait Metropolis Daily acknowledged that since 
the newspaper markets in Beijing and Fuzhou were less competitive than in Guangzhou, 
local newspapers in these areas experienced less pressure to satisfy market demands, even 
though readers there expressed a similar desire to know more about social problems. As a 
result, the managerial cadres in Beijing and Fuzhou newspapers did not see a pressing 
need for journalists to collaborate with legal or other experts.  
Second, the weaker community of professional journalists in Beijing and Fuzhou 
was unfavorable to critical news reporting. Compared with the situation in Guangzhou, 
fewer journalists at local newspapers in Beijing and Fuzhou really committed themselves 
to citizen advocacy. More journalists saw themselves as ordinary wage laborers instead of 
professionals. “Critical news reporting,” said a journalist for the Beijing Times, “requires 
team work. A single hero cannot make it. You need to have colleagues who support each 
other and push the managerial cadres to take more risks. Journalists in Guangzhou have 
more peer support” (June 2011, Beijing). Journalists for local newspapers in Beijing and 
Fuzhou were not as motivated as their Guangzhou counterparts by professional ideals or 
the desire to advance social change and thus were less supportive of one another. So, 
while lower competition allowed Beijing and Fuzhou newspapers to take readers’ 
demands less seriously, the weaker professional community in each site also made it more 




This configuration of political, economic, and professional power impacted the 
extent to which journalists in Beijing and Fuzhou utilized network mechanisms to 
produce critical news reports in two related ways. First, these structural conditions 
impacted the scope of collaboration. Legal professionals did work with the Beijing Times 
and the Strait Metropolis, but their role in news production was relatively limited 
compared with what was taking place in Guangzhou. Legal professionals helped 
journalists in Beijing and Fuzhou to analyze social problems, while also writing 
commentaries on social problems for newspapers, but they did not have much substantive 
participation in news selection and investigation. As a result, the ability of journalists to 
stretch the gray area of news reporting was much more limited.  
Second, the structural conditions in Beijing and in Fuzhou also impacted the nature 
of collaboration. Networks developed between legal experts and journalists in Beijing and 
Fuzhou were less politicized compared with those developed in Guangzhou. Although 
many interviewees in the Beijing and Fuzhou collaborative networks saw critical news 
reports as important to the development of an informed citizenry and the rule of law in 
China, few of them alluded to critical historical events that motivated them (e.g., the 1989 
Tiananmen protests), or to their own efforts to bring about social or political change. 
Unlike their counterparts in Guangzhou, journalists and legal professionals in the Beijing 
and Fuzhou collaborative networks did not share a cohesive political agenda. As a result, 
when they perceived considerable political risk, their lower level of enthusiasm and 





In sum, although journalists in the Beijing Times and the Strait Metropolis sought 
access to resources in the legal field, they were unable to make full use of collaborative 
networks for the purpose of critical news reporting. As a result, the overlap of the 
newspaper and legal fields yielded fewer critical news reports in Beijing and Fuzhou than 
in Guangzhou.  
Shanghai: Stifled Collaboration 
Similar to their counterparts in Beijing and Fuzhou, newspapers in Shanghai were 
influenced by the collaborative model of critical news reporting in Guangzhou, but they 
had even less success in adopting the model. When considering how to enhance market 
and professional performance in the early 2000s, journalists in Shanghai looked to other 
newspaper organizations and Guangzhou newspapers stood out as examples. Similar to 
journalists in Guangzhou, Shanghai journalists found that readers were eager to know 
more about emerging social problems. These journalists also realized that the rule of law, 
which was intertwined with these problems, was the key to understanding and resolving 
them. A journalist in Shanghai Morning Post recalled:  
Many problems have occurred in the process of China’s economic development. For 
example, workers cannot get their wages. People without urban dweller status are 
treated as second-class citizens due to the household registration system. There are 
various problems, and we realize that every problem is related to unenforced or unjust 
laws. Things were not like that in the past. Because of the importance of law in 
everyday life and in official rhetoric, we thought that collaborating with the legal 





Yet, Shanghai journalists who were zealous about Guangzhou’s collaborative 
practices experienced great difficulty transplanting the model to Shanghai. Similar to the 
situations in Beijing and Fuzhou, the structure of the newspaper market and of the 
journalist community in Shanghai was not favorable to the adoption of the Guangzhou 
model. The competition in the Shanghai newspaper market was not as high as in 
Guangzhou. Many managerial cadres in Shanghai newspapers tended to believe that their 
newspapers could be profitable without taking political risks. The professional 
community of journalists in Shanghai was also weaker than in Guangzhou. Some 
journalists were enthusiastic about satisfying readers’ demands for more information 
about social problems, but their numbers were relatively small and they were unable to 
bring about change in their organizations. One journalist who moved to Shanghai from 
Guangzhou in order to be a “pioneer” shared his experience with me. Because Guangzhou 
already had so many ambitious journalists, he thought he could make more of a difference 
in Shanghai. But even though his colleagues in Shanghai respected him, he still was 
unable to change the practices in his organization. His experience shows the importance 
of a supportive professional community to the adoption of the Guangzhou model. He 
eventually returned to Guangzhou in order to join that community once again.  
Unlike journalists in Beijing and Fuzhou, Shanghai journalists encountered a further 
obstacle – concentrated political power – when attempting to adopt the Guangzhou model. 
As I have mentioned, the multi-level Propaganda Departments in Guangzhou, Beijing, 
and Fuzhou created fissures and spaces for journalists and legal professionals to produce 




and monitors every local newspaper in Shanghai, and no newspaper organization is higher 
than the Shanghai Propaganda Department in the official hierarchy. When officials in the 
Shanghai Department of Propaganda determine that news content is inappropriate, they 
call newspaper organizations directly to issue a warning. Sometimes the officials also 
notify other newspaper organizations in Shanghai to prevent them from covering the 
inappropriate stories. Essentially, the single-level government structure in Shanghai 
facilitates an extremely effective form of censorship that is much easier to enforce. 
The less fragmented political power structure in Shanghai substantially restricted 
collaboration between legal experts and journalists. The legal profession had little 
opportunity to comment on social problems or to participate in news topic selection, 
investigation, or framing. To be sure, Shanghai newspapers did invite legal experts to 
write commentaries, but collaboration often ceased following intervention by the Shanghai 
Propaganda Department. A journalist at the Shanghai Morning Post explained:  
We did want to have collaboration with legal professionals and public intellectuals, but 
there were a lot of difficulties. Local government officials, especially those in the 
Propaganda Department, frown on such collaboration. They call us when they see our 
reports. Knowing our situation, potential collaborators tend to prefer working with 
news organizations that give them more freedom. (July 2011, phone interview)  
Apparently, the concentrated political structure not only interrupted ongoing collaboration, 
but also discouraged legal professionals from working with Shanghai newspapers at all. 
Owing to the unfavorable structural conditions in Shanghai, although the 
institutional overlap of the newspaper and legal fields created a structural opportunity for 




align with the original purpose of the law dissemination programs – helping citizens obey 
the law and strengthening the government’s legitimacy. Instead of producing critical news 
reports, the overlap of the newspaper and legal fields spurred two kinds of news reports in 
Shanghai. The first entailed journalists touching base with government officials in charge 
of legal affairs to obtain relevant laws, policies, and court decisions and then simply 
disseminating them verbatim. As one journalist at the Shanghai Morning Post stated:  
The government wants us to disseminate laws and policies. Readers also want to know 
more about laws... We usually copy and paste court and other official documents. We 
seldom have our own commentaries. Many of us are sympathetic to the Southern 
Media Group’s views, but what we can do is very limited. (August 2011, phone 
interview) 
The second kind of report contained accounts of happy stories in which journalists 
narrated how citizens used the law to combat injustice and how the government protected 
citizens’ rights. Successful stories of legal mobilization satisfied not only the 
government’s demand for “positive” propaganda and law dissemination, but also readers’ 
demand for legal knowledge (Stockmann and Gallagher 2011). Instead of interviewing 
legal profession who knew the odds of successful legal mobilization, journalists were 
pressured into interviewing only those citizens who were lucky enough to experience 
justice. In the process of producing both types of reports, journalists in Shanghai did not 
use the law to reveal fundamental problems in Chinese society; rather, they helped the 
state to advance its authoritarian political order.   
In summary, although the institutional overlap between the legal and newspaper 




bureaucratically efficient Propaganda Department, the less competitive newspaper market 
and the weak journalist community in Shanghai stifled collaboration between the media 
and legal professions. As a result, journalists in Shanghai were not able to transform 
resources into critical news reports. 
4.4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
To review, my empirical analysis examined when and why newspapers in China are 
able to produce critical news reports despite the limited freedom of the press. Using 
content analysis, I established that considerable variation exists among five selected local 
newspapers in terms of critical news reporting. By analyzing in-depth interview data, I 
found that the overlap between the newspaper and legal fields created by institutional and 
network mechanisms facilitated critical news reporting and helps to explain this variation. 
With the Chinese state’s shift to law as a new mode of domination, the legal field became 
a critical site providing valuable resources for journalists to resist political pressure and 
produce critical news reports. The Chinese state’s use of media to disseminate law further 
forged a bridge connecting the newspaper and legal fields. Nevertheless, the extent to 
which newspapers were able to utilize resources in the legal field through network 
mechanisms was conditioned by the structural conditions in the newspaper field. In 
Guangzhou, a strong professional community, competitive market, and fragmented 
political power structure combined to allow journalists there to produce a considerable 
amount of critical news reports through substantial collaboration with pro-liberal legal 
professionals. In Beijing and Fuzhou, although the fragmented political power structure 




community and the less competitive market in these locations hindered the scope of 
collaboration and limited the amount of critical news reporting. Finally, in Shanghai, 
critical news reporting was even less common as collaboration between the two 
professions was largely stifled by the concurrence of a weaker journalist community, a 
less competitive market, and a more unified political power structure. I discuss the 
contributions of these findings below.  
By examining variation among Chinese newspapers in terms of critical news 
reporting, my empirical analysis provides a more nuanced picture and understanding of 
Chinese media. The conventional view tends to see mass media as uniformly unbeneficial 
to the advancement of democracy (Graber 2003). Conforming to this view, scholars 
writing about the Chinese context often describe Chinese media as being successful in 
propagandizing for the government and pursuing economic benefits (Stockmann and 
Gallagher 2011), but uninterested in democratic causes (Pan 2010; Zhao 2004). My 
analysis reveals a more complex picture. The conventional description is, indeed, 
applicable to certain Chinese media, but my empirical evidence suggests that existing 
research underestimates the democratic ambition of some Chinese media. As I have 
shown here, journalists in Guangzhou newspapers were open about their increasing 
disillusion with and even opposition to the CCP over time, as well as their aim of bringing 
about socio-political change through critical news reporting. The beliefs and practices of 
these journalists reveal that, under certain conditions, members of the Chinese media can 
and do use their embeddedness within state agencies to pursue agendas that may 




echo the argument of Zhao and Lin (2008) that existing studies tend to overlook the 
democratic aspect of Chinese media, and I complement their national-level observation 
with a sub-national level analysis.
17
  
In addition to showing the heterogeneity of Chinese newspapers, my study also 
contributes to a deeper understanding of the conditions under which newspapers in China 
are more likely to fulfill their democratic role in normative theories. I did this by 
developing a theoretical framework that highlights field overlap mechanisms (Evans and 
Kay 2008) and applying this framework to examine critical news reporting in China. My 
theoretical framework helps to reveal critical aspects that are not considered in previous 
studies of Chinese media. Previous literature suggests some possible conditions under 
which Chinese journalists are likely to produce critical news reports. The first condition 
that is presumed as necessary is often autonomy from political authority. Unfortunately, 
Chinese media are not situated in free spaces – spaces in which actors have freedom from 
authorities (Evans and Boyte 1992; Polletta 1999). Instead, the government exercises 
political control over media on a regular basis. The second possible condition is the 
presence of alliances between journalists and other social groups, enabling the former to 
resist political pressure. Here again, existing research quickly points out that the absence 
of opposition parties and independent citizens’ groups in China limits this possibility 
(Zhao 2000c:591). I agree that social networks bridging the newspaper and other fields 
can facilitate critical news reporting, but unlike existing research, I argue that such 
alliances may be more likely than currently thought and, in fact, are already happening 
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today. My argument diverges from the conventional assessment of Chinese media 
because, crucially, I incorporate institutional field overlap into my analysis. I find that the 
institutional process through which the Chinese state exercised political control and 
strengthened its legitimacy – specifically, by building legal institutions and disseminating 
legal knowledge – enabled the formation of cross-cutting networks in certain locations 
and inadvertently created conditions conducive to critical news reporting.  
By highlighting the importance of the legal field to critical news reporting, this study 
is able to analytically parse out and empirically demonstrate the social and cultural 
mechanisms that translate legal institutions into resistance. In so doing, I contribute to the 
literature on law and resistance. Although previous research points out law’s role as both 
an instrument of domination and resistance (Bourdieu 1987; Burstein 1991; Ewick and 
Silbey 1991; Hunt 1990; McCann and March 1995), little attention has been paid to how 
legal institutions influence the formation of social relationships and, therefore, how these 
social relationships impact the cultural aspect of resistance. This study shows that the 
Chinese state’s shift to law as a new mode of domination and its use of media for law 
dissemination impacted resistance by shaping the social and cultural aspects of news 
production. Once law was established as the new form of symbolic order in China, 
resistance was channeled into the legal arena. And by then relying on media to diffuse law 
throughout society, the Chinese state opened the way for collaboration between the media 
and legal professions. Importantly, the Chinese state did not have full control over the 
formation of collaborative networks. In Guangzhou, the strong professional journalist 




and the state's public embrace of the rule of law – however flawed and uneven that 
embrace may be – enabled journalists to appropriate law to uncover social problems and 
expand the space for critical news reporting. Essentially, the Chinese state’s incomplete 
control over the social dimension of the institutional processes it set in motion and over 
the cultural interpretation and application of law created conditions that actually enabled 
critique of the state.  
This study also contributes to the emerging literature on field overlap in two ways. 
First, I propose a more parsimonious classification of field overlap mechanisms that 
distinguishes between institutional mechanisms and network mechanisms, but also 
theorizes their relationship as non-mutually exclusive and interdependent. As Evans and 
Kay (2008) point out, more theoretical and empirical work is needed to examine the 
importance of different types of field overlap mechanisms for political contention. My 
findings suggest that different types of field overlap mechanisms are important in distinct 
ways. Field overlap through institutional mechanisms enables the creation of network 
mechanisms that, in turn, play a crucial role in directly aiding resistance. In my study, if 
the Chinese government had not enacted its policy of law dissemination that bridged the 
media and legal fields, it would have had been much more difficult for journalists to 
collaborate with legal experts in the first place, given the government’s hostile attitude to 
cross-boundary interactions. This was thus the first necessary, but not necessarily 
sufficient step. It was then the creation of social networks in specific locations with 




legal field and produce critical news reporting. Both kinds of field overlap mechanisms 
were necessary and they operated in intersecting, yet distinct ways.  
Second, my study calls for greater attention to the contingent and heterogeneous 
effects of field overlap and demonstrates how power distribution in a field can impact the 
use of field overlap mechanisms. Previous studies point to the structural importance of 
field overlap to political mobilization, but little research has been done to explain why 
only some actors are able to utilize such opportunity. By investigating how structural 
conditions – the configuration of political, economic, and professional power – in the 
newspaper field constrained and enabled field overlap mechanisms, my study helps to 
identify the conditions under which actors can better utilize such mechanisms and 
mobilize for political change.  
As the relationship between media and the public is at the heart of civic life and 
democracy, this study also has three broader implications. First, my findings about the 
neglected aspect of Chinese media can provide some insight into the study of social 
movements and push us to rethink some common assumptions in the literature on social 
movements. In current social movement theory, already limited given its overwhelming 
focus on liberal democracies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are major actors 
that aim to bring about social change (Tarrow 1998), and they vie for the attention of 
depoliticized mass media to advance their political agendas (Bail 2012; Gamson 2004; 
Rucht 2004). My findings provide a different insight – namely, that media organizations 
in authoritarian contexts can act as de facto social movement organizations under certain 




state. This insight calls for more reflexivity in applying the prevailing social movement 
framework to authoritarian contexts as this framework may underestimate the role of 
media in social movements.  
Second, my findings illuminate the study of the public sphere in authoritarian 
contexts. Research on the public sphere often accuses mass media of contributing to a 
degenerated public sphere and depoliticized citizenry (Bourdieu 2001; Habermas 1989; 
Mills 1956). The existence of media that produce critical discourse, connect with social 
groups, and behave as de facto social movement organizations in China, however, 
suggests that under certain conditions media can contribute to the public sphere and to the 
formation of publics in ways that are not captured in current literature. 
 Finally, this study can shed some light on how to understand the state-society 
relationship and political resistance in authoritarian contexts. Conventional wisdom about 
the relationship between authoritarian states and civil society is that the former inhibits 
the latter, while only ties between non-state actors strengthen the capacity of civil society 
(Cohen and Arato 1992:446). The conventional wisdom is not so much wrong, as 
inattentive to the unintended consequences of state action and to the level and 
implications of incoherency within the state. The case of critical news reporting in China 
suggests that authoritarian states may inadvertently contribute to the growth of civil 
society in the process of building legal institutions, in part through the action of some 
state actors who are sympathetic to non-state actors. As a result, linkage between state and 
non-state actors may strengthen social forces as well. Accordingly, research on political 




processes that connect state and non-state actors to understand potential paradoxical 
effects of such processes. Similar to China, many other authoritarian states now embrace 
“rule of law” to govern their populaces, and while these authoritarian states understand 
“rule of law” in oppressive terms (Tamanaha 2004:2-3), the building of legal institutions 
may lead to unintended consequences in aiding collective political resistance nonetheless. 
In closing, however, it is important to acknowledge that the findings of this research 
are still limited in two ways and, thus, invite further study. First, the generalizability of 
my findings can be restricted by case selection. I restricted my analysis to news produced 
by newspapers. In addition, the selection of newspaper organizations for this research was 
restricted to the coastal region of China in order to facilitate comparison. Further research 
examining newspapers and other kinds of media organizations across regions is needed to 
examine the generalizability of my findings. Second, a growing body of research 
demonstrates the Internet has impacted politics in China, particularly through contributing 
to an increasingly critical citizenry and citizen activism (Lei 2011; Yang 2003; Yang 
2009). It is reasonable to expect that information communication technologies have also 
affected the journalist community and its alliance with other social groups, which could 
further impact field overlap and the ability of journalists to produce critical news reports. 
Fruitful future research could examine the extent to which and the conditions under which 







Supplementary Notes on Case Selection 
1. I excluded non-comparable news organizations from the selection pool. Beijing is 
the national capital and both national and local newspapers operate there. Since 
national newspaper organizations (e.g., China Youth Daily) are situated in a different 
political environment and market than local newspaper organizations, I did not select 
national newspaper organizations. In addition, I excluded local newspaper 
organizations with cross-regional backgrounds. The Chinese state allows few 
newspaper organizations to engage in cross-regional collaboration (e.g., Beijing 
News). I did not select these organizations because they are embedded in unique and 
more complicated power structures than those of ordinary local newspaper 
organizations. 
 
Supplementary Notes on Content Analysis 
1. To determine what constitutes critical news reports, I asked subjects to name three 
important societal problems and solutions to these problems that journalists should 
report if there is no pressure. My research assistant and I combined similar responses 
into categories and then selected the categories that were mentioned by at least 75% of 
the subjects.  
2. I used two methods to decrease the potential bias that results from using keywords 




my interviewees, who are familiar with how journalists across news organizations 
report relevant issues. Second, I used synonyms of the keywords for selection. One 
powerful feature of WiseNews is its integrated thesaurus, which allows for a 
comprehensive search by keywords. 
3. My research assistant and I read through each article. Following a protocol, we 
independently decided whether it discussed the relevant dimension in the domestic 
context. According to the protocol, discussion of the relevant dimension does not need 
to be the main idea of the article. Any discussion, regardless of its length, suffices. I 
calculated Cohen's kappa (Cohen 1960) to assess the interrater reliability. The 
agreement score (0.89) suggests excellent agreement. We deliberated and made a 






Amplifying Limited Liberalization Effects: Boundary Processes and the Creation of a 
Nationwide Counterpublic Sphere 
In Chapter 2, I established the existence of a flourishing nationwide counterpublic 
sphere in China. Through a longitudinal study from 1949-2010, I located the rise a 
nationwide counterpublic sphere in the post-2005 period. With the rise of public opinion 
and the state’s continued effort to contain it, particularly its more dissident voices, the 
tension between official and excluded discourses has become increasingly salient and 
constant. As many academic writings and commentaries in Chinese newspapers have 
pointed out, China’s discursive space has split into two parts. One part is composed of 
official discourse that promotes the government’s agenda; China is described as full of 
hope and the Chinese state is framed as competent and accomplished. The other part is 
comprised of discourse produced by Chinese people that not only reveal societal problems, 
but also harshly criticize the CCP Party-state (He 2008; McCormick and Liu 2003; Zheng 
and Wu 2005; Zhou 2009). Although this latter discourse is considered deviant and 
non-mainstream by the Chinese state, it has influenced the development of public events 




Both the Chinese government and scholars attribute the cause of surging public 
opinion in China, particularly the emerging critical public discourse, to the rise of the 
Internet (He 2008; McCormick and Liu 2003; Tai 2006; Yang 2009; Zheng 2008; Zhou 
2006). Commentaries in newspapers such as the People’s Daily and the Beijing Daily 
exemplify this view, suggesting that the Internet has contributed to the formation of a 
nationwide venue where non-mainstream viewpoints and criticisms of the state circulate.
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Unlike conventional explanations that link the Internet or information communication 
technologies (ICTs) to the growth an influential counterpublic sphere in a relatively 
simple or automatic manner, I argue that the rise of such a sphere in China can be traced 
to institutional, cultural, and social processes that predate, but were significantly impacted 
by the development and diffusion of ICTs. Specifically, the development and diffusion of 
ICTs expanded the media field, extended pre-existing social and cultural processes, and 
triggered the formation of a boundary that framed state and citizens opposite one another. 
As such, an adequate account of the rise of the counterpublic sphere should consider how 
the institutional and socio-cultural contexts that I investigated in Chapters 3 and 4 enabled 
individuals to shape the emerging online discursive space and delineate the contours of a 
nationwide counterpublic sphere. 
In order to make this argument, I first review the literature on the political 
consequences of the Internet in China. Then, I draw on the concept of boundary process 
to study the development of China’s counterpublic sphere, showing how the concept 
helps to theorize the multi-level processes that shaped China’s emerging counterpublic 
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sphere. Next, I review my research methods and data analysis strategy. After that, I 
present the results of my empirical analysis. I first show the meso-level process that 
connected the previous institutional and socio-cultural processes, as detailed in Chapters 3 
and 4, to the development of the online news market. Then, I show how this meso-level 
process led to the politicization of citizens at the micro-level, which, in turn, delineated 
the contours of the emergent nationwide counterpublic sphere. Finally, I summarize the 
research findings and discuss their contribution to the existing literature. 
5.1.  AN ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTERUBLIC SPHERE FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF BOUNDARY PROCESS 
In this section, I develop a theoretical framework to account for the emerging 
counterpublic sphere in China. I begin by discussing the conventional approach to 
studying the rise of public opinion. Drawing on the notion of boundary processes, I argue 
that an adequate theoretical framework should incorporate an analysis of the structure of 
the expanded media field after the adoption of the Internet and consider how actors in the 
expanded media field interact with broader cultural contexts to participate in boundary 
making. 
5.1.1. The Conventional Approach to Studying the Rise of Public Opinion 
Existing studies of the rise of public opinion in China consider the technological 
differences between the Internet and traditional media, and examine how the 
technological properties of the Internet have brought about democratic prospects. 




been dominated by the Party-state. Despite continuing censorship, the Internet has led to 
the production and dissemination of more diverse information and communication, thus 
diminishing the monopolistic power of the Chinese state. Furthermore, the Internet also 
creates new social space for interaction, aiding insurgent politics and social movements to 
confront the state. Through increased interaction with other citizens and increased 
exposure to diverse points of view, citizens have developed political interests, critical 
attitudes, and a greater ability to resist state manipulation (Hung 2003; Lagerkvist 2005; 
Lei 2011; McCormick and Liu 2003; Rosen 2010; Shen, Wang, Guo, and Guo 2009; Tai 
2006; 2008; Yang 2009; Zheng and Wu 2005; Zheng 2008). More sophisticated studies 
consider not only the impact of the Internet, but also the role of mass media in setting the 
public agenda and influencing online public discourse (Qian and Bachman 2010; Yang 
2005; Zhao 2008; Zhou and Moy 2007).  
Despite their contributions, existing studies that examine the rise of public opinion 
in China have two major weaknesses. Both weaknesses derive from the narrow focus of 
the research. First, existing studies are susceptible to the critique that they pay insufficient 
attention to how contexts shape the political impact of the Internet. Guillén and Suárez 
(2006) suggest the existence of a “rich-get-richer” effect, arguing that countries that are 
already democratic are better situated to utilize ICTs politically as they have a more solid 
political and cultural foundation. Conversely, ICTs are unlikely to help spread democracy 
within authoritarian countries, precisely given their already insufficient democratic 
foundation. Guillén and Suárez (2006)’s concern is consistent with Habermas’s 




public with the capacities to identify, interpret, and present society-wide problems is the 
most critical condition for a mobilized public sphere. Importantly, such capacities are 
embedded in “liberal patterns of political culture and socialization.” In essence, the 
contexts in which ICTs are employed influence whether ICTs can enhance democratic 
political culture and practices, as well as the capacity of individuals to discuss 
society-wide problems. Accordingly, an adequate analytical framework should consider 
how broader contexts in China shape the ways in which actors utilize ICTs to formulate 
critical public discourse. 
The second weakness of existing studies is their inadequate accounting for the 
collective antagonism against the Chinese state in the emergent public opinion. Research 
in Chinese studies suggests the Chinese state has generally been successful in generating 
regime legitimacy at the mass level (Nathan 2003; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011). 
Studies have also found that Chinese people believe the central state is benevolent despite 
corrupted local governments (Lee 2007), that Chinese people do not have rights 
consciousness (Perry 2008), and that Chinese people are satisfied with the status quo in 
spite of increasing inequality (Whyte 2010; Xie 2010). All of which begs the question, 
then, of how to explain the prevailing antagonism against the state in recent public 
discourse. Studies of the rise of public opinion in China do not sufficiently address why 
and how individuals have become antagonistic to the Chinese state – enough so to form a 
flourishing counterpublic sphere – and what role the Internet or ICTs have played in the 




likely rooted in broader contexts, a narrow focus on the media system alone, particularly 
the use of ICTs, is unlikely to account fully for the antagonism.  
5.1.2. The Formation of a Counterpublic Sphere as Boundary Processes 
To address the inadequacy of existing studies, I propose to draw on the concept of 
boundary processes to analyze the formation of China’s nationwide counterpublic sphere. 
A public sphere mediated by communication technology is essentially a non-face-to-face 
community “linked primarily by common identities but minimally by networks of direct 
interpersonal relationships” (Calhoun 1991a:95-96). Lamont and Molnár (2002) suggest 
that boundaries provides useful analytical tools to explain the formation and development 
of communities. Indeed, as boundaries establish commonality, distinction, and opposition 
(Tilly 2005), an analysis of boundary processes is indispensable for studying the formation 
of a counterpublic sphere. My proposed framework is composed of two nested parts. The 
first analyzes how the media field expanded and was restructured with the adoption of the 
Internet, and how this, in turn, impacted the boundary-making processes that constituted a 
counterpublic sphere. The second part addresses how actors in the expanded media field 
interacted with broader cultural contexts and participated in boundary making. 
The structure of the expanded media field  
Similar to existing studies of rising public opinion in China, my theoretical 
framework acknowledges the critical role of the Internet in the development of the public 
sphere. Anderson (1983) has shown in Imagined Communities that when information is 




face-to-face interaction (Anderson 1983). And, as Yochai Benkler (2006) convincingly 
argues in The Wealth of Networks, the Internet has many novel technological properties 
that make it an exceptional medium for disseminating information, connecting individuals, 
and providing a playground on which individuals can interact with other actors. 
But unlike existing studies, I incorporate a more comprehensive analysis of how the 
media field was reconstructed by various actors with the adoption of the Internet. Instead 
of analyzing how the Internet changes individual behavior and interaction directly, I 
analyze how the emergence of new technology reshaped the media field – a critical 
context impacting interaction and boundary making. As literature on news production 
suggests, political, market, and professional power all play a part in shaping the media 
field and influencing news production, and varying configuration of political, market, and 
professional powers can contribute to public spheres with different political cultures 
(Benson and Neveu 2005; Boggs 2000; Champagne 2005). Accordingly, understanding 
the interplay of different kinds of power is critical to the study of the public sphere.  
This important insight, however, is lost in studies related to the Internet in China. 
Thus far, most studies only focus on the control mechanisms of the Chinese state and 
tug-of-war conflicts between the state and Chinese people. They overlook how key 
non-state actors, particularly, business organizations and media professionals, can jointly 
structure the expanded media field. As such, existing studies neglect the possibility that 
previous developments in the media field, especially the social and cultural processes in 
the press market that were detailed in Chapter 4, can impact the structure of the expanded 




moderates the interaction of actors, dissemination of information, and, therefore, 
boundary-making processes, I incorporate an analysis of it in my theoretical framework.  
Boundary-making processes in the expanded media field  
The second component of my theoretical framework highlights how actors in the 
expanded media field interact with broader cultural contexts to participate in boundary 
making. This analysis highlights the processes that culminated in the formation of the 
counterpublic sphere in China. As large-scale, non-face-to-face community is connected 
mainly through common identities and minimally by directly interpersonal relationships 
(Calhoun 1991a), an analysis of boundary processes requires paying particular attention to 
how individuals draw on a shared symbolic structure to create a common identity and 
differentiate insiders and outsiders. Symbolic structures are conceptual and cultural 
distinctions that social actors create to classify objects, people, and practices (Alexander 
1992a; Alexander 2006; Lamont and Molnár 2002). They often exist in binary forms with 
opposing categories of pure and impure (Alexander 1992a; Alexander 2006)). Differences 
in everyday life, for instance, unequal access to and distribution of resources and 
opportunities, do not automatically translate into symbolic boundaries that set some 
members in a society apart from others unless actors mobilize a shared symbolic system 
to politicize and contest those differences.  
Symbolic structures differ across contexts. In the Chinese case, the symbolic 
structure of laws and rights is likely to be critical in the boundary-making process. As I 




when the Chinese state’s replaced the symbolic structure of class struggle with a new 
symbolic structure framed in terms of laws and rights. My study of critical news reporting 
in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the symbolic structure of laws and rights provide media 
and legal professionals with legitimate symbolic resources to partly overcome censorship 
and uncover societal problems. It is likely that laws and rights can be mobilized by 
ordinary citizens to delineate the contours of the counterpublic sphere, but I leave this as 
an empirical question.  
The mobilization of symbolic resources can be impacted by the structure of the 
expanded media field, especially elite networks in the expanded media field. The 
composition of social networks among media professionals and other elites in the 
emerging online sector can shape how citizens engage with the symbolic structure. As 
Tilly (2005:213) has pointed out, elites often play a critical role in political contention 
even though participation of the masses also impacts the outcome. When well-connected 
entrepreneurs with knowledge to employ symbolic structures for resistance exist, it is likely 
that boundaries are politicized and contested. Thus, an adequate analysis of the boundary- 
making process in the expanded media field should include an analysis of how elite 
networks formed and transformed with the expansion of the media field and how this 
network impacted cultural and political processes.  
Finally, I propose to examine the politicization of ordinary citizens in the expanded 
media field because, ultimately, it is ordinary citizens’ action that split China’s discursive 
space and led to the creation of the counterpublic sphere. As existing studies suggest that 




1995) and shared cultural mediums provide a basis for forging identities (Alexander 
2006), I propose to analyze how citizens’ interaction with other actors and viewpoints in 
the expanded media field shaped identity, engagement with symbolic system, and 
political participation. I will also investigate the micro mechanisms through which 
citizens draw on cultural mediums to generate solidarity, division, and antagonism, as 
well as the effects of these cultural processes on the development of the public sphere.  
5.2. DATA AND METHODS 
This chapter draws on 48 in-depth interviews with informants. To understand how 
the media field was expanded and restructured with the adoption of the Internet, I 
conducted in-depth interviews with the following categories of informants:  
(1) Experienced journalists: In order to investigate the connection between the 
press market and the newly emerging Internet sector, I interviewed experienced 
journalists in newspapers who are knowledgeable about the development of the media 
field before and after the Chinese state’s adoption of the Internet. 
(2) Media professionals in Internet portals and online communities: Companies like 
Yahoo in the U.S. are Internet portals. Internet portals and online communities are critical 
venues where news and public opinion are circulated and produced. I interviewed two 
categories of media professionals in four top domestic portals, and one Internet 
community. The first category is media professionals who take high management 
positions. They provided insider information about the development of the media field, as 




category is media professionals who are in charge of censorship. As these professionals 
engage with uncensored texts produced by Internet users, they provided me with 
important information about the boundary-making processes in the online discursive 
space.  
(3) Scholars familiar with media, telecommunications services, and China’s WTO 
negotiations: These scholars provided abundant information about the development of the 
media field over time. 
(4) Officials in the Ministry of Commerce: Officials in the Ministry of Commerce 
contributed information regarding China’s WTO negotiations and the impacts of China’s 
WTO accession on the construction of the emerging online news sector.  
(5) Officials in the State Council Information Office: The State Council 
Information Office has authority to regulate the Internet; my interviews with officials in 
this office focused on how the government regulates the Internet.  
(6) Lawyers and legal scholars: I interviewed lawyers and legal scholars who 
cooperate with media professionals to shape news reports and public opinion.  
(7) Public intellectuals: I interviewed public intellectuals who are public opinion 
leaders. They come from diverse backgrounds, including journalists, human rights 
lawyers, scholars, etc. They provided information regarding how they became public 
intellectuals, how they are connected with other actors, and how they contribute to setting 
the public agenda and shaping public opinion. 
The distribution of informants is provided in Table 5-1. Face-to-face interviews took 




to two and half hours. All interviews were organized around a set of questions tailored to 
the respondent’s area of expertise. E-mails were exchanged when further information was 
required. 
TABLE 5-1: Interviews with informants. 
 Categories of informants Numbers 
1. Experienced journalists  8 
2. Media professionals in Internet portals and communities 12 
3. Scholars familiar with media, telecommunications services and 
China’s WTO negotiations 
9 
4. Officials in the Ministry of Commerce 2 
5. Officials in State Council Information Office 2 
6. Lawyers and legal scholars  6 
7. Public intellectuals 9 
 Total 48 
 
I read through interview notes and transcripts carefully to understand how the media 
field was expanded and restructured after the adoption of the Internet. To increase the 
validity of my analysis, I constantly compared interview data from different subjects to 
determine areas of agreement and divergence. When areas of divergence occurred, I 
conducted follow-up interviews via telephone or e-mail to clarify and deepen my 
understanding of the data. I also asked certain interviewees to read and comment on my 
analysis. Through this process of repeatedly analyzing and triangulating data, I was able 
to construct a narrative about the development of the media field and the structure of the 
expanded media field. 
The second data source for this study is 50 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens. 




conducted these interviews to understand how citizens interact with broader cultural 
contexts and participate in boundary making through the mediation of media. In-depth 
interviews with ordinary citizens are particularly helpful for understanding the process of 
politicization at the individual level, given that most research on political communication 
in China is either based on statistical analysis of survey data, content analysis of online 
discourse, or interviews with activists. The data sources analyzed by existing studies are 
limited in understanding the transformation that occurs for ordinary citizens as they 
experience changes in a broader political environment and participate in discursive 
arenas. 
The distribution of these subjects is depicted in Table 5-2. Subjects were selected 
according to Internet-use and social class. After the adoption of the Internet, China’s 
media field expanded to incorporate an online sector, and the structure of the online sector 
differs from that of the traditional media sectors. And as many studies suggest, this 
difference impacts political communication (Lei 2011; Yang 2009; Zheng and Wu 2005; 
Zheng 2008). To tease out the effect of online experience, I included non-netizens as a 
comparison group. As political contention in China is often mobilized along the class 
lines, position in social structure could presumably influence politicization at the 
individual level; therefore, I recruited netizens and non-netizens within each social class. 
I conducted interviews with ordinary citizens in Chongqing in 2011. Each interview 
lasted about one and a half hour. I selected Chongqing as the site for two reasons. 
Chongqing encompasses a rural area along with a core urban area. This made access to 




collaborator in Chongqing, who helped me to recruit subjects and implement interviews. 
As my project is politically sensitive, having a local collaborator who could avoid and 
handle problems was critical. 
TABLE 5-2: Interview subjects In Chongqing. 
 Netizens Non-netizens 
Peasants 8 5 
Working class 9 5 
Middle class 9 5 
College students 9 0 
Total 35 15 
 
Investigating the micro-process of politicization through in-depth interviews in a 
politically restricted environment requires careful research design. I took two measures to 
facilitate interviews. First, to increase the possibility that interviewees would reveal their 
political views, I spent twenty minutes chatting with them before formal interviews to 
make the interviews less awkward and more relaxed. Second, following William 
Gamson’s (1992) strategy in Talking Politics, I used specific issues regarding food safety, 
land grabbing, and labor disputes as concrete situations to elicit responses. These issues 
were selected because they are important to ordinary citizens’ daily lives. Even citizens 
with a low level of education can talk a lot about these issues. Furthermore, these issues 
are not considered intrinsically politically sensitive light in the common sense of politics 
in China. Conversation about these concrete issues thus provided a more natural and 
neutral entry point for me to discuss more abstract topics later.  
Each interview was organized around a set of open-ended questions. I discussed food 




about an issue, I asked interviewees to express their viewpoints on the issue, particularly 
what they thought about the severity of issue and the cause of the problem, and which 
categories of actors they associated with the issue, particularly, local governments, the 
central government, courts, businesses, and citizens. When interviewees made any 
judgments, I asked them the criteria and rationale according to which they made those 
judgments. I also asked interviewees how they accessed information about the issue. 
Furthermore, I asked if any persons or media were especially influential in terms of 
helping them to know and think about the issue and why. After we discussed three issues, 
I asked interviewees to discuss the similarities and differences among the three issues. I 
also asked interviewees to reflect on whether their views of these problems and the 
associated actors had changed over time. Then, I moved discussion from these specific 
issues to more general issues in China, such as conflicts and divisions in China and how 
interviewees evaluated the government. Lastly, I asked a series of questions about media 
use, selection of media, and various forms of political participation. I also asked subjects 
to reflect upon whether and how media and Internet use shape their understandings and 
practices. Through these in-depth interview, my aim was to understand: (1) how 
interviewees employ cultural mediums to interpret news and public opinion, as well as to 
participate in the making of public opinion and other political action; (2) how they relate 
themselves to wider publics, state agencies, and actors in specific cases and in general, 
and why. 
I analyzed interview notes carefully to compare the micro-process of politicization 




interview data and facilitate analysis, I read through all the interview notes to develop a 
set of codes that emerged from the data. Next, I closely reviewed the interview notes 
again and coded my interview notes. I then identified recurring themes and patterns across 
the data. Finally, I considered the relationships between categories of subjects and the 
patterns of responses. 
5.3. EXPLAINING THE RISE OF A COUNTERPUBLIC SPHERE IN CHINA 
In this section, I present the results of my empirical analysis. I first describe how the 
media field was expanded and reconstructed by various actors after the Chinese state’s 
adoption of the Internet. Next, I analyze how this reconstruction extended elite networks 
and cultural practices from the press market to the online news market. Then, I show how 
the social structure in the expanded media field greatly impacted the selection of news 
and circulation of information via Internet portals. Lastly, I examine how citizens 
interacted with broader cultural contexts to participate in boundary making. 
5.3.1. Restructuring the Expanded Media Field 
The Chinese state’s decision to pursue the benefits that accrued with adopting new 
information communication technologies triggered the expansion and reconstruction of 
the media field. The Chinese state installed the Internet in 1994, aiming to capitalize on the 
economic and technological benefits (Tai 2006:129). When the Internet began to boom in 




which are state agencies, into influential news providers and propaganda organs on the 
Internet. However, China’s decision to join the WTO impacted the government’s plan.
2
  
The Party-state’s boundary work in the press market 
To understand the impact of the Chinese state’s decision to adopt new ICTs and join 
the WTO, it is necessary to understand the state’s boundary-setting in the press market 
and the Chinese state’s strategy to shape emerging online news service. Although the 
Chinese state created a press market, it established geographical and sectoral boundaries 
to retain political control over news outlets. Despite the acceleration of media 
marketization in China since 1992, the Party-state retains control over news media (Lee 
2000; Zhao 1998; 2004; 2008). News media are simultaneously market actors and state 
actors. Only organizations affiliated with the Party-state are allowed to publish newspapers. 
Most of these organizations are party organs (e.g., local Party committees), government 
bureaucracies and mass organizations incorporated into the state.
3
 Since newspapers are 
institutionally linked with the Party-state, they are organized hierarchically and 
horizontally, with the Central Committee of the CCP on the top. One important feature of 
the press structure is that only Party committees are allowed to publish newspapers for 
general readers. Other organizations can publish only specialized newspapers (e.g., 
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economic reform in 1978. Only eight years later, China applied to rejoin GATT, General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade; the goal here was to facilitate domestic economic reform and make reform irreversible. 
This was necessary as the conservative faction inside the Party was actually strongly opposed to economic 
reform, and pro-reform leaders, in particular Zhao Zhiyang, hoped that by linking domestic institutions with 
international ones, it would be harder for the conservative faction to stall or reverse reforms. China finally 
joined the WTO in 2001 after 15 year long negotiations. 
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business) or newspapers for specific target groups (e.g., peasants). Nevertheless, the power 
of local Party committees is limited geographically. Although local Party committees are 
allowed to publish local commercial daily newspapers for general interest, they generally 
participate only in local press markets. Local daily newspapers are oriented toward local 
readers. Most local commercial daily newspapers do not have cross-regional and 
cross-sectoral influence. Even though the state loosened regulations on cross-regional 
collaboration and operation, newspapers continue to operate, at most, in multiple localities 
at the local level, or at the national level with a narrow specialization. None of the 
newspapers are permitted by the central Party-state to publish a national, market-oriented 
daily newspaper for general readers.  
The absence of national market-oriented daily newspapers is a result of deliberate 
political decisions. Although they are state actors, news organizations are likely to 
represent interests of a specific faction inside the CCP. News media that have access to the 
general public nationally could act as a de facto oppositional party, threatening the CCP’s 
political monopoly. In one of his important talks, Deng Xiaoping instructed that the state 
should outlaw connections between individuals across organizations or regions, and 
prohibit illegal organizations and publications (Deng 1994:271). The ultimate goal is to 
avoid the emergence of cross-sectoral and regional forces that could compete with the CCP. 
Such threats can arise from both outside and inside of the CCP. For the central state, local 
or specialized news organizations are easier to control. They also have smaller political 




news reports and civic discourse, the Party-state can still suppress them. As one journalist 
said:  
There is no commercial daily newspaper for general readers because of the state’s policy. 
Market demand and business interests are strong. Chinese people want to know more 
about what happens in the country. Local commercial daily newspapers do not satisfy 
such need. Considering the size of China’s population and advertisement market, the 
press market can definitely accommodate few national commercial daily newspapers. 
The government continues to restrict this out of political considerations. In some news 
media, journalists share similar political orientation. The government is unlikely to allow 
them becoming nationally influential. The possibility that national-level media 
organizations can be used by factions inside the Party-state is best exemplified by the 
1989 Tiananmen protests, in which journalists played an important role in political 
mobilization (June 2011, Beijing).  
The Chinese’s state’s construction of the expanded media field  
Around the late 1990s, the central state attempted to turn major news media, which are 
state agencies, into key players on the Internet. The government expected that China’s 
national news media, specifically People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency, and local 
press conglomerates would flourish on the Internet. The state could thereby “seize the 
commanding heights” of the Internet.
4
 Essentially, the state intended to shape the 
economic and political order in the emerging online news service sector according to the 
order in the existing press market, which was based on bureaucratic-level and geographic 
boundaries. This order would benefit Chinese news media economically and help to 
maintain political control.  
Nevertheless, China’s decision to join the WTO impacted the central state’s plan. 
Trade in telecommunications was one of the most fiercely debated issues in China’s WTO 
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negotiations (Wang 2001). China decided to open its telecommunications service sector, 
including the Internet information service, but the Chinese government refused to open the 
media sector (DeWoskin 2001; Lee 2003:12). Importantly, China’s plan to join the WTO 
and deeply integrate itself to the global economy ruled out the possibility that the state 
could be the sole provider of Internet content service, but this did not mean the state would 
lose its regulatory power (Hsueh 2011). The entrance to non-state actors, whether foreign 
or local, in Internet content service could impede the central state’s goal of transposing the 
order in the press market onto the emerging online news service sector. A law professor 
commented:  
The government knew very early that it was impossible to keep the telecommunications 
sector closed. One important consequence is that the government cannot control the 
Internet content providers in the same way as it controls news media through 
employment and promotion even though the state can still impose censorship and other 
regulations. …The government’s decision to join the WTO opened up opportunities for 
domestic private players. When people talk about WTO’s impacts, they mainly consider 
WTO’s benefit for foreign investors. But WTO has some beneficial impacts on local 
private actors in China because it limits the state’s monopolistic power (June 2011, 
Beijing). 
To minimize non-state actors’ potential negative impacts on the state’s plan for 
China’s online news service, the central state enacted regulations to secure news media’s 
economic advantages and the state’s political control. The Chinese state claimed its 
monopoly over the definition and production of news information. It defined news 
information as information on current affairs and politics, including reports and comments 
on politics, economy, military affairs, diplomacy, and other public affairs. The state then 
established a distinction between news media and non-news media among Internet news 




non-news media can provide Internet news service, they can only reprint news produced by 
Chinese news media. They are not permitted to collect or edit news themselves. As such, 
non-news media are forced to rely on news media, which are state actors, to provide online 
news service. In addition, to prevent foreign capital from controlling Internet news service 
providers, the state prohibited Internet news service providers from existing in the form of 
Chinese-foreign joint ventures, Chinese-foreign cooperatives, or wholly foreign-owned 
entities, although foreign capital is allowed to invest in Internet news providers.
5
 Officials 
in the central state, at least at one point in time, believed that they could control Internet 
news as long as the central and local states could monitor news media according to the 
conventional division of labor, and as long as the state could regulate the few private 
Internet news providers.   
The role of Internet portals in structuring the expanded media field 
Ultimately, however, the development of Internet news service deviated from the 
state’s plan. Internet portals, rather than the websites of Chinese news media, have become 
the most popular sites where netizens go to obtain news. Internet portals were first  
established in China in late 1998 and obtained approval from the state to provide news 
service in 2000.
6
 This was one year before China’s WTO accession and the very first time 
in the PRC’s history that non-state business actors were permitted to provide news to 
nationwide readers. Today, China has four major Internet portals: Sina, Sohu, NetEase and 
Tencent, all of which are among the top ten most popular websites in China according to 
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statistics in July 2013.
7
 They also own and operate very popular social media, particularly 
Weibo and QQ. The four Internet portals are all publicly-traded companies listed on 




The Chinese state’s regulation of the press market inadvertently contributed to the 
success of Internet portals. Whereas the absence of national, market-oriented, and 
general-interest daily newspapers helped the Chinese state to control the press, it 
unexpectedly created a niche for Internet portals. Since Internet portals and newspapers are 
similar in that text-based content is important, Internet portals actively recruited 
experienced journalists and editors from the press. By recruiting these professionals, those 
running Internet portals became cognizant of the fact that the state’s restrictions in the press 
market had created an unsatisfied market demand. Internet portal executives believed that 
their companies should provide products similar to national, commercial daily newspapers 
to satisfy this demand. Domestic Internet portals eventually developed a business model 
that was very different from Yahoo’s model. Yahoo mainly provided a directory of 
websites in order to gain advertising revenues. In comparison, Chinese Internet portals 
provided voluminous news to attract web traffic in exchange for advertising revenues, 
regardless of whether they had other important sources of revenue. Chinese Internet portals 
later integrated blogs, instant messengers, and Weibo (i.e., microblogs) to boost web traffic, 
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while also extending their services to mobile phone users. A nationwide online news 
market that linked Internet and mobile phone users and crossed the boundaries in the press 
market thus emerged. An executive at one of the top four Internet portals recalled:  
Although Internet portals began to provide news, such development was not planned. In 
the beginning, we did not realize what they were doing. We just tried to search for doable 
business models. With the recruitment of experienced journalists, we recognized the 
capacity of Internet portals and discovered the role of Internet portals as daily 
market-oriented newspapers for the general public. In the U.S., Yahoo is perhaps the 
only influential Internet portal that provides news. People visit websites of news media 
to read news. But we have four major Internet portals in China and people read news on 
Internet portals. Internet portals in China benefit very much from the boundaries that the 
government set in the press market (June 2011, Beijing). 
There are several reasons why news media in the press market did not dominate the 
emerging online news market as the state had anticipated. First, as state actors, news media 
faced strict constraints on capital and ownership structure. By contrast, Chinese Internet 
portals had access to the global capital market. Due to inadequate capital and the absence of 
profitable business models to generate revenues from websites, even successful news 
media were not enthusiastic about investing in their websites. Second, although the state 
did not allow Internet portals to produce news, intense competition among news media in 
local or specialized press markets gave Internet portals leverage to obtain news without 
having to pay high license fees. There are only four major Internet portals, but there are 
numerous newspapers. Newspapers realized that, with the existence of their competitors in 
the press market, it would only be to the detriment of newspapers to pass up the chance to 
boost their visibility on Internet portals. Additionally, Internet portals and local newspapers 
also found that they attracted different kinds of advertisement. The rise of the former did 




sports and entertainment news for other news with news media. The official definition of 
news does not prohibit Internet portals from producing sports and entertainment news. 
Since celebrities live in major cities, producing sports and entertainment news is expensive 
for new media outside major cities. As Internet portals are located in major cities, it is 
convenient for them to produce such news. Taken together, the above conditions resulted in 
more collaboration than competition between Internet portals and newspapers. News 
produced by numerous newspapers is thus centralized by the four major Internet portals and 
spread to online forums, communities, and social media. 
Compared with domestic Internet portals, transnational Internet portals, particularly 
Yahoo, tended to transplant business models that were successful elsewhere, without 
adequate local adaptation. When its local competitors invested in news service, Yahoo 
China did not follow. Yahoo China lost its readership quickly, despite initially being the 
most popular Internet portal in China. Reflecting upon Yahoo China’s failure, one former 
employee said:  
The executives in the U.S. did not understand the strong demand for news information in 
China back in 1998. Although Yahoo’s business model succeeded in the U.S. and other 
countries, demand of Chinese users was very different because of China’s political 
condition. When the executives realized this, it was too late for Yahoo to catch up (June 
2011, Beijing). 
In addition to providing products similar to national, commercial daily newspapers, 
Internet portals also developed very successful social media, which play an increasingly 
important role in the production of news and public opinion. Although the central 
government monopolizes the power to define and produce news, online forums, blogs, 




portals operate forums, blogs, and Weibo, they aggregate user-generated content swiftly. 
Media practitioners increasingly look to user-generated content as a potential source of 
news. 
In summary, the Chinese state’s decision to adopt the Internet led to the expansion of 
the media field, but the government’s reconstruction of the media field was conditioned 
by its decision to join the WTO. This reconstruction created opportunities for domestic 
non-state actors familiar with Chinese local contexts to remove the boundaries in the press 
market set by the state and form a national online news market. 
5.3.2. Extending Elite Networks and Cultural Practices from the Press Market to 
the Online News Market 
With the expansion of the media field, the social networks and political culture 
associated with bold newspaper organizations spread to Internet portals, the online news 
market, and online discursive and social spaces. The labor market is an important 
mechanism that extends the influence of specific news media to Internet portals. Although 
the latter are not allowed to produce news, there is still room to edit and compile the news, 
as well as to produce content that is not “news” according to the state’s definition. Since the 
mid-2000s, Internet portals actively recruited journalists to serve as top-level executives 
and editors as well as to steer the online news service. Despite the expansion of journalism 
education and the acceleration of media marketization, competent media practitioners were 
in short supply. The Southern Media Group, a press conglomerate belonging to the 




few news organizations that has attracted and trained competent journalists. The Southern 
Daily Group publishes the outspoken the Southern Metropolis Daily and the Southern 
Weekly. As discussed in Chapter Four, the Southern Metropolis Daily and the Southern 
Weekly are famous for producing critical and investigative reports, as well as for promoting 
citizen identity, civil society, rule of law, and constitutionalism. Although state agencies 
have cracked down periodically on the Southern Media Group, its newspapers and 
journalists have been highly valued in the press and labor markets, respectively. Star 
journalists in the Southern Media Group and a few economic news media were targets of 
headhunting. With access to the global capital market, Internet portals were able to provide 
much more competitive packages than news media.  
The huge readership of Internet portals and, therefore, the potential social influence 
was also attractive for ambitious journalists. In the mid-2000s, the Southern Media Group 
began losing experienced journalists. A large proportion of high-level positions in charge 
of news service in Internet portals were filled by journalists who worked previously in the 
Southern Media Group. In this way, the social networks, professional ideals, and political 
orientation associated with the Southern Media Group spread to Internet portals. These 
social networks included lawyers, legal scholars, commentators, and public intellectuals 
who collaborated with the Southern Media Group. Reflecting upon the loss of employees, a 
former editor-in-chief in the Southern Media Group said:  
Owing to the restricted ownership structure, there is weak connection between 
employees’ economic gains and success of news media. Our employees are willing to 
work here mainly because of their recognition of our values and professional ideals. 
Recently, my colleagues and I counted the number of journalists that we lost. Around 




executives and high-level editors in the four major Internet portals worked in the 
Southern Media Group. At first we felt very sad about such loss, but we realize that it is 
actually a good thing since our journalists spread elsewhere our core values, ideals and 
commitments – building a civil society, enhancing citizenship rights, as well as 
promoting rule of law. Now many of our journalists take leadership in the Internet sector. 
They are in a better position to influence more citizens. With the spread of our journalists, 
we have more alliance elsewhere (June 2011, Guangzhou). 
Journalists who left news media and took leadership positions in Internet portals are 
aware of the national influence of Internet portals and the role of such portals as national 
daily newspapers for general readers. There is variation in terms of whether Internet portals 
create a salient political identity, such as a more liberal or critical stance, as well as whether 
Internet portals form a formal strategic alliance with pro-democratic news media. Yet, what 
is generally shared by media professionals who took leadership positions in Internet portals 
is their respect for the rule of law, belief in the importance of civil society, and desire to 
help society identify problems and search for possible solutions. These media professionals 
are also inspired by democratic experiences elsewhere, especially in other Chinese societies. 
Of course, these actors still pursue their aims within political and economic constraints. A 
vice executive of one Internet portal said:  
For me the decision to move from the press to Internet portals was straightforward. I was 
amazed by the power of the Internet. When recruiting me, my boss showed me the 
company’s web-traffic report. At that time, only the China Central Television had that 
kind of influence. I was thrilled. For media practitioners, acclaims from the small media 
circle are not as much worth pursing as social influence. Ultimately, we want to impact 
public opinion and how people think. We want to help to build a society in which 
universal values are respected and citizens have genuine rights. This is indispensable for 
China’s modernization. We attempt to help the society to identify problems and achieve 
a consensus through providing an information environment where citizens can evaluate 
competing viewpoints. We know we are an Internet portal with national influence. Of 
course, we are constrained by the government. The government does use us as a channel 
to promote official discourse and agendas, but we still have space to pursue our goals… . 
I benefit very much from my previous working experience. I received excellent 




other news media, and experts in other fields. These recourses are precious for me (June 
2011, Beijing).  
Although Internet portals receive instructions from state agencies on a regular basis, 
within the limitations set by the state, media professionals in Internet portals are inclined to 
select news that reflects current problems in China – more specifically, news understood 
through the lens of citizenship rights. Editors at Internet portals are politically and 
economically motivated to reprint problem-oriented news, which tends to attract wide 
readership and trigger discussion, but they also believe that such news deserves public 
attention and discussion. Moreover, in many high profile public events since 2003, media 
professionals in Internet portals have worked with those in the outspoken newspapers and 
legal professionals to mobilize support from citizens and influence the state’s decision 
making. The triumph of public opinion in many public events may appear to result from 
the unorganized and spontaneous action of netizens, but the collaboration of media and 
legal professionals actually plays a crucial role in setting the public agenda, framing 
issues, and mobilizing public opinion.  
Ambitious media professionals associated with outspoken newspapers not only 
extended their networks and practices to major Internet portals, they also attempted to 
reach the public and other elites through social media. Before the rise of social media, 
active journalists leaked the results of their investigations anonymously on Internet forums 
when their investigations were censored. But with the growing popularity of Weibo since 
2009, media professionals increasingly use their real identities to disclose information, thus 
giving the information greater credibility. Media professionals also publicize grievances of 




resort to restore their rights given the dysfunctional nature of the institutions that do exist 
presumably to reflect and address citizens’ concerns and grievances. Appealing to 
journalists, rights defense lawyers, activists, and other public opinion leaders to spread 
information is a common strategy as these actors have extensive online networks that 
traverse social groups, and the ability to frame problems effectively. By helping citizens to 
air their grievances and share their views with other citizens, many media professionals 
extended their influence and became online spokespersons and public intellectuals.  
In short, with the expansion and reconstruction of the media field, social networks, 
professional ideals, and cultural practices associated with outspoken newspapers were 
spread to Internet portals, the online news market, and ordinary citizens.  
5.3.3. An Emerging Boundary between Citizens and the State 
The social structure in the expanded media field greatly impacts the selection of 
news and circulation of information by Internet portals. Over time, the online discursive 
space mediated by major Internet portals and social media has become a venue where 
news and information about all kinds of social problems aggregates. This aggregation of 
various problems had led to the emergence of a salient boundary between citizens and 
state agencies in the online discursive space.  
My interviews suggest that classification practices in the processes of reading and 
discussing news are key. According to official statistics, 65.7% of Chinese netizens 
participated in an online discussion in 2008. In 2009, 56.1% of netizens described 




increased their concerns about the society. Statistics in 2010 found that 80.1% of Chinese 
netizens read news online.
9
 These data indicate that reading news and expressing opinion 
online are common practices among the five million Chinese netizens. Media professionals 
in charge of censorship at Internet portals are extremely familiar with how netizens engage 
with news and information online, as censors review online comments produced by 
netizens on a daily basis and have access to uncensored comments. These media 
professionals described netizens’ comments as exercises of moral judgment, in which 
netizens were identifying victims and culprits. In every piece of news that reveals a 
problem, there exists at least one victimized citizen whose rights are denied. But when it 
comes to blame, the stories produced by most news organizations tend to be vague in terms 
of identifying culprits and specifying the cause of problems, due to political considerations. 
Some reports even indicate culprits suggested by state agencies, which sometimes means 
pointing to the victims themselves and citizens who are sympathetic to the victims. This 
ambiguity in the news and these questionable classifications of victims and culprits often 
generate contestation. Internet portals and forums give netizens easy ways to comment by 
letting them share their opinions online or even simply click to indicate whether they are 
supportive or not of a specific response. Since the most supported comments are usually 
listed first, it is easy to see the most accepted views.  
It becomes clear that ties between certain individuals and government agencies are 
perceived by the online public to be the most common culprit generating problems. 
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Netizens accuse state agencies, including the central government, of impairing rights, 
creating obstacles for citizens to restore their rights, and violating the state’s obligation to 
protect rights. Essentially, netizens tend to place state agencies on the unlawful side of the 
scale of justice established by the state itself. Since state agencies’ image as culprits has 
become fixed in the public mind, even propaganda that acclaims Party-state achievement 
can backfire in online discursive space. This happens often when the Propaganda 
Department asks Internet portals to highlight news that promotes the Party-state. State 
agencies are even seen now as a source of pollution. When an actor is perceived by the 
online public as associated with the state, this tends to be accompanied by a contaminated 
reputation. A chief editor of a top Internet portal said: 
Chinese people have strong feeling that they are victims of imperialism, but now more 
Chinese citizens realize that they are victims of unchecked power. The harm inflicted by 
state agencies is more real as it occurs on a daily basis. Now the true cleavage does not 
exist between people who belong to different classes, but between people inside and 
outside the Party-state.  
In the interviews, government officials in charge of online censorship admitted that, given 
the sophisticated censorship, they did not expect the rising oppositional discourse. The 
key principle of censorship practices is censoring criticism of the central government, 
criticism of the communist regime, and information instigating collective action. Even 
though journalists are able to take risks to criticize local governments that lack the 
authority to supervise them, they are not likewise able to criticize the central government 
and the communist regime. Under previous conditions when Internet portals were not well 
established, critical news reports were primarily circulated locally or only among specific 




consequences at the national level. Under the new Internet conditions, however, news that 
reveals problems in certain localities and specific government agencies is now broadcasted 
nationally. Despite censorship, the aggregate of news that passes censorship tends to 
generate detrimental results at the national level – the negative perception of the state, 
including the central state, and the communist regime. The key is that censorship 
practices only focus on individual issues and news, but cannot control how Chinese 
people relate to the news they consume. It is thus necessary to understand how Chinese 
people make sense of news and information.  
5.3.4. Politicization of Citizens 
I draw on interviews with ordinary citizens to understand the micro-process of 
classification and its effects in generating a shared identity and opposition. As I have stated, 
subjects were selected according to Internet-use and social class. There are three salient 
similarities across subjects. First, all interviewees perceive problems in China. Among the  
top three issues, food safety and land grabbing problems are considered rampant, and 
labor disputes are considered significant, but becoming less severe. Second, interviewees 
with different backgrounds use the same cultural medium – laws and rights – to think 
about and discuss problems. When interviewees made a negative judgment about a 
specific actor in the interviews, the negative judgment was usually about the unlawfulness 
of the actor. Interviewees are generally knowledgeable about law, especially law related 
to their interests. For example, even subjects without secondary education and access to 
the Internet know their rights under labor laws very well. Third, interviewees tend to think 




Chinese people, but are salient between the Chinese state and Chinese people. Social 
inequality was a recurring theme that interviewees brought up when they discussed social 
conflict and division, but many interviewees mentioned that the rising social inequality 
has caused tension in China not because of the inequality itself, but because of the 
problematic connection between the rising rich and the state.   
There are, however, critical differences between netizens and non-netizens with 
similar socioeconomic backgrounds. First, netizens tend to perceive problems as more 
severe. This is because non-netizens are less cognizant of problems beyond their local 
contexts. When discussing the three issues (food safety, land grabbing, and labor disputes) 
in the interviews, non-netizens often mentioned local cases, whereas netizens alluded to 
many high-profile cases across localities. Netizens were also familiar with a variety of 
problems across social groups and aspects of life. 
Second, although the two groups both invoke the language of laws and rights to  
discuss problems, and perceive the existence of a huge gap between law on the books and 
law in action, the ways in which the two groups understand laws and rights greatly differ in 
two important respects. Non-netizens care about laws and rights to the extent that laws 
and rights are closely related to their material or personal interests, whereas netizens are 
more likely to demand rights that are beyond their material or personal interests, 
particularly political rights. Netizens are inclined to claiming their rights as citizens to 
participate in public affairs even though the government does not allow them to exercise 
such rights. Understanding news and expressing opinion is a minimal form of political 




political rights as the fundamental cause of problems in China, as citizens cannot use 
institutionalized channels to hold the government responsible. According to them, the 
inability of citizens to organize NGOs or political parties to monitor the government and 
business organizations make the problems unsolvable. The two groups also differ in terms 
of whether they take the legitimacy of law as granted. Non-netizens tend to accept 
whatever is written in the law, whereas netizens recognize that law is also an instrument 
for domination and, thus, consistency is required between laws and rights. Many netizens 
mentioned that using unjust laws to govern the populace violates the principle of rule of 
law. In short, although non-netizens and netizens share the same cultural medium, 
netizens employ higher standards to identify problems and make judgments.  
Third, although both non-netizens and netizens think the main conflict and division 
in China is that between the state and Chinese people, the two groups perceive different 
levels of conflict and relate to the conflict in different ways. Non-netizens are more likely 
to think that conflict and division exists at the local level. They also tend to have a 
bifurcated view of state legitimacy, seeing the central leaders as benevolent, but local 
officials as corrupted (Lee 2007:21). As such, it is only local government and officials that 
are understood as in conflict with Chinese people. In addition, non-netizens are less likely 
to see themselves as victims in the conflict unless they or their family encounter personal 
problems. In comparison, netizens are more likely to think that conflict and division exists 
at the national level. They tend to regard problems as systematic and blame state agencies 
at all levels. They are also more inclined to identify themselves as victims suffering from 




identification motivates netizens to contest official discourse online and support other 
citizens when there is an opportunity. 
I pushed interviewees to reflect upon the origins of their cultural schemes – how and 
from where they gained their understanding of the world and how to make sense of it. The 
results revealed that netizens and non-netizens rely on very different sources of 
information in order to understand the concepts of law and rights. Non-netizens mostly 
mentioned that they learned about laws and rights from TV and local newspapers. Many 
non-netizens said that local newspapers contain useful information about their rights, and 
they discuss these issues with family, friends, and colleagues. In general, non-netizens did 
not question the credibility or value of mass media, even though some did mention that 
media based in Hong Kong have higher credibility.  
In contrast to non-netizens, netizens generally perceive mass media in China as 
unrealizable, and they stated that public intellectuals and only very few outspoken 
domestic newspapers (particularly the Southern Weekly) greatly influence how they think 
about laws and rights. Many netizens mentioned that they receive recommendations 
regarding specific public intellectuals and newspapers from their friends and teachers. 
Although netizens may not necessarily agree with the concrete opinions of media or public 
intellectuals, they generally appreciate the analytic frameworks that emphasize citizenship 
rights, rule of law, and citizen participation. They told me that it is not so much specific 
information or facts, but rather the alternative analytic framework that has influenced them 
the most in the long term. My interviewees think the alternative framework promoted by 




promoted by the Chinese state. Public intellectuals, in particular, have a huge influence on 
college students. And though debates exist between rightist and leftist intellectuals (Zhao 
2008), my interview data did not find that debates defined in such terms had a noticeable 
influence on ordinary citizens. Essentially, the response of interviewees suggests that the 
elite networks in and beyond the media field have influenced how netizens understand the 
symbolic structure of laws and rights. But while acknowledging the influence of public 
intellectuals and outspoken newspapers, my interviewees in the netizen group emphasized 
that such influence is mediated by and intertwined with complex long-term living 
experiences and personal biographies. 
The cultural medium that citizens use to make sense of news and problems, as well 
as the amount of problem-oriented news and information to which citizens are exposed, 
impacts citizens’ classification practices in the process of reading and discussing news. 
Compared with netizens, non-netizens are exposed to less problem-oriented news and 
information, and they use a lower standard to judge various actors involved in the 
problems. Generally, when non-netizens have negative perceptions of the local 
government and officials, it is linked to their own personal experiences and/or the 
experiences of their family and friends. As a result, non-netizens are more likely to view 
problems as individual and local, and they are less likely to establish connections with 
citizens beyond their local contexts.  
Netizens, on the other hand, are exposed to a variety of problems and use a higher 
standard to make their judgments. Despite variation within netizens as a group, most of 




repetitively exposed to numerous problems online across localities and over time, they 
begin to see the structural roots of problems and, therefore, expand their targets of blaming. 
As we discussed food safety, labor disputes and land-taking in interviews, I developed a 
sense of whether and how interviewees established connections between these issues. A 35 
year-old driver with a high school education articulated:  
I used to see problems as a single dot, but I can connect them into a line and a plane 
after I knew more and more on the Internet. The pattern is simple. Government 
officials and people with connection to them gain from ordinary citizens’ loss of 
rights. Immoral businesses are able to profit from selling unsafe food because of 
their ties with officials. Officials and their land developer friends profit from 
grabbing citizens’ properties. Anyway, we are ‘shitizens’ instead of citizens. Why 
didn’t leaders in the central government intervene? It’s precisely because of their 
vested interests (July 2011, Chongqing). 
Many interviewees in the netizen group emphasized that, from the reoccurrence of 
problems over time and the co-occurrence of problems in every locality in China, they find 
a central government that has been reluctant to tackle problems and even indifferent to local 
government’s suppression of victims and whistleblowers. Some interviewees even see the 
central state’s indifference to such suppression and its “inaction” to many problems as 
prima facie evidence that indicates the state’s deep involvement in all kinds of problems. 
As a result, netizens blame state agencies at all levels, and relate the cause of problems to 
citizens’ lack of political rights and the state’s lack of accountability. Many of my 
interviewees said that problems are caused by unchecked political power and the lack of 
motivation among leaders to take citizens seriously. In essence, the aggregation of 
problems online leads to new understandings about the nature of problems and a belief in 
an opposition between citizens and the state – and, significantly, this effect holds despite 




Reading and discussing problem-oriented news and information through the lens of 
citizenship rights also strengthens citizen identity. In the interviews, netizens explained 
why they think they are similar to and connected with other citizens. First, they all 
encounter problems and exclusion in their daily life. Second, while problems may manifest 
differently, citizens share a common cause - the state’s infringement of or failure to protect 
rights. Third, interviewees believed that ordinary citizens’ lack of connection to state 
agencies makes them susceptible to problems and more likely to suffer from exclusion. A 
40-year-old safety guard who works in a university said:  
We all encounter problems in our daily life. Although problems may look different, 
they are all related to the problematic nature of the government. I feel that I am the 
same as other citizens. As long as you do not belong to the “interest group”, it is likely 
that you are negatively affected by the system, whether you are a worker, peasant or 
teacher. This kind of thinking motivates me to support other citizens and use my rights 
to ask the government for change even though I know the limitation of my effort (2011 
July, Chongqing). 
Similar to the safety guard, many netizens also alluded to how citizen identity motivates 
them to voice their opinions, even though they know the limitation of public opinion in 
China. These interviewees pointed out that the public has limited attention and capacity to 
react to all of the problems in China. Additionally, there is no adequate institution to raise 
the likelihood that state agencies would deal with these problems. Even though government 
agencies do tackle some problems, they mostly do so in an ad hoc manner, rather than 
addressing problems systematically. Furthermore, the public has limited capacity to 
oversee how the government addresses problems in the long run due to restrictions on 




responsibilities to demand change motivates netizens to contest official discourse online, 
support other citizens, and exercise their rights over the government. 
5.4. DISCUSSION 
To review, my empirical analysis explained the rise of an influential nationwide 
counterpublic sphere in China. By analyzing in-depth interview data, I found that that the 
rise of the counterpublic sphere is the outcome of a long institutional, cultural, and social 
process that was catalyzed by the development and diffusion of ICTs. Given the 
emergence of new ICTs and the benefits that accrued with joining the WTO, the Chinese 
state decided to expand and restructure the media field. Nevertheless, this restructuring 
inadvertently benefited non-state business actors, especially domestic Internet portals, 
while also extending existing elite networks and cultural practices associated with critical 
news reporting from the press market to the online news market. These elite networks 
greatly impacted the selection of news and the circulation of information via Internet 
portals and social media, as well as netizens’ understanding of the symbolic structure of 
laws and rights. Rather than attending only to the protection of their personal interests and 
private rights, netizens have used a broader lens of citizenship rights to make sense of the 
various problems aggregated in online discursive space and to classify and identify with 
the actors involved in the problems. The classification practices involved in the process of 
reading and discussing news have led to a widespread belief in an opposition between 




My empirical analysis contributes to existing studies that examine the rise of public 
opinion in China by specifying the institutional, cultural and social processes that have 
enabled and facilitated individuals to construct the emerging counterpublic sphere. As I 
have stated, existing studies of rising public opinion in China tend to focus on how 
technological properties of the Internet can help citizens to bring about social change and 
how the Chinese state has regulated the Internet to forestall such change (Hung 2003; 
Lagerkvist 2005; Lei 2011; McCormick and Liu 2003; Rosen 2010; Shen et al. 2009; Tai 
2006; 2008; Yang 2009; Zheng and Wu 2005; Zheng 2008). This approach neglects how 
contexts can mediate and moderate the effect of the Internet. By tracing the restructuring 
of the media field and examining the dynamics of interaction in the expanded media field, 
my analysis finds that two pre-existing conditions played a key role in shaping how 
Chinese people use ICTs and produce public discourse. The first condition is the 
existence of elite networks that are associated with critical news reporting. These elite 
networks have greatly impacted the operation of Internet portals and social media, as well 
as the production and circulation of news and information in the emerging online news 
market. They also provide alternative frameworks for citizens to make sense of news and 
information. The second condition is the existence of a shared symbolic structure of laws 
and rights. This shared symbolic structure provides resource for citizens to demand 
citizenship rights and serves as a lens for citizens to interpret news and information. In 
essence, situating the use and diffusion of the Internet in a broader institutional, cultural, 
and social context contributes to a deeper understanding of how the Internet can shape the 




The above insight about the importance of institutional, cultural, and social contexts 
in moderating the political consequences of ICTs has implications beyond the Chinese 
context. Scholars who are interested in the relationship between technology and 
democracy tend to have a binary – whether utopian or dystopian – view regarding the 
impact of ICTs on political development and discuss their effect in very abstract ways 
(Benkler 2006; Dahlgren 2000; 2001; 2005). But, as the Chinese case has demonstrated, 
the effect of ICTs is context-dependent. Thus, an analysis of the impact of ICTs on social 
and political change requires an analysis of the structure of the media field and the 
broader contexts in which the media field is situated, as these conditions shape the way in 
which ICTs are used.  
 By specifying the institutional, cultural, and social foundation that has enabled 
Chinese people to employ ICTs for political contestation, my study helps to address the 
question raised by Guillén and Suárez (2006) about how ICTs are likely to help spread 
democracy within authoritarian countries, given their insufficient democratic foundation. 
My study has demonstrated that the authoritarian state can inadvertently contribute to the 
social-cultural foundation of democracy through institution building. In the Chinese case, 
the elite networks that have greatly impacted the online discursive space, in fact, emerged 
from within the Chinese state after it accelerated the process of media marketization. 
These elite networks were also able to extend to the online sector because of the Chinese 
state’s decision to adopt the Internet and join the WTO. Furthermore, the symbolic 
structure of laws and rights used by Chinese people to make sense of news, make moral 




Chinese state. The key is that the Chinese state does not have complete control over how 
citizens interpret laws and rights, or how they employ these symbolic resources. 
Therefore, seeds of liberalization, or what Habermas (1996:359) calls “liberal patterns of 
political culture and socialization,” can develop beneath the façade of an authoritarian 
regime. 
Finally, by studying the boundary processes that contributed to the counterpublic 
sphere, my study helps to understand and account for the collective antagonism against 
the Chinese state in public opinion at the national level. Existing studies in the field of 
Chinese studies do not pay sufficient attention to this emerging phenomenon. For instance, 
research suggests the Chinese state has been successful in generating regime legitimacy at 
the mass level (Nathan 2003; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011). Even when existing 
studies attend to antagonism between the Chinese people and the Chinese state, they find 
that such antagonism exists only at the local level (Lee 2007; O'Brien and Li 2006). For 
example, in her study of labor protests in China, Lee (2007) found that the rhetoric of 
legal rights has become central to labor protests throughout China with the unfolding of 
legal reform, but the central government’s legitimacy is not tarnished when local 
governments fail to deliver what law promises. Lee argues that because local 
governments are in charge of legal enforcement, people believe that it is local 
governments that should be blamed when questions of law arise. Although my findings 
about non-netizens are consistent with previous research about the relationship between 
Chinese people and the Chinese state, my findings about netizens contradict previous 




and netizens with similar socioeconomic backgrounds, I was able to account for their 
divergent views on the relationship between the Chinese state and Chinese people and 
understanding the collective antagonism that led to the counterpublic sphere. My findings 
thus help to explain an emerging phenomenon that has not gained sufficient attention in 
existing literature.  
In closing, it is important note the limitations of this study. Although my analysis of 
the politicization of citizens at the micro-level can complement my previous research on 
the relationship between media use and political attitudes and behavior based on analysis 
of survey data (Lei 2011), the generalizability of my findings is restricted since I did not 
have a random sample of subjects, even though I maximized variation within subjects. 
Future research can adopt Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) sampling strategy in their study of 







This dissertation is motivated by the disjuncture that exists between the development 
of the counterpublic sphere in China and the dominant theory of the public sphere. The 
dominant theory, which mainly derives from historical cases in Western Europe, assumes 
the indispensability of a relatively autonomous and vibrant civil society for a flourishing 
public sphere. According to this theory, a thriving nationwide counterpublic sphere would 
be unlikely to emerge, let alone thrive in China owing to the absence of an active civil 
society there. In reality, however, the Chinese case reveals the limitations of the dominant 
theory in traveling beyond Western European contexts. The Chinese case presents a 
negative case for comparative historical sociology regarding the public sphere and 
provides an opportunity to critique the universal assumptions of existing scholarship. 
Through investigating the Chinese case, I aim to achieve two goals. First, I aim to explain 
the rise and persistence of China’s nationwide counterpublic sphere. Second, I aim to 
reconcile the Chinese case with the dominant theory of the public sphere and thereby 
restructure the theory of the public sphere.  
In this chapter, I discuss how this dissertation has achieved these two goals. I first 




relation to previous research on the history of public opinion in China and literature 
related the public sphere. Third, I discuss broader implications of my findings. I first 
situate my findings in relation to three streams of discourse on democracy: discourse 
about market and democracy, rule of law and democracy, and technology and democracy. 
Then, I consider my findings in relation to the authoritarian resilience thesis. Finally, I 
end the dissertation by discussing its generalizability and limitations, and noting 
opportunities for further research.  
6.1. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
My core argument in this dissertation is that a social-cultural foundation is needed 
for a public sphere to grow and persist. While theorists examining the emergence of the 
public sphere in Western contexts emphasize the role of civil society – broadly defined as 
space outside the state, the Chinese case suggests a completely unexamined and distinct 
process in which the state is the unintended and paradoxical architect of the counterpublic 
sphere. I developed this argument by examining how the Chinese state inadvertently 
helped to build the social-cultural foundations of China’s counterpublic sphere. I 
summarize the findings of each empirical chapter below.  
6.1.1. The rise of a nationwide counterpublic sphere 
In Chapter 2, the first substantive chapter of my dissertation, I established the 
existence of a flourishing nationwide counterpublic sphere in China. Drawing on 
interview data with informants, I argued that when an authoritarian state frequently takes 




indicator of the existence of an influential nationwide counterpublic sphere. In this 
situation, a counterpublic sphere can be said to exist because the state takes a hostile and 
exclusionary attitude toward it, and the sphere is influential in the sense that the state is 
forced to respond to its demands. Through a longitudinal study from 1949-2010, I located 
the rise a nationwide counterpublic sphere in the post-2005 period.  
Before 2005, the Chinese state rarely engaged with public opinion that it regarded as 
antagonistic. Between 1949 and 1986, the government seldom acknowledged, let alone 
dealt with public opinion. When “public opinion” was mentioned in newspapers, it 
generally referred to voices outside of China that either said something positive about the 
CCP or criticized Western imperialism. This pattern reflected the low level of influence 
that the voices of Chinese people had in Chinese politics. Gradually, however, coverage 
of domestic public opinion in the news did begin to grow. Between 1987 and the 1989 
Tiananmen incident – a very short period – CCP reformist leaders endorsed the right of 
citizens to formulate public opinion and acknowledged public opinion as a check of 
political power. During this period, public opinion was not perceived by the central 
government as threatening or oppositional to its authoritarian rule. Not surprisingly, 
however, this stance shifted following the Tiananmen incident in 1989. In the following 
decade, the state approached public opinion as something that needed to be controlled. 
This very response indicated the presence of a public sphere that was considered 
antagonistic to the state, but the influence of this sphere was limited insofar as the state 
did not need to compromise with it or satisfy the demands of those within it. From 1998 




public opinion and reduced its use of restrictive measures. During this period, the central 
state allowed much more space for public opinion, but only did so because it had shifted 
back to seeing public opinion as of little consequence.  
In the post-2005 period, a new pattern emerged. The central state increasingly took a 
restrictive approach to public opinion, but, paradoxically, it also began to treat public 
opinion as a check of political power. This period is the only time in the PRC’s history 
that both restrictive and affirmative approaches simultaneously and drastically climbed. In 
short, the state was attempting both to control public opinion, but also to acknowledge it 
as an independent and influential force to be reckoned with. I argue that this pattern of 
state responses between 2005 and 2010 provides powerful evidence of something entirely 
new – a flourishing, nationwide counterpublic sphere. 
6.1.2. Disseminating law to the populace: From lawlessness to the emergence of a 
nationwide symbolic structure based on laws and rights 
In Chapter 3, I investigated the origin and diffusion of the symbolic structure of 
China’s public and counterpublic spheres. Explaining the development of a public sphere 
requires a specification of its cultural medium, as well as an account of where this 
medium originates from and how this medium is diffused to and accepted by actors in the 
public sphere. Existing studies based on Western experiences suggest that this medium 
tends to grow outside of the state (Alexander 2006; Habermas 1989:56). Contrary to this 
view, I demonstrate the critical role of the Chinese state in establishing a symbolic 




counterpublic sphere. As support for communist ideology has declined over time and 
national sentiment cannot be mobilized to deal with most of problems that upset Chinese 
citizens, the symbolic structure based on law and rights has become the most critical 
shared medium for public dialogue. 
I argued that the establishment of a nationwide symbolic structure based on law and 
rights in China was part of the state’s efforts to address the CCP’s legitimation crisis in 
the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). To address this crisis, the Chinese 
state initiated both economic and legal reform. With regard to the latter, Chinese leaders 
defined the nature of law as a partial substitute for class struggle and a pragmatic 
instrument to achieve stability, unity, and modernization. Since these reforms were also 
conditioned by the global market economy, Chinese law related to the economy was 
linked with its counterparts in other countries, and shaped by international law, including 
the latter’s enshrinement of the concept of rights.  
For the state’s campaign to make law a new symbolic structure to succeed, law 
needed to be disseminated and accepted by the Chinese populace. This was a daunting 
task in the late 1970s and 1980s. To this end, the Chinese state diffused law through 
political campaigns and media communication. The central government’s goal was to 
ensure that citizens’ knew and obeyed the law, and to facilitate the construction of a 
socialist market economy. Through this process, however, the discourse of protecting 
rights became increasingly widespread. The actual diffusion of the discourse of rights 
depends on the enactment of laws that are closely related to ordinary citizens’ economic 




concept for citizens. This condition was satisfied in the mid-1990s, after the Chinese state 
restructured itself to address the1989 Tiananmen crisis and accelerated China’s economic 
reform. The discourse of rights regarding citizens’ economic lives expanded rapidly 
during the period from 2000 to 2005. 
Through the dissemination of law, the Chinese state, to a large degree, replaced the 
public’s existing symbolic structure of class struggle with one framed in terms of laws 
and rights. Precisely because the Chinese state is a capable authoritarian state, it was able 
to build a legal field that would have taken much longer to develop in other contexts, and 
impose a cultural medium based on laws and rights that penetrated fully into society. As a 
result of the state’s capacity, despite being essentially “lawless” in the late 1970s, by 2001, 
China’s legal institutions were already recognized as sophisticated enough to meet the 
demanding requirements of WTO membership. As the first wave of the Rule of Law 
Index showed in 2011, China scored as well as many advanced democratic countries and 
actually surpassed many developing countries, regardless of political regime, in terms of 
making law widely accessible and comprehensible to citizens. 
6.1.3. Freeing the press: How field overlap explains critical news reporting 
In Chapter 4, I examined how the Chinese state’s decision and strategy to develop 
the legal field inadvertently facilitated the production of critical news reports – reports 
that identify fundamental societal problems, analyze their causes, and search for solutions 
– even though critical news reporting is often discouraged, if not completely suppressed 




Similar to the legal field, the development of China’s media field was subjected to 
the same macro-condition – the Chinese state’s need to address its legitimation crisis after 
the Cultural Revolution, although the restructuring of the media field came later than the 
building of the legal field. After Deng Xiaoping reconstituted the Chinese state in the 
aftermath of the 1989 Trainman incident, he decided to accelerate China’s economic 
reform in 1992. This decision led not only to the enactment of laws that were closely 
related to ordinary citizens’ economic lives in the mid-1990s, but also to the redefinition 
of news service as part of the service industry. In the past, newspapers were primarily 
subsidized by the state and expected to serve as mouthpieces of state propaganda. But 
after the Chinese state redefined the nature of news service, it began to drastically reduce 
its funding of newspapers, forcing them to rely on advertising and sales to survive. As a 
result, although newspapers are still state agencies responsible for propaganda, they are 
simultaneously market actors that must attract readers. The marketization of newspapers 
has also spurred the growth of a professional journalist community. Although the 
profession as a whole is still far from independent, norms viewing journalists as 
spokespersons for citizens have emerged. As a consequence of these developments, 
political, market, and professional power and logics all influence news production.  
The resulting media field in China presents a much more nuanced picture than 
previous analyses would suggest. Although Chinese media are still described by some as 
remaining “aloof to the democratic impulse in the society” (Pan 2010:185) and attempting 
to “avoid a critical interrogation of the broader social and economic structure” (Zhao 




still applicable in the case of some Chinese newspapers, other newspapers have 
increasingly attempted to resist state control and produce critical news reports – 
sometimes provoking, in turn, a government crackdown. 
I investigated why and how certain newspapers were able to produce critical news 
reports, despite the limited freedom of the press. I found that the overlap of institutional 
and social network mechanisms linking the newspaper and legal fields helped to facilitate 
critical news reporting. The central state’s shift to law as a new mode of domination – and 
especially its use of the media to disseminate law – created a new bridge between the 
legal and newspaper fields, inadvertently bringing about new opportunities for actors in 
the latter, in particular. Given the Chinese state’s usual effort to prevent connections 
across organizations in order to forestall the rise of competing political power, this 
institutional intersection created a novel and critical condition for the formation of 
cross-cutting networks. The transformation of the legal field also elevated the potential 
impact of such institutional field overlap. As the process of legal reform unfolded, the 
legal profession became more established and diversified over time. Although the 
majority of legal professionals are still focused on making money, some have begun to 
see themselves as guardians of citizens’ rights. The overlap of the legal and newspaper 
fields through institutional mechanisms brought about opportunities for journalists to 
access resources in the legal field and to resist the state’s political logics using law. 
Nevertheless, how this institutional field overlap played out hinged on structural 
conditions in the newspaper field across locations. In Guangzhou, a strong professional 




combined to allow journalists there to produce a considerable amount of critical news 
reports through substantial collaboration with pro-liberal legal professionals. This 
collaboration and the state's public embrace of the rule of law – however disingenuous as 
that embrace may have been – enabled journalists to appropriate law to uncover social 
problems and expand the space for critical news reporting. In this process of collaboration, 
public-spirited journalists and legal professionals also developed the common goal of 
cultivating a civil society, and critical news reporting was seen as an important means of 
achieving that goal. In Beijing and Fuzhou, by contrast, although the fragmented local 
political power structure provided some space for critical news reporting, the relative 
weakness of the journalist community and the less competitive market in these locations 
hindered the scope of collaboration and limited the amount of critical news reporting. 
Finally, in Shanghai, critical news reporting was even less common as collaboration 
between the two professions was largely stifled by the concurrence of a weaker journalist 
community, a less competitive market, and a more unified political power structure.  
6.1.4. Amplifying limited liberalization effects: Boundary processes and the 
creation of a nationwide counterpublic sphere 
In Chapter 5, I examined the processes by which the limited liberalization effects 
outlined in Chapter 4 escalated into a nationwide counterpublic sphere. I showed that the 
Chinese state’s decision to pursue the benefits that accrued with adopting the new 
information communication technologies (ICTs) and joining the WTO triggered a series 
of field overlaps and boundary processes. These processes culminated in the rise of the 




To understand the impact of the Chinese state’s decision to adopt new ICTs and join 
the WTO, it is necessary to understand the state’s boundary-setting in the press market 
and the Chinese state’s strategy to shape emerging online news service. Although the 
Chinese state created a press market, it established geographical and sectoral boundaries 
to retain political control over news outlets. For example, none of the country’s regional 
newspapers are permitted to publish a national, market-oriented daily newspaper for 
general readers. The Chinese state did plan to turn major news media, which are state 
agencies, into influential Internet news providers that could compete with non-state 
Internet news providers, though it hoped to maintain control of this process. But in 
China’s WTO negotiations, although China did not open its press market, it did open the 
telecommunications service market and this ruled out the possibility that the state could 
maintain its monopoly over Internet news providers. In order to privilege state actors and 
minimize the influence of non-state actors, the government established a distinction 
between non-news media and news media among Internet news providers. Although 
non-news media are permitted to provide Internet news service, they can only reprint 
news produced by news media – media still controlled by the state.  
Despite this favorable treatment for state actors, the geographical and sectoral 
boundaries in the press market set by the Chinese state inadvertently created a niche for 
non-state Internet portals to satisfy the demand for national, commercial daily newspapers. 
Internet portals are companies like Yahoo. Since Internet portals and newspapers are 
similar in that text-based content is important, Internet portals in China recruited 




these professionals, those running Internet portals became aware of the fact that the state’s 
restrictions in the press market had created an unsatisfied market demand. Domestic 
Internet portals eventually developed a business model that provided a huge amount of 
news and social media service. A nationwide online news market that broke the 
boundaries in the press market thus emerged. 
By extending the media field to include online space, the state inadvertently aided 
non-state actors, facilitated the rise of media professionals committed to critical news 
reporting, and further triggered a series of field overlaps. With the rise of the Internet 
service sector, these journalists were suddenly able to consider employment options 
outside of the state-run media system. And they were highly valued in the labor market 
because of their work. With access to the global economic market, Internet portals 
provided media professionals with much more competitive packages and the promise of a 
much larger readership. These portals have, thus, been able to fill a large proportion of 
their high-level positions in charge of news services with journalists devoted to critical 
news reporting. In this way, particular social networks, professional ideals, and political 
orientations were spread to Internet portals. Cultural practices related to critical news 
reporting also extended to the online news market. Although Internet portals are not 
allowed to produce news themselves, there is still room to edit and compile the news. A 
larger proportion of Internet portals are inclined to select news that reflects current 
problems within the limitations set by the state. This news tends to attract wide readership 
and trigger discussion on online forums and social media. As a platform for interaction, 




extending critical cultural elements and practices from media and legal professionals to 
other elites, social movement activists and ordinary citizens. Increasingly, various actors 
come to the online news space to produce, disseminate, and discuss news related to 
societal problems, even though they may not necessarily agree with each other’s political 
views. 
This meso-level integration process led to the politicization of citizens, which, in 
turn, delineated the contours of an emergent nationwide counterpublic sphere. Despite 
continuing censorship, exposure to ostensibly local and individual problems across time 
and localities has transformed how netizens think about the cause of ostensibly unrelated 
problems and targets of blaming. The symbolic structure of the laws and rights that were 
established by the Chinese state became a yardstick by which netizens defined and 
discussed problems – often resulting in interpretations of the law that differed from those 
of the state. By learning about common threats to rights and common problems, netizens 
developed an identity as victimized citizens. Netizens accused state agencies of impairing 
rights, creating obstacles for citizens to restore their rights, and violating their obligations 
to protect rights. Netizens also saw the recurrence of problems over time and the 
emergence of similar patterns of problems across localities. They found a central 
government reluctant to tackle problems, fulfill various rights, and even indifferent to the 
suppression of victims and whistleblowers. As a result, many netizens began to see the 
structural roots of problems and, accordingly, expanded their targets of blaming. Rather 
than seeing the central state as benevolent and local governments as corrupt, many 




lack of political rights to hold the government accountable. This aggregation of individual 
and local problems eventually led to a surge of public opinion that challenged the state 
and increasingly framed citizens in opposition to the state.  
6.2. DISCUSSION OF CONTRIBUTION 
In this section, I first review how my findings contribute to understanding the current 
rise of the counterpublic sphere in China’s in relation to the country’s historical context. 
Next, I consider how my findings can illuminate the dominant theory of the public sphere, 
the limitations of which provided the motivation for the dissertation. Then, I discuss how 
my findings can shed light on literature related to the public sphere more broadly. 
6.2.1. Understanding the present in China in relation to the past 
Comparing my findings and the narrative provided by historian Lin Yutang deepens 
our understanding of current developments in China in relation to a broader historical 
context. I began my dissertation by pointing out the findings of Lin Yutang’s A History of 
the Press and Public Opinion in China (1936). Lin found that public opinion was 
generally passive, only mobilized for short periods around issues of national identity and 
only under exceptional circumstance. Lin believed that long-standing censorship in China 
accounted for this passivity and ended his book with a call to awaken public opinion. 
Despite continuing censorship in China, my empirical analysis has shown that public 
opinion mobilized based on citizen identity has become a constant social-political force 
and constituted a flourishing nationwide counterpublic sphere. Looking at the continuity 




understand and explain the current rise of the counterpublic sphere in China and its 
absence in the past.  
Juxtaposing Lin’s and my studies reveals a critical similarity between China’s past 
and present. Our work highlights China’s efforts to pursue modernity, in part, by adopting 
global hegemonic norms. Achieving modernity has been a critical goal for various actors 
in China since the Qing Dynasty, even though actors have differed in how they have 
defined and pursued that goal. In Lin’s narrative, the Chinese states and intellectuals in 
the Qing Dynasty and the Republic era embraced Western norms to a certain extent in 
order to modernize China and address crises resulting from capitalist imperialism in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These modernization projects encompassed the 
development of media and legal institutions. As Lin’s narrative shows, the birth of the 
modern Chinese press was highly influenced by European missionaries and merchants. 
The development of the modern Chinese press was simultaneously a process of 
socio-political movements to modernize and democratize China, in which many Chinese 
intellectuals introduced the Chinese people to Western notions of liberty, democracy, and 
constitutional reform. Adopting Western legal institutions to reform Chinese legal 
institutions was part of the modernization projects in the Qing Dynasty and Republic of 
China (Lei). Similarly, the pursuit of modernity has been a critical goal for the 
contemporary CCP and a means for the CCP to obtain legitimation. Although the CCP 
Party-state once resisted global hegemonic norms in its pursuit of modernity, the 
catastrophes and legitimation crisis in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution led CCP 




necessary for China to integrate with the global capitalist economy. Similar to the 
modernization projects in the Qing Dynasty and the Republican era, the CCP’s 
modernization project since 1978 incorporated the reconstruction of China’s legal and 
media fields according to hegemonic norms.  
Despite this similar attention to China’s pursuit of modernity, there remain 
significant differences between Lin’s work and my own in terms of how reformers in the 
different periods were able to implement their modernization projects. Further, I argue 
that these differences explain the divergent outcomes in our respective studies. Reformers 
in the Qing Dynasty and the Republic era adopted some global hegemonic norms in order 
to modernize China, but the precarious international and domestic conditions did not 
allow the Chinese states and other reformers to build solid institutions as part of this effort. 
In comparison, the CCP Party-state after the Cultural Revolution was able to successfully 
build institutions to implement its modernization project and address its legitimation crisis. 
The development of legal institutions has long been one of the most critical elements of 
modernization projects in China since the Qing Dynasty, as legal institutions define 
fundamental political and economic relationships between domestic actors and between 
international and domestic actors. In the case of both the Qing and the Republican 
governments, state power was seized by the Kuomintang and CCP, respectively, before 
they were able to significantly reform their legal institutions, whereas the CCP was able 
to maintain the unity of the nation and build legal institutions that allowed its economic 
integration with the rest of the world. The CCP Party-state also established a shared 




was essentially abandoned during the Cultural Revolution and the concept of rights was 
foreign to the majority of populace.  
The success of the Party-state in building legal institutions, however, also made the 
state susceptible to the force of law and rights. Both Lin and I show how certain media 
professionals and intellectuals were zealous in bringing about social-political change and 
advocating constitutional reform and protection of rights. But how these elites grounded 
their claims and were able to diffuse their discourse differs enormously in two studies. In 
Lin’s analysis, ideas like civil and political rights were only mobilized by elites, and these 
elites mobilized Western notions directly. The Constitution of the Republic of China was 
not enacted until December 1946 – only two years before the birth of the People’s 
Republic of China. Although ordinary Chinese people believed that “a good government 
always listened to the voice of the people (Lin, 1936:2)” and that people are entitled to 
revolt against a government that fails to provide people with subsistence, most Chinese 
people did not consider themselves entitled to participate in the state’s decision-making or 
to hold the government accountable on a regular basis.  
In comparison, the media and legal professionals in my study directly mobilized 
Chinese law instead of Western notions to promote notions of citizen rights, civil society, 
and constitutionalism, and they were able to diffuse their ideas to ordinary citizens. This 
was made possible, in part, because the legal institutions built by the CCP Party-state 
more or less resemble their counterparts in democratic countries, where the concept of 
rights constitute a critical component of those institutions. The CCP had also very 




level of society. In other words, the infrastructure built by the CCP Party-state facilitated 
the ability of media professionals, legal professionals and intellectuals to spread their 
ideas, even when those ideas were critical of the state. Although the CCP Party-state 
wanted citizens merely to obey the law and understand it just enough to participate in a 
market economy, it was unable to prevent alternative interpretations of laws and rights 
and the appropriation of the shared symbolic structure to promote a more liberal and 
critical political culture.  
In essence, building upon Lin Yutang’s study, my findings help to understand the 
current rise of the counterpublic sphere and the general passiveness of public opinion in 
the past. The comparison of Lin’s and my studies suggests that the CCP Party-state’s 
success in building institutions, especially modern legal institutions, to pursue its 
modernization projects, as well as the Party-state’s incomplete control over how various 
actors used and understood these institutions, explains the current rise of the 
counterpublic sphere in China. The lack of institutional basis for intellectuals and media 
professionals to produce and spread critical political culture and practices explains the 
inactiveness of public opinion in the past.  
6.2.2. Theories on the relationship between the public sphere and civil society 
The findings of my dissertation not only help to understand the development of 
public opinion in the Chinese context but also contribute to the theory of the public sphere. 
Existing studies, mostly based on experiences in Western Europe, theorize that the 




society to enable and sustain the public sphere lies in its fostering of people’s ability to 
organize themselves beyond the direction and control of the state. When civil society is 
well-developed, it is likely to produce capable agents for the public sphere because it 
allows individuals to articulate interests, develop a common identity and democratic 
political culture, and acquire the capability to participate in politics (Calhoun 1993; Eley 
1992; Fraser 1990; Habermas 1989; Habermas 1996; Koller 2010; Madsen 1993; Somers 
1993; Tilly 2007). The above theory of the public sphere describes the Western European 
experience nicely, but it does not transfer well to the Chinese context. The inconsistency 
between the Chinese case and the dominant theory based on Western experiences renders 
the Chinese case a negative case in comparative historical sociology. Contrary to the view 
that sees China as an essentially inappropriate context for studying the public sphere due 
to the enormous disparity between socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions in 
China and the Western Europe (Calhoun 1993; Wakeman Jr 1993), I argue that the 
varying conditions between the Chinese and Western contexts actually present valuable 
opportunities to study the public sphere, as these variations reveal alternative paths by 
which a public sphere can develop. 
As such, in this dissertation I have used the Chinese case to expand the content of the 
theory of the public sphere and its range of application. Rather than completely 
abandoning the dominant theory because of its limited explanatory power, I identify and 
preserve its central proposition – namely, that a social-cultural foundation is needed for a 
public sphere to grow and persist. Whereas the dominant theory suggests that civil society 




explored alternative paths by which the social-cultural foundation of China’s 
counterpublic sphere developed, and shown how the Chinese state was the unintended and 
paradoxical architect of the counterpublic sphere. My empirical analysis has shown how 
the Chinese state’s response to the legitimation crisis it faced in the late 1970s by creating 
legal institutions and transitioning to a market economy inadvertently contributed to the 
symbolic resources, cultural practices, and social networks that made China’s 
counterpublic sphere possible. By identifying the role of the Chinese state in establishing 
the social-cultural foundation of the counterpublic sphere and by specifying the 
mechanisms by which the state made this contribution, my dissertation deepens 
understanding about the social-cultural foundation of the public sphere and extends the 
dominant theory of the public sphere to the Chinese context.  
This expanded understanding of the social-cultural foundation of the counterpublic 
public sphere suggests an alternative path of political development. When considering 
how to advance democracy – the development of an effective public sphere is just one 
example – too often social theorists, social scientists and practitioners focus on the 
democratic potential of civil society. It is as if civil society has become equated by many 
with guaranteeing democracy after the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, existing studies about civil society provide limited insights into what the 
essential elements of civil society are that foster democracy, and how advancement of 
democracy is possible in contexts where civil society is always suppressed and critical 
political culture is lacking. Studies of Eastern Europe show that the state’s failure to 




social space (Bernhard 1993; Weigle and Butterfield 1992). Yet, these studies cannot 
adequately explain political development in contexts where the state has coped with 
systematic crisis successfully and continues to restrict independent social groups, as in the 
Chinese case. In contrast to existing studies that focus on the democratic potential of civil 
society, my study suggests that the building of legal institutions with rights as critical 
components, dissemination of law to ordinary citizens, and the building of 
communication institutions – however flawed these institutions may be – are likely to 
enable citizens in authoritarian contexts to develop a common identity, a critical culture, 
and the capacity to use public discourse to hold the state accountable.  
Importantly, even authoritarian states infamous for suppression, such as the Chinese 
state, may be motivated to build institutions that support both the public sphere and civil 
society. In the Chinese case, a few state actors, particularly certain journalists in 
state-controlled newspaper organizations, intentionally contributed to the counterpublic 
sphere and aimed to build a civil society; others did so unwittingly. In this respect, part of 
what we think of as civil society in Western contexts actually exists within the Chinese 
state, as these state agencies helped citizens to build the same symbolic structure to 
communicate, develop a collective identity, and understand their rights and responsibility 
to participate in politics. Furthermore, because the social-cultural foundation of the 
counterpublic sphere is sustained by institutions built by the state, the state, in turn, 
cannot completely crack down on this counterpublic sphere to the extent that it cannot 




Understanding the paradoxical role of the Chinese state to the development of the 
China’s counterpublic sphere sheds light on how to understand the state-society 
relationship and political resistance in authoritarian contexts. The separation and 
opposition of state and society is a common assumption in Western political theories 
(Fraser 1990). Research on civil society suggests that as the state inhibits civil society, 
only ties between non-state actors strengthen the capacity of civil society (Cohen and 
Arato 1992:446). This assumption instructs researchers to focus on social networks 
comprised of non-state actors. Yet, as the Chinese case has demonstrated, linkages 
between state and non-state actors may strengthen social forces as well. Accordingly, 
research on political resistance and civil society in authoritarian contexts should attend to 
the institutional processes that connect state and non-state actors in order to understand 
the potential paradoxical effects of such processes.  
Having emphasized the critical role of the state’s institution-building for the public 
sphere, I can now answer critical questions raised by Emirbayer and Sheller (1999: 
146-47): “Can changes in economic or political organizations, or even both, conduce to 
democracy in the absence of a self-organized citizenry, or an autonomous associational 
realm (civil society)? Is the existence of an autonomous civil society itself sufficient for 
democratization, or is it more a question of what kinds of bridging structures, mediating 
practices, and channels for communication will prevail there?” My findings suggest that 
changes in economic or political organization are, indeed, likely to conduce to democracy, 




institutions can trigger complex cultural and social processes that facilitate coordination 
among citizens and collective resistance in authoritarian contexts. 
6.2.3. Contribution to four perspectives related to the study of the public sphere 
In Chapter 1, I discussed four perspectives related to the study of the public sphere: 
(1) the Habermasian framework, (2) the media-centered perspective, (3) the media effects 
perspective, and (4) the historical and cultural sociology perspective. The purpose was to 
develop a theoretical framework that facilitates empirical investigation. Now, I discuss 
how my findings contribute to these four perspectives, respectively. 
The Habermasian framework  
In Chapter 1, I pointed out two major issues with the Habermasian framework. The 
first problem is its neglect of the role of the state in the development of the public sphere. 
Since this framework considers a non-interventionist state a necessary condition for the 
rise of the public sphere and attributes the degeneration of the public sphere to an 
interventionist state (Habermas 1989), analysis of the role of the state is minimal in 
theories of the rise of the public sphere. As Richard Madsen (1993:187) nicely 
summarized this assumption, “ In the thinking of Habermas, and of a long tradition of 
western political theory…, a democratic public sphere does not descend from the realm of 
a benevolent state, it arises from below, from a voluntarily organized citizenry.” Contrary 
to the Habermasian framework’s treatment of the state, I argue we need to bring the state 




intended and unintended consequences of the state’s actions for the development of a 
counterpublic sphere.  
My findings have demonstrated that even an authoritarian state infamous for 
censorship and suppression of civil society can significantly contribute to the 
social-cultural foundation of the counterpublic sphere. In the Chinese case, the CCP 
Party-state’s action facilitated the development of the counterpublic sphere in two 
non-mutually exclusive ways. First, key state actors, particularly certain journalists in 
newspaper organizations who saw themselves as spokespersons for the public, 
intentionally contributed to the emerging network of counterpublic spheres. Chinese 
newspapers are regulated by the state, but precisely because they are part of the state 
apparatus, journalists were able to utilize state resources to connect and collaborate with 
various non-state actors.  
Second and more importantly, the Chinese state’s actions inadvertently helped to 
build the social-cultural foundation of the counterpublic sphere. The state set in motion 
complex institution-building processes to address its legitimation crisis, but these 
processes generated unintended consequences. These consequences derived from the 
state’s incomplete control over how different actors, including state agencies themselves, 
used the institutions that it created. For example, many media disseminated law in 
accordance with the state’s instructions, but on a broader level, the institution of law and 
the state and media’s efforts to diffuse law built a nationwide symbolic structure with 
unforeseen effects. Likewise, the state’s creation of a press market created more space for 




production was then appropriated by pro-liberal journalists and legal professionals to 
develop critical news reports and contribute to civic discourse. Furthermore, the very 
complexity of the globalization process constrained the state’s policy space and made the 
its calculations difficult. For example, although the Chinese state successfully controlled 
news media by restricting capital and the ownership structure, these constraints, 
ultimately, situated state-controlled news media in an inferior position vis-à-vis private 
Internet portals in the online news market and amplified the influence of pro-liberal media 
professionals.  
In short, my study contributes to the Habermasian framework by demonstrating the 
need to incorporate an analysis of the state into the theory of the public sphere. Regardless 
of its intentions, the state is both a critical actor and a venue for actors contributing to the 
social-cultural foundation of the public/counterpublic sphere. A theoretical framework 
that focuses exclusively on civil society neglects the ways in which state action and the 
relationship between state and non-state actors can contribute to the rise of a 
public/counterpublic sphere.  
My dissertation also contributes to the Habermasian framework by developing a 
multi-level theoretical framework that operates at macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of 
analysis and attends to cross-level interaction. The other major problem with the 
Habermasian framework is that if fails to specify the concrete actions and processes that 
lead to the rise of the public sphere. The root of the problem is that this framework 
operates at a very high-level of analysis. My study of the Chinese case shows that a 




that unfold across levels of analysis: (1) why the Chinese state made critical decisions 
under specific historical conditions, (2) how these critical decisions at the macro-level 
triggered important meso-level process – the restructuring of the legal and media fields 
and the overlap of the two fields, (3) how the overlapping of the legal and media fields led 
to the creation of social networks that helped to develop critical political culture and 
practices, and (4) how the above social-cultural processes continued to spread, led to the 
politicization of citizens, and culminated in the rise of China’s nationwide counterpublic 
sphere. 
The media-centered perspective 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the main problem with the media-centered perspective is 
that it underestimates or even ignores the role of other spheres of life and institutions in 
constituting and shaping the public sphere. My study contributes to the literature from the 
media-centered perspective in two related ways. First, it shows how institutions and 
action beyond the media field can interact with those within the media field to jointly 
shape the social-cultural foundation of the public sphere. Second, it further demonstrates 
that because media organizations can interact with institutions and action beyond the 
media field in various ways, though the media field is critical to the development of the 
public sphere, how it shapes the public sphere is still indeterminate. The above findings 
can also shed new light on discussion and debates related to the political consequences of 




Extant studies from the media-centered perspective tend to predict or point out 
unequivocal political consequences of media marketization in authoritarian contexts. 
Market mechanisms are expected to generate forces that counteract the monopolistic power 
of the authoritarian state (Curran 1991:48; Keane 1991:152-153). The acceleration of 
media marketization in China since 1992 has, thus, drawn scholars to study its political 
implications, but scholars have not found the expected liberalizing effects – at least not in 
the form expected by the literature. The most common argument is that media 
marketization has not produced significant liberalizing effects due to the state’s updated 
control mechanisms that effectively monitor news content, journalists, and media (Lee 
2000; Lynch 1999; Zhao 1998; 2004). Scholars also argue that media marketization has, in 
fact, rendered media into even more effective propaganda organs for an authoritarian state, 
thus enhancing the state’s legitimacy (Stockmann 2013; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011). 
Another argument is that media marketization has led to the triumph of political and 
capitalist market power, as well as the exclusion of the disadvantaged groups (Zhao 2004).  
Rather than seeing media marketization as a process with a homogeneous impact in 
China, my findings provide a more nuanced understanding of this process and suggest 
that only when we examine the overlap of media and legal fields can we adequately 
explain the varying outcomes of media marketization. By bringing media and legal field 
overlap into the analysis, I demonstrate that, under certain local conditions, media 
professionals can utilize field overlap mechanisms to collaborate with actors in and 
beyond the legal field, jointly producing critical news and civic discourse. Therefore, 




of news can simultaneously be a process of coalition-building among professionals in 
different fields, a process of establishing  civil society networks, a process of 
culture-making and diffusing, and a process of resistance.  
My findings also help us to rethink the debate over the political consequences of the 
rise of the Internet in China. Some argue that the Internet has democratic consequences 
(Lei 2011; Tai 2006:289; Tang 2005:87, 98; Yang 2009; Zheng 2008). Others contend that 
the Internet does not have democratizing consequences as it remains primarily a 
playground for entertainment under the control of the state (Kluver et al. 2010; Peters 2002; 
Yang 2009, p.10). There are also middle ground arguments that are more ambivalent about 
the development (Zhao 2008; Zhou 2006). Despite their divergent assessments, existing 
studies are similar in that they focus on technology and the actions of state and non-state 
actors in the media field, especially in relation to ICTs, censorship, and citizens’ reactions 
to censorship. Yet, few efforts have examined how social and cultural conditions can 
moderate the impact of ICTs and interaction between various actors. My findings show 
that the Internet does have certain democratic consequences in China, but these 
consequences depend on the existence of other conditions – in particular, a shared 
symbolic structure of laws and rights, and collaborative networks comprised of 
public-minded legal and media professionals. Understanding these conditions and their 
impact requires investigating institutions and action beyond ICTs and the media field. In 
essence, this study contributes to debate about the Internet by highlighting the importance 
of contextualizing it and understanding the conditions and mechanisms by which the 




Another related contribution of my study to discussions of media marketization and 
the rise of the Internet in China is its provision of a more reflexive view of the Chinese 
state. In general, the media-centered perspective only analyzes and theorizes the intended 
consequences of state action. As such, it focuses on how the Chinese state controls the 
press and the Internet, how the state conducts propaganda, and how effective these 
controls are. To be sure, the state’s political control influences the development of the 
public sphere, but the state’s other actions can have unintended consequences for the 
efficacy of its political control. Existing literature frames the Chinese state as the ultimate 
barrier to a counterpublic sphere in China, yet my findings show that, far from preventing 
the rise of a counterpublic sphere, the state actually facilitated the emergence of precisely 
what it sought to suppress. 
Media effects perspective 
As I pointed out in Chapter 1, the media effects perspective is even narrower than the 
media-centered perspective as the former operates mainly at a micro-level and only 
examines whether and how exposure to media impacts individual political attitudes and 
behavior. Much research questions the causal claims in the media effects research and 
even challenges the entire research paradigm (Valkenburg and Peter 2013). Indeed, even 
though the research from media effects perspective can establish the association between 
media use and political attitudes and behavior, it provides limited evidence of how this 




Rather than disregarding the merit of the media effects perspective altogether, I have 
attempted to complement research from this perspective. In another research project, I 
analyzed representative survey data from the media effects perspective (Lei 2011). I 
found that Chinese netizens, as opposed to traditional media users and non-media users, 
are more politically opinionated. Furthermore, they are more likely to be simultaneously 
supportive of the norms of democracy and critical about the Party-state and political 
conditions in China, while also being potential and active participants in collective action 
(Lei 2011). Wanting to know more about these statistical associations, I examined 
in-depth interview data in my dissertation project to identify the mechanisms that mediate 
between media and Internet use, political attitude, and political behavior, as well as what 
effects media really create. I found that the cultural medium of laws and rights mediate 
media and Internet use, political attitude, and political behavior. Chinese netizens draw on 
this symbolic structure to make moral judgments about the state and non-state actors. 
These moral judgments have further impacted the formation of identity, motivated 
participation in public debates and collective action, and led to a boundary that divides 
state and non-state actors. My findings also enhance our very understanding of “media 
effects.” I found that, exposed to abundant information and various problems online, 
Chinese netizens, as opposed to non-netizens, have developed a higher standard of moral 
judgments based on laws and rights, as well as the capacity to think about the cause of 




The historical and cultural sociology perspective 
Unlike the media-centered perspective and the media effects perspective, the 
historical and cultural sociology perspective does not restrict itself to the media system. 
Instead, it provides comprehensive analysis of the public sphere, highlighting how 
institutional and social processes produce its social-cultural foundation (Alexander 2006; 
Emirbayer and Sheller 1999). Despite its merit, analysis from the historical and cultural 
sociology perspective tends to be grounded in understanding of Western liberal 
democracies. As a result, analytical frameworks from this perspective are based on 
assumptions that may not hold true in other contexts.  
First, the historical and cultural sociology perspective takes for granted conditions 
that may not exist in other contexts, in particular, the existence of fundamental political 
and civic rights, a basic consensus about democracy, and a non-interventionist state. As a 
result, this perspective is limited when it comes to theorizing the rise of a counterpublic 
spheres in an environment where fundamental rights and a basic consensus about 
democracy are lacking and the state strictly regulates society. My study thus contributes 
to the historical and cultural sociology perspective by theorizing how legal institutions can 
create resources for resistance despite their deficiency of the legal institutions and how the 
overlap between the media and legal fields – partly produced by the state’s action – can 
create structural opportunities for collective resistance despite penetrative domination.  
Second, the historical and cultural sociology perspective overlooks factors that could 




democracies. Particularly, this perspective does not consider how global conditions and 
diffusion of norms can shape the development of the public sphere at a national-level. 
This is mainly because research from the historical and cultural sociology perspective 
studies countries in the global core – countries that are powerful in shaping global norms 
and institutions. My findings have demonstrated the need to take into account how 
global-local interaction can shape a national public sphere. The history of China’s public 
opinion since the nineteenth century can actually be understood as a narrative about 
global-local interaction in the process of globalization. The Chinese state’s decision to 
seek legitimacy by embracing, at least to a certain extent, global hegemonic norms set in 
motion complex institutions that , in turn, impacted the development of public opinion. 
Importantly, however, as Lin Yutang’s work and my work show, the ways in which this 
process unfolds hinges on local contexts at specific historical moments.  
6.3. BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
6.3.1. Theories and practices of democracy 
Beyond the literature related to the public sphere and civil society, this dissertation 
has broader implications for thinking about theories and practices of democracy. 
Highlighting how the development of the legal and media fields in China’s integration 
with the global market economy contributed to the rise of an influential counterpublic 
sphere, this dissertation is situated at the intersection of three streams of discourse on 
democracy: discourse about market and democracy, rule of law and democracy, and 




congruent to democracy in conventional wisdom. In this section, I discuss my findings in 
relation to discourse on how democracy is related to market, law, and technology, and 
consider how my findings can shed light on theories and practices of democracy. 
According to Anglo-American conventional wisdom, a market economy and 
democracy are naturally congruent. A market economy is a precondition for democracy, 
so economic liberalization goes hand in hand with democratization. Three main rationales 
account for the presumably facilitative relationship between a market economy and 
democracy. The first rationale is that, as a sphere of self-organization, the market limits 
the power of the state. The second rationale is that a connection exists between market 
freedom and political freedom. Social agents who benefit from market freedoms, such as 
the bourgeoisie, tend to have an interest in advancing political freedom. The third 
rationale is that a market economy needs the support of rule of law, which is conductive 
to democracy (Beetham 1997).  
Absent in these rationales about the supportive relationship between market and 
democracy but crucial in the Chinese case is the role of the state in the development of 
market and the consequences of the state action. First, in certain situations, the market can 
restrict the Chinese state’s power, but the power of the market, if there is any, also derives 
from the way in which the Chinese state constructed the market in the first place. 
Secondly, a connection between market freedom and political freedom only exists to the 
extent that social agents can mobilize legal institutions that the CCP Party-state built in 
order to recognize and enforce various rights in a market economy. In Lin Yutang’s 




public opinion because various social forces contributed to the under-development of 
legal institutions. Thirdly, legal institutions that enable a market economy can, to certain 
extent, advance democracy in China given the Chinese state’s efforts to make legal 
knowledge widely accessible. In essence, the ostensibly natural supportive and facilitative 
relationship between markets and democracy is anything but natural, and this relationship 
cannot be fully specified or understood without taking into account the role of the state in 
constructing the market.  
Whereas conventional wisdom overestimates the power of the market, the Chinese 
case suggests that it underestimates the force of law, particularly the democratic potential 
of undemocratic law. Rule of law is widely believed to be conductive to democracy – 
Habermas’s theory of law exemplifies this assumption. According to Habermas, rule of 
law reflects the notion of self-determination. The law-making process requires democratic 
procedures to ensure that law reflects the will of citizens. Law can bind the state and 
citizens because law derives its validity from the consent of citizens (Habermas 1996). In 
other words, the consent from the governed justifies and counter-balances law’s 
oppressive characteristics.  
This link between law and democracy is absent in the Chinese case and makes 
Chinese law undemocratic according to conventional wisdom. The Chinese state does not 
adopt a thick formulation of rule of law. Rather, it adopts an extremely thin version of 
rule of law that legal scholars refer to as “rule by law.” Under such a system, the 
government conducts its affairs through law, but democratic procedure in the law-making 




and uses law as an instrument for governance and domination. Scholars and 
commentators thus contend that China’s “rule by law” is undemocratic and lacks the 
quality of rule of law (Diamond 2003; Tamanaha 2004; Zhao 2003).  
Despite its inadequacy, I argue that even “rule by law” can advance democracy 
under certain conditions as the establishment of “rule by law” provides an opportunity for 
citizens to form a community based on citizen identity, consider the meaning of rule of 
law and democracy, and demand more rights from the government. In the Chinese case, 
three conditions were important. The first condition is that modern Chinese law 
acknowledges the same basic civil, political, and socio-economic rights as their 
counterparts in liberal democracies, even though these rights are not realized and may 
even suppressed be by the government. My study finds that even when confined to a 
largely rhetorical existence, these rights empower citizens and give citizens grounds to 
make demands on the government. The second condition is that law became a shared 
cultural medium, providing a common language for citizens to discuss problems and 
develop a common identity. As I have mentioned, the Chinese state is one of the very few 
authoritarian states willing and able to disseminate law widely; this remains true 
regardless of how the state actually planned to enact and enforce law. The third condition 
is that experts, especially legal and media professionals, provided citizens with 
interpretations of laws and rights that competed with the official interpretation, thus 
raising citizens’ expectations about rule of law and democracy. Under these conditions, 
“rule by law” – however flawed – has still generated social-cultural forces that aim to 




In essence, conventional wisdom neglects the relationship between rhetoric and 
reality. In E. P. Thompson’s study of legal history in England, he found that although 
English liberal law reinforced social inequalities and benefited the ruling class, the 
ideology of law – the thinking that rulers ought to be bound by law – enabled the 
transformation of rhetoric to reality. As the ideology of law spread, it became a culture 
affecting the behavior of both the rulers and the ruled (Tamanaha 2004; Thompson 1975). 
Indeed, when rhetoric is taken for granted and deeply rooted in culture, it can become a 
social-cultural force with self-fulfilling properties.   
In addition to the market and rule of law, certain forms of technology, especially 
ICTs, are also considered conductive to democracy according to conventional wisdom. 
There are two main rationales. First, technology can spread liberty and democracy. 
President Clinton’s speech in 2000 that advocated granting China permanent normal trade 
relations status under the WTO exemplified this rationale; as he put it:  
In the new century, liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem….When China 
joins the WTO, by 2005, it will eliminate tariffs on information technology products, 
making the tools of communication even cheaper, better, and more widely available. 
We know how much the Internet has changed America, and we are already an open 
society. Imagine how much it could change China. Now, there's no question China has 
been trying to crack down on the Internet -- good luck. That's sort of like trying to nail 
Jello to the wall…. In the knowledge economy, economic innovation and political 
empowerment, whether anyone likes it or not, will inevitably go hand in hand.1 
Second, technology is believed to contribute to a participatory citizenry and culture, both 
of which are essential for democracy. Scholars continue to debate this relationship 
between technology and democracy, with some praising the democratic potential of 
                                                 
1
 President Clinton’s address can be found at http://www.techlawjournal.com/trade/20000309.htm, accessed 




technology, and others viewing the conventional wisdom as unrealistically romantic 
(Barber 1998; Barber 2000; Barney 2000; Benkler 2006; Sunstein 2007). 
The Chinese case suggests that the effect of technology on democracy is 
context-dependent. But before elaborating on this point, it is important to clarify what we 
can and cannot glean from the Chinese case. The Chinese case is about incremental 
political change – how an influential counterpublic sphere capable of holding the 
government accountable on a regular basis can emerge and survive in an authoritarian 
context. It is not a case about revolution and regime transition as in the events comprising 
the so-called Arab Spring. In the Chinese case, technology is a catalyst that consolidated a 
series of historical processes. On the one hand, had it not been for ICTs, it could have 
been taken much longer for an influential counterpublic sphere to arise in China as ICTs 
did help to produce and spread critical political culture across social groups. ICTs are 
especially important in extending critical culture and practices from politicized elites to 
ordinary citizens. On the other hand, had it not been for the previous development and 
institution-building in the media and legal fields, the effect of ICTs would have been very 
limited. ICTs do not automatically spread democracy or lead to critical culture and 
practices. There need to exist the social-cultural foundations that support the production 
of critical culture and capable agents. Technology, on its own, is inert. It’s the critical 
capable agents supported by networks, fields, and institutions who activate and employ 
ICT’s effectively. 
Nonetheless, though the Chinese case is not about regime transition and rapid 




Spring. After the celebration of revolutions, regime transitions, and the triumph of 
technology and people, nations are still faced with how to strengthen the capacity of the 
state and hold the state accountable. The building of institutions that provide a nation’s 
democratic social-cultural foundation is still key. The capability of people to use ICTs to 
seize the power of the state does not automatically translate into the capability to build 
solid institutions and to hold the state accountable on a regular basis.  
6.3.2. The authoritarian resilience thesis 
This study of the rise of the counterpublic sphere in China also helps to reflect upon 
a prevailing argument in Chinese studies – the authoritarian resilience thesis. China’s 
recovery from the 1989 political crisis and its rising global influence has brought 
scholarly attention to the persistence of its authoritarian regime. Andrew Nathan’s 
seminal article, “Authoritarian Resilience” (2003) triggered the recent trend of studying 
regime endurance, particularly in the Chinese context. Although Nathan does not 
explicitly define what he means by authoritarian resilience, his writing shows that he 
understands authoritarian resilience as the absence of transition from authoritarian regime 
to democracy. Drawing on Samuel Huntington’s (1968) theory regarding the effect of 
institutionalization on political order, Nathan argues that institutionalization is a critical 
mechanism that has aided the CCP regime to address challenges, thus contributing to the 
regime’s resilience. He pointed out that the regime as a whole enjoys high levels of 
acceptance because the regime has developed a variety of “input institutions,” which 
include local village elections, administrative litigation, official agencies that handle 




institutions” enable citizens to address their grievances, they help to generate regime 
legitimacy at the mass level.  
The authoritarian resilience thesis has galvanized many empirical studies in Chinese 
politics and comparative politics. In these studies, Chinese rulers are usually described as 
successful social engineers. They are portrayed as having designed institutions with good 
incentive structures and achieved the goals that they targeted accurately. Thus, they have 
been able to channel and defuse societal discontent and maintain the regime’s high 
support among citizens. The process of institutionalization is argued to have successfully 
generated intended consequences. For instance, the Chinese state has created 
commercialized, yet strictly regulated media that not only generate revenues but also 
disseminate propaganda (Stockmann 2013; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011). The state 
has also developed a variety of institutions, such as the Political Consultative Conference, 
that have successfully co-opted and incorporated non-party elites (Yan 2011). Moreover, 
the Chinese state has updated institutions, such as the People’s Congress and Internet 
forums, to facilitate deliberation in decision-making and, thus, buttress the regime 
legitimacy (Warren 2007).  
Despite the overwhelming triumph of the authoritarian resilience thesis, there are 
concerns about whether scholars have adequately attended to the contradictory effects of 
institutionalization on regime stability. Minxin Pei (2012) provides an alternative 
explanation, arguing that the CCP regime has been able to endure because of political 
repression and China’s economic performance. He also points out the regime’s weakness 




of the CCP to provide adequate public goods, such as rule of law, public education and 
public health care, has generated mass disenchantment. Similarly, Larry Diamond (2012) 
states that China faces a looming crisis of authoritarianism.  
I have three concerns with studies that advance the authoritarian resilience thesis. 
First, as long as a regime transition does not occur, any evidence showing institutions 
working for the interests of the Party-state can be used to support the authoritarian 
resilience thesis. Whether these aspects of intuitional process have any causal relationship 
with the endurance of the authoritarian regime, however, is questionable.  
Second, my study reveals a less triumphant picture of the institutional process in 
China than that suggested by the authoritarian resilience thesis and related studies. 
Although institution-building may appear effective in strengthening the authoritarian rule 
in the short run, this process has generated unintended and contradictory consequences in 
the long run. Particularly, the institutions established by the state have generated 
antagonism. The expectations created by institutional norms, particularly law, have led to 
citizens’ dissatisfaction with multiple institutions (e.g., courts, media, local government, 
etc.) as the contradictions between such institutional norms and actual state practices 
become increasingly visible. The state’s embrace of law without adequate determination 
and practices to realize the project has produced savvy citizens who are able to identify, 
reveal, and even spread information about the problematic contradictions in the regime. 
Although there is no solid evidence to show that this contradictory aspect of the 
institutional process will lead to regime transition, my findings in Chapter 5 and my 




institutional process initiated by the Chinese state has failed to create regime legitimacy at 
the mass level and has even led to emerging mass disenchantment.  
Third, the emphasis on the endurance and transition of the regime in the literature 
can neglect more nuanced changes in the authoritarian regime and the implications of 
these changes. With the unfolding of the institutional process and the rise of public 
opinion in China, although the authoritarian regime endures, more and more constraints 
have been placed on the Chinese state. The endurance of the regime can be understood as 
an outcome resulting from the continuing negotiation between the Chinese state and 
Chinese people, in which the Chinese state has increasingly had to give up some power in 
order to maintain its rule. Indeed, if the power relationship has tilted toward the people 
over time, the phenomenon that is called authoritarian resilience can also be understood as 
the advancement of democracy – that is, if we care not only about the line drawn by social 
scientists to distinguish authoritarian regimes from democratic regimes, but also about the 
substance of political life. Relatedly, I suggest the same criticism about the overemphasis 
on regime transition – or lack thereof – can be applied to research on the Arab Spring as 
more attention continues to be given to regime transition, rather than to how life 
conditions are or are not enhanced through incremental political change. In the case of 
China, we tend to be too pessimistic, reading lack of regime change as meaning no 
change in political. By contrast, in the case of the Arab Spring countries, there has been 
an opposite tendency among some to equate regime change with “everything’s all better” 





6.4. GENERALIZABILITY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This dissertation is motivated by the inadequate generalizability of the dominant 
theory of the public sphere, which theorizes the development of the public sphere based 
on Western European experiences. Rather than accepting that an active civil society is 
indispensable to the growth of a public sphere, I have contended that a social-cultural 
foundation is needed for a public sphere to grow and investigated the alternative path by 
which an influential counterpublic sphere developed in China. In the Chinese case, 
although an active civil society is absent, the institution-building process that the Chinese 
state set in motion inadvertently and paradoxically established the socio-cultural 
foundation for China’s counterpublic sphere. In essence, by analyzing the Chinese case, I 
extend the theory of the public sphere to the Chinese context and enhance its 
generalizability. 
I do not claim that my findings about the specific path by which the counterpublic 
sphere developed in China can be generalized to other contexts. As the difference 
between my study and previous studies based on cases in Western Europe demonstrates, 
varying socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions can impact the development of 
the public sphere. Nonetheless, my findings about the unintended consequences of 
institutional processes for the growth of the counterpublic sphere may be applicable to 
other authoritarian contexts. One of my key findings is that, even more than the existence 
of media institutions that facilitate communication, the development of legal institutions, 
especially the dissemination of legal knowledge, was critical to the rise of China’s 




their providing citizens with cultural frames to make moral judgments and legitimate 
resources to resist the state.  
To examine the extent to which the dynamics I uncovered in China might be 
applicable to other contexts, I analyzed the 2005-2008 World Values Survey data in five 
authoritarian countries (China, Vietnam, Morocco, Iran, and Jordan). My preliminary 
analysis, presented in Appendix B, finds that ICTs have significant politicized effects in 
attracting and producing citizens with critical views on the state – but, importantly, such 
effects only exist in authoritarian countries where the state endeavors to publicize laws 
and make law widely accessible, but simultaneously fails to protect fundamental rights 
(e.g., China and Iran). This suggests that it is not simply the existence of ICTs or even the 
existence of contradictions in state rhetoric and reality that matters; rather, it is the 
existence of a citizenry capable of identifying such contradictions and then using ICTs to 
discuss their implications. This preliminary analysis suggests that part of my findings 
about the specific development in China may shed light on research in other authoritarian 
contexts. 
Despite its contributions, my dissertation does have some limitations. In terms of 
understanding the Chinese case, my findings can be restricted by case selection. I 
restricted my analysis to news produced by newspapers and Internet news providers. I did 
not analyze the development of radio, televisions, and other media because I argued that 
their development is less critical to the growth of China’s counterpublic sphere. In 
addition, the selection of newspaper organizations for this research was restricted to the 




how the Internet impacted the growth of the counterpublic sphere in China, I did not 
conduct a comprehensive survey of all kinds of public forums and social media. Future 
research can examine the extent to which my main argument holds true after 
incorporating facts that were not presented in my analysis.  
In terms of understanding the development of the public sphere in general, the 
Chinese case suggests just one possible developmental path. In-depth historical and 
comparative analysis is necessary to understand (1) the extent to which a social-cultural 
foundation is needed for the development of the public sphere, (2) the various paths by 
which such social-cultural foundation can develop, and (3) the various mechanisms by 
which the social-cultural foundation can impact the development of the public sphere. In 
many authoritarian countries, media systems are similar in that they are partially 
commercialized but still under the firm control of the state. Nevertheless, authoritarian 
countries vary widely in terms of the development of legal institutions and how their 
states use the media to disseminate law to citizens. This suggests that the connection 
between legal and media fields, and between these fields and citizens could be very 
different across countries. Future research can study how and why the configurations of 
these relationships vary across these countries, and how this impacts the development of 





Appendix A: Evidence Related to the Authoritarian Resilience Thesis 
I use four survey data sets to examine the institutional process that Nathan (2003) 
posits as contributing to regime legitimacy and resiliency. The four survey data sets are 
the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey, the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey, the 2002 
AsiaBarometer Survey and the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey. The main data sets that I 
analyze are the 2002 and, particularly the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey, as these are 
nationally representative and contain more questions relevant to this study. I first show 
change over time and then present the analysis of the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey, 
which includes several questions that are able to examine the relationship between 
perceptions of institutional contradictions, use of information technology, and political 
attitudes towards institutions.  
DECLINING TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS 
Although Nathan (2003) argues that “input institutions” such as official agencies, 
People’s Congress at all levels, and media successfully generate mass support for the CCP 
Party-state, analysis of the 2002 and 2008 Asian Barometer Surveys (Table A-1) shows 





service, People’s Congress, newspapers, television, and police all declined over time in 
the period between 2002 and 2008. Applying logistic regression, I find that such decline 
of trust is statistically significant for all institutions examined in Table A-1. Conversely, 
distrust in every institution increased. Even courts, which suffer the least from loss in trust 
among all institutions, saw an increase in distrust in courts that rose by around 6%. 
Except for the distrust rate against courts and the police, distrust rates against all 
institutions at least doubled. Among these institutions, trust in local governments, 
newspapers and televisions dropped the most. In 2008, only around half of respondents 
expressed trust in the three institutions. In addition, there are a higher percentage of 
respondents who were not sure about whether the current form of government in China is 
best for citizens in 2008. Moreover, the percentage of respondents who believe that 
people running the Chinese government do what is right for the country fell tremendously, 






TABLE A-3: Trust in institutions by year (Asian barometer surveys). 
 
Trust in the central 
government 
Trust in local 
government 
Trust in courts Trust in civil service 
Year 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008 
A great deal or 
quite a lot of 
trust (%) 
92.91 87.49 72.70 53.77 71.98 69.81 67.71 49.12 
Not very much 
trust or no trust 
(%) 
1.27 4.87 19.55 38.80 15.13 21.09 19.91 40.23 
Don’t know or 
no answer (%) 
5.82 7.63 7.76 7.43 12.89 9.10 12.37 10.65 
Regress “trust 










 Trust in parliament Trust in newspapers Trust in television Trust in the police 
Year 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008 
A great deal or 
quite a lot of 
trust (%) 
86.63 82.40 71.76 43.12 84.42 51.03 76.70 67.23 
Not very much 
trust or no trust 
(%) 
1.29 6.15 12.90 43.58 7.57 39.46 17.13 25.56 
Don’t know or 
no answer (%) 
12.48 11.45 15.34 13.30 8.01 9.51 6.18 7.21 
Regress “trust 











Our form of 
government is the 
best for us. 
You can trust people 
who run our 
government to do 
what is right. 
 
Year 2002 2008 2002 2008 
Agree (%) 75.93 73.47 73.49 51.46 
Disagree (%) 4.49 2.74 13.83 32.83 
Don’t know or 
no answer (%) 
19.58 23.79 12.68 15.71 
Agree vs. 





1. Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed). 





To ensure the validity of such a trend, I examined the 2003 and 2006 AsiaBarometer 
Surveys, although the 2003 AsiaBarometer Survey is not nationally representative. 
Analysis of the AsiaBarometer Surveys, as presented in Table A-2, reveals an analogous 
trend. Trust in the central government, local governments, the legal system, People’s 
Congress, media, and the police all dropped over time. Conversely, distrust in all 
institutions rose greatly. In 2008, the distrust rate vis-à-vis the central government, the 
legal system, and the parliament reached 13.7%, 34.4%, and 26.85%, respectively. In 
addition, the distrust rate against the legal system is only 3.5% lower than that against the 
infamous Chinese local governments. Similar to the analysis of the Asian Barometer 
Surveys, local governments and media suffered from the greatest loss of trust. I also show 
trust in public education and the public health system over time because Pei (2012) 
criticizes the Chinese state for failing to provide essential public goods, particularly 
education and health care in his criticism of the authoritarian resilience thesis. The results 
are supportive of Pei’s statement. Trust in the two institutions clearly declined drastically 
and distrust rose tremendously. Judging from the analysis of the Asian Barometer Surveys 
and AsiaBarometer Surveys, there is an unequivocal trend of declining trust and climbing 
distrust in institutions, although the rates vary across institutions. The “input institutions” 
pointed out by literature as keys to enhancing regime legitimacy in the authoritarian 






TABLE A-4: Trust in institutions by year (Asiabarometer surveys). 
 
Trust in the 
central 
government 
Trust in local 
government 




Year 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006 
A great 
deal or 
quite a lot 
of trust (%) 
90.13 84.70 80.25 59.85 73.88 64.70 81.88 71.25 
Not very 
much trust 
or no trust 
(%) 




1.00 1.60 1.50 2.30 3.25 0.90 3.25 1.90 
 Trust in media 
Trust in the 
police 
Trust in public 
education 
Trust in the 
public health 
system 
Year 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006 
A great 
deal or 
quite a lot 
of trust (%) 
71.00 41.20 70.75 64.40 84.00 71.45 70.13 44.65 
Not very 
much trust 
or no trust 
(%) 




2.50 1.05 1.38 0.60 1.50 0.75 1.88 0.75 







I also examine the implication of lack of trust in various institutions for trust in the 
central government, using the 2002 and 2008 Asian Barometer Surveys. The results, as 
presented in Table A-3, indicate that lack of trust in local government, courts, People’s 
Congress and television is associated with a lower likelihood of trusting in the central 
government. Specifically, according to the analysis of the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey, 





)], 92% [100*(1– e
-2.489
)] and 38% [100*(1– e
-0.479
)] for respondents who 
lack trust in local governments, courts, People’s Congress and television, respectively, 
holding other variables constant. Consequently, when the “input institutions” themselves 
do not receive trust from the populace, they are less likely to generate support for the 






TABLE A-5: Relationships between distrust in “input institutions” and trust in the central 
government (Asian Barometer Surveys). 
 Trust in the central 
government 
Trust in the central 
government 
 2002 2008 
Not much trust in local 
government 
-2.220*** -1.194*** 
 (0.286) (0.232) 
Not much trust in courts -0.913*** -2.349*** 
 (0.275) (0.220) 
Not much trust in civil 
service 
-0.350 0.00897 
 (0.277) (0.259) 
Not much trust in 
parliament 
-1.859*** -2.489*** 
 (0.246) (0.162) 
Not much trust in 
newspapers 
0.0624 0.0995 
 (0.294) (0.280) 
Not much trust in 
television 
-0.547 -0.479* 
 (0.310) (0.242) 
Not much trust in the 
police 
-0.132 -0.0520 
 (0.247) (0.184) 
n     3183     5075 
1. Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
2. Control variables include gender, age, education, and subjective class. 





PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUIONAL CONTRADICTION AND TRUST IN 
INSTITUTIONS 
Although institution-building may appear effective in strengthening the authoritarian 
rule in the short run, this process can generated contradictory consequences in the long 
run. The expectations created by institutional norms can lead to citizens’ dissatisfaction 
with institutions as the contradictions between such institutional norms and actual state 
practices become increasingly visible. 
I analyze the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey to examine the relationships between 
perceptions of institutional contradictions and trust in institutions. The descriptive 
statistics of major variables are presented in Table A-4. Applying logistic regression, I 
find that perceptions of institutional contradictions have constant negative impacts on 
trust in all kinds of institutions (Tables A-5). Specifically, when a respondent believes 
that local or central governments could be corrupt, he or she is less likely to trust a variety 
of institutions. Suspicion about the government officials’ holding important information 
also decreases the likelihood that a respondent will trust various institutions, including 
media. The factor that has the most detrimental effect on trust in institutions is the 
perception that the central government does not always abide by the law. Such perception 
has the largest impact on trust in the central government and on the belief that the current 
form of the government is the best. Specifically, for respondents who believe that the 





government and of believing that the current form of government is the best both decrease 
by 61% [100*(1– e
-0.929
) ; 100*(1– e
-0.950






TABLE A-6: Descriptive statistics of the 2008 Asian barometer survey. 
Variable Definition Mean Min Max SD 
Female 1=female 0.49 0 1 0.50 
Age Respondent’s age in years 47.66 18 99 16.07 
Education level      
  Below primary 1=below primary  0.23 0 1  
  Primary  1=primary 0.20 0 1  
  Secondary 1=secondary 0.47 0 1  
  Tertiary 1=tertiary  0.04 0 1  
  No answer 1=no answer 0.06 0 1  
Local government  
could be corrupt 
0=not very corrupt 
1=others 
0.69 0 1 0.46 
Central government  
could be corrupt 
0=not very corrupt 
1=others 
0.66 0 1 0.47 
Government officials 
withhold information 
1=Government officials withhold 
important information at least 
occasionally  
0.40 0 1 0.49 
National government 
does not always abide 
by  
law 
0=National government officials abide 
by the law most of the time 
1=others 
0.33 0 1 0.47 
Main source of political 
information 
 
    
  Internet 1=Internet 0.07 0 1 0.25 
  Newspaper 1=newspaper 0.21 0 1 0.41 
  Television 1=television 0.89 0 1 0.32 






TABLE A-7: Logistic regression of trust in institutions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

















Local government  -0.439* -0.663*** -0.465*** -0.445*** -0.279  -0.176  
could be corrupt (0.196) (0.0972) (0.112) (0.0942) (0.156) (0.0938) 
Central government -0.962*** 0.222* -0.396*** -0.00917 -0.772*** -0.146 
could be corrupt (0.185) (0.0929) (0.105) (0.0922) (0.146) (0.0915) 
Government officials -0.312* -0.491*** -0.551*** -0.465*** -0.135 -0.243** 
withhold information (0.128) (0.0787) (0.0861) (0.0795) (0.108) (0.0796) 
National government -0.929*** -0.714*** -0.645*** -0.653*** -0.745*** -0.467*** 
does not always 
abide by  
(0.120) (0.0821) (0.0860) (0.0834) (0.104) (0.0852) 
law       
Main source of 
political information 
      
Internet -0.984*** -0.116 -0.0984 -0.177 -0.406  -0.307  
 (0.231) (0.152) (0.168) (0.156) (0.219) (0.166) 
Newspaper -0.199 0.0547 -0.0606 -0.0465 -0.414** 0.0539 
 (0.173) (0.0998) (0.110) (0.0986) (0.147) (0.0981) 
Television 0.552*** 0.157 0.443*** 0.239  0.540*** 0.244  
 (0.154) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.136) (0.126) 
Radio 0.314 0.0752 0.0840 0.122 0.0820 0.271* 






       









t is the best 
for us 
You can trust people who 
run our government to do 
what is right 
 
Local government  -0.194* -0.666*** -0.413** -0.232*  
could be corrupt (0.0942) (0.106) (0.137) (0.0938)  
Central government -0.284** -0.0420 -0.586*** -0.102  
could be corrupt (0.0908) (0.101) (0.128) (0.0910)  
Government officials -0.454*** -0.713*** 0.445*** -0.0855  
withhold information (0.0798) (0.0846) (0.103) (0.0785) 
 
National government -0.563*** -0.753*** -0.950*** -0.698***  
does not always 
abide by  
(0.0836) (0.0845) (0.0937) (0.0829)  
law      
Main source of 
political information 
      
Internet -0.349* -0.123 0.0499 -0.635***  
 (0.161) (0.164) (0.222) (0.171) 
 
Newspaper -0.0139 -0.212* 0.0877 0.0885  
 (0.100) (0.106) (0.139) (0.101)  
Television 0.396** 0.276* 0.371** 0.195  
 (0.124) (0.123) (0.133) (0.122)  
Radio 0.316** 0.136 0.528** 0.0828  
 (0.113) (0.125) (0.166) (0.116)  
1. Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
2. Source: 2008 Asian Barometer Survey (n=5,075). 
3. Control variables include gender, age, education level, subjective class, frequency of following political news, 





MEDIA USE, PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTION, AND 
TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS 
I further examine where perceptions of institutional contradiction come from, finding 
that respondents whose main source of political information is the Internet are more likely 
to think that government officials withhold information, that the central government does 
not always follow the law, and that local government could be corrupt (Table A-6). 
Analysis of the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey also helps to evaluate the claim about the 
role of the Internet in strengthening regime legitimacy. Research that supports the 
authoritarian resilience thesis suggests that the Internet actually buttress the regime 
legitimacy (Warren 2007). As statistical analysis in Table A-5 shows, the relationship 
between relying on the Internet as one’s main source of political information and trust in 
institutions varies across institutions. There is a significant inverse relationship between 
using the Internet as the primary source of political information, on the one hand, and 
trust in the central government, trust in television, and belief that the current form of the 
government is the best, on the other hand, holding other variables constant. Accordingly, 






TABLE A-8: Logistic regression analysis of perception of institutional 
contradictions. 







does not always 
abide by law 
Local government 
could be corrupt 
Central 
government 
could be corrupt 
Main source of 
political information 
    
Internet 0.458** 0.457** 0.492** 0.141 
 (0.165) (0.173) (0.179) (0.163) 
Newspaper 0.345*** 0.00352 0.0355 -0.197† 
 (0.101) (0.112) (0.104) (0.102) 
Television 0.378** -0.645*** -0.444** -0.532*** 
 (0.142) (0.124) (0.149) (0.146) 
  Radio 0.148 -0.305* -0.209† -0.182 
 (0.119) (0.132) (0.120) (0.115) 
n 5075 5075 5075 5075 
1. Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
2. Source: 2008 Asian Barometer Survey (n=5,075). 
3. Control variables include gender, age, education level, frequency of following political news, subjective 










Appendix B: Heterogeneous Political Effects of the Internet 
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CULTURAL MEDIUM, AND THE POLITICAL 
EFFECTS OF THE INTERNET 
Although literature suggests that the Internet attracts and helps produce politicized 
citizens because it is a forum able to accommodate diverse viewpoints and mobilize 
political participation (Rheingold 2000; Weber et al. 2003), how political contexts 
moderate or mediate such politicized effect has received little empirical study. Answering 
this question requires identifying the sociopolitical foundation of the public sphere and its 
characteristics across political contexts. Guillén and Suárez (2006) suggest the existence of 
a “rich-get-richer” effect, arguing that countries that are already democratic are better 
situated to utilize information technologies politically as they have a more solid political 
foundation. Conversely, information technologies are unlikely to help spread democracy 
within authoritarian countries, precisely given their already insufficient democratic 
foundation. Regardless of the validity of Guillén and Suárez’s prediction, their view on the 
importance of a political foundation is critical. In fact, their view resonates with literature 





specifically, an autonomous civil society, for a thriving public sphere (Calhoun 1993:296-7; 
Eley 1992; Habermas 1996:269, 382; Somers 1993). Habermas (1996:359) identifies two 
necessary conditions for a mobilized public sphere. The first condition is a public with the 
capacities to identify, interpret and present society-wide problems. Such capacities anchor 
in “the voluntary associations of civic society and [are] embedded in liberal patterns of 
political culture and socialization” (Habermas 1996:359). The second condition is 
sufficient occasion to exercise the above capacities. Specifically, there should be a need to 
solve problems of societal integration. Habermas states that the second condition is easily 
satisfied as problems tend to accumulate over time, whereas the first condition is more 
difficult to attain.  
To consider the political impact of the Internet in authoritarian contexts on 
politicization, it is necessary to explore how the two conditions identified by Habermas 
may vary across political contexts. Few people would dispute that an autonomous civil 
society is less likely to exist in authoritarian countries. Nevertheless, does the absence of an 
autonomous civil society rule out the possibility that some kind of sociopolitical foundation 
capable of fostering liberal political culture and socialization could exist in such contexts? 
Emirbayer and Sheller (1999) suggest that the presence of an autonomous civil society 
itself may not be the most critical key. What are essential to the development of the public 
sphere could be the social networks and shared symbolic resources that connect individuals 
and facilitate their capacity to identify and thematize problems. It is true that voluntary 





shared symbolic structures, but an activist state could also improve conditions for citizen 
participation in opinion formation (Asen and Brouwer 2001; Baiocchi 2003; Fraser 1990; 
Schudson 1994). 
 In authoritarian contexts, I argue that a non-monolithic state and the possibility of 
unintended consequences of state-building create conditions in which infrastructure built 
by the state can foster oppositional discourse. In addition, literature suggests that laws and 
legal institutions, even those built by authoritarian states, could be critical resources that aid 
resistance. In the democratization processes of South Korea and Taiwan, legal structures 
established by authoritarian leaders were mobilized by elites and citizens to resist 
domination and make demands for democracy. Notably, both South Korea’s and Taiwan’s 
constitutions recognized fundamental rights, thus empowering citizens and providing 
grounds for resistance. The development of legal institutions also led to the emergence of 
political elites familiar with the official language of law. Some of these elites turned out to 
be oppositional leaders (Cheng 1989; Cotton 1989). Accordingly, even in an authoritarian 
context where an autonomous civil society is absent, social networks and symbolic 
resources that can facilitate political mobilization of citizens are still likely to exist, partly 
as an unintended outcome of state-building. The diffusion of information technologies 
provide an opportunity for such social networks and symbolic resrouces to expand. 
The second condition that Habermas points out is a need to solve the problems of 
societal integration. It could be argued that such need is even higher in authoritarian 





In authoritarian contexts such as China, citizens often encounter difficulty in participating 
in politics (Yang 2009:119). Also, news media, courts and other institutions are often too 
dysfunctional to address grievances (Cai 2008). Insufficient and ineffective institutions for 
citizens to express opinion and address problems could make the Internet a space where 
citizens enunciate their problems. 
The above discussion suggests that authoritarian countries could still have the 
sociopolitical foundation for the development of the public sphere, despite the absence of 
an autonomous civil society. Shared symbolic resources, especially laws and the concept of 
rights, help citizens to recognize exclusion and articulate problems. The Internet may have 
even stronger effects in attracting and producing citizens with critical views on the state in 
authoritarian versus other contexts [Hypothesis 1] precisely due to insufficient institutions 
in the former. In addition, symbolic resources that facilitate resistance may develop 
differently within authoritarian countries. Such variation could impact the political 
ramifications of the Internet. As a symbolic structure, law raises expectations and helps to 
articulate problems. The development of legal institutions is also likely to generate social 
networks that could be mobilized for resistance. Hence, when an authoritarian state 
disseminates law without instituting the sociopolitical changes necessary for citizens to 
realize those rights, it creates a dilemma for itself. Ultimately, although an authoritarian 
state can use law to govern its populace, the state’s selective compliance with laws and 
dubious respect for rights can render it vulnerable to having those laws and rights 





effects in authoritarian countries where the state does a better job publicizing law than 
building institutions that actually protect rights [Hypothesis 2]. 
DATA AND METHODS 
I draw on data from 48 countries, using the latest wave of the World Values Surveys 
(WVS, 2005-8) for analysis. The dataset has 54 countries, but because questionnaire items 
on my variables are not available for six countries, my analysis is restricted to 48 countries. 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable: distrust in the government.
1
 This is the 
only variable in the survey that taps whether respondents have critical views on the state. 
Although the variable does not directly measure how respondents are critical of the state 
and official discourse, distrust in the government manifests as citizens ’general negation of 
the state, including its credibility, practices and discourse. Since my main interest is the 
extent to which the relationship between Internet use and critical views on the government 
varies across political contexts, the main individual-level independent variable is Internet 
use. To avoid omitted variable bias, I follow literature on political communication, 
especially analyses of the WVS, to incorporate variables noted to be related to political 
attitudes and access to the Internet. These variables measure media consumption, 
socioeconomic characteristics, life satisfaction, political interest and political membership 
                                                 
1
 The survey item (V136) asks: “Do you trust the government in your capital?” Respondents who responded 
“not very much” or “none at all” are coded as 1 and otherwise (“a great deal,” “quite a lot.” “no answer,” or 





(Lei 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2009). The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable 






TABLE A-9: Descriptive statistics of individual-level data. 
Dependent variables Min Max Mean/Proportion SD N 
Distrust in the government  0 1 0.50 0.50 69,077 
Independent variables      
Information source      
Newspaper 0 1 0.54 0.50 69,077 
Radio or TV 0 1 0.86 0.35 69,077 
Internet 0 1 0.27 0.45 69,077 
Age 15 98 41.54 16.68 68,850 
Female 0 1 0.51 0.50 69,077 
Education (vs. no education)      
No Answer 0 1 0.01 0.09 69,077 
Primary  0 1 0.22 0.42 69,077 
Secondary 0 1 0.49 0.50 69,077 
Tertiary 0 1 0.20 0.40 69,077 
Government worker  0 1 0.17 0.38 69,077 
Professional 0 1 0.07 0.26 69,077 
Farmer or agricultural worker 0 1 0.08 0.27 69,077 
Manual worker 0 1 0.22 0.41 69,077 
Student  0 1 0.08 0.27 69,077 
Unemployed 0 1 0.10 0.30 69,077 
Household income 1 10 4.65 2.34 61,378 
Life satisfaction 1 10 6.86 2.27 68,231 
Happiness 1 10 0.82 0.39 69,077 
Interested in politics 0 1 0.46 0.50 69,077 
Politics is important  0 1 0.42 0.49 69,077 
Political party membership 0 1 0.16 0.37 69,077 
NOTE.–Independent variables with missing values are dummied out. Data are weighted by country 
weights. Source: World Values Surveys 2005-8, fifth wave. 
 
 
I collect country-level data from multiple sources. The main country-level 
independent variable in Hypothesis 1 is political regime. I classify countries into 
non-authoritarian and authoritarian countries based on the 2007 Democracy Index. There 





Jordan, and Burkina Faso. Hypothesis 2 examines variation within authoritarian countries. 
The main country-level independent variable is the gap between the state’s efforts to 
publicize laws versus its same efforts to ensure citizens realize rights. Drawing on the 2011 
Rule of Law Index, I construct an indicator to measure such gap.
2
 Two items in the Index 
are relevant. “Open government” measures how well states publicize laws and make laws 
comprehensible to citizens. “Fundamental rights” measures how well states protect 
fundamental rights. I subtract the score of “fundamental rights” from that of “open 
government” to measure the gap between the state’s efforts in both areas. As the 2011 Rule 
of Law Index does not include Burkina Faso, my examination is limited to five 
authoritarian countries.  
I also collect data about the following country-level variables that may influence 
distrust in the state and individual Internet use: (1) The 2007 KOF economic globalization 
indicator: There have been debates over whether economic liberalization leads to political 
liberalization and democratization (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005:238-9; Guthrie 
2009). Therefore, level of economic liberalization could potentially influence attitude 
towards the state. As the KOF economic globalization indicator measures flows of capital 
and goods as well as trade barriers, it is a good indicator of economic liberalization. (2) 
World Bank Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2007: Literature suggests that 
                                                 
2
 To the best of my knowledge, the 2010 and 2011 Rule of Law Indices are the only indices that provide 
information about how well states publicize laws and protect rights. Unfortunately, the 2010 Index only 
includes three out of the six authoritarian countries in my dataset. To minimize missing data, I decided to use 
the 2011 Index. Since the status of rule of law does not fluctuate much within a short period, the 2011 Index 





national income per capita is related to political liberalization and political attitudes toward 
the state (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). GNI is also likely to associate with individual 
Internet use. (3) The 2007 Corruption Perception Index: Perceived corruption could be also 
related to attitudes toward the state. (4) Percentage of individuals using the Internet in 2007: 
This measures how widely the Internet is used by the population in a country. The sources 







TABLE A-10: Descriptive statistics of country-level data. 
Independent variables Min Max Mean/Proportion SD N 
KOF economic globalization 25.01 93.63 67.03 15.33 48 
GNI per capita, PPP (current 
international $) 
800 55,660 18188.33 15,045.81 48 
Authoritarian regime 0 1 0.13 0.33 48 
Percentage of individuals  0.37 86.93 37.73 28.00 48 
Internet use      
Corruption perception index  2.3 9.4 5.04 2.31 48 
Gap between the efforts of 
the 
-0.06 0.14 -0.04 0.09 5 
government to publicize law       
and to protect rights      
NOTE.– (1) The higher the corruption perceptions index value, the lower the perceived corruption. 
(2) Source: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), World Bank, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, International Telecommunication Union, International Telecommunication 
Union, Transparency International, and the World Justice Project.  
 
I employ hierarchical models to analyze data. Since respondents are nested within 
countries, multilevel models allow simultaneous examination of the effects of individual- 
and country-level variables and their interactions. Importantly, multilevel models provide 
correct and robust estimation of coefficients and standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002). I apply multilevel logistic regression models since the dependent variable is binary. 
I include all individual-level variables as fixed effects due to the small number of countries 
and simplification. However, I include a random intercept to control for different means 






My analysis of the 48 country data is presented in Table A-9. I start from a baseline 
model (Model 1), which only incorporates individual-level independent variables and a 
random intercept. The association between individual Internet use and critical attitudes 
towards the state is marginal. Then, I add authoritarian regime as a contextual variable and 
an interaction term of individual use and authoritarian regime (Model 2). The results show 
that respondents in authoritarian countries are less likely to have critical views on the 
government. In addition, the association between individual Internet use and critical views 
on the state in non-authoritarian contexts is negligible. Importantly, authoritarian contexts 
interact with individual Internet use, implying that the size of association between Internet 
use and critical attitudes towards the state is significantly larger in authoritarian contexts. 
Finally, I added other country-level variables and their interactions with individual Internet 
use (Model 3). The direct effect of authoritarian contexts on political attitudes, as well as 
the effect of authoritarian contexts in moderating the association between Internet use and 
distrust in the state remains significant. None of the other country-level independent 
variables have significant contextual effects. Neither do they significantly interact with 
individual Internet use. Specifically, the odds that an Internet user distrusts the state are 
1.42 (e
.352
) times greater in authoritarian versus other contexts, holding all other variables 






TABLE A-11: Hierarchical regression models on distrust in the government in 48 
countries. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variables Coeff Robust Coeff Robust Coeff Robust 
  SE  SE  SE 
Country-level effects       
Intercept .044 .148 .292 .113* .763 .587 
Authoritarian regime   -1.698 .600** -1.582 .366**
* 
KOF economic globalization     -.006 .010 
GNI per capita     .000 .000 
Corruption perceptions index     -.142 .114 
Percentage of individuals use     .004 .012 
Individual-level effects       
Information source       
Internet .079 .045† .038 .049 .250 .112* 
Newspaper .075 .033* .070 .033* .061 .020** 
Radio or TV -.052 .053 -.048 .052 -.049 .028† 
Age -.003 .001* -.004 .001* -.004 .001**
* 
Female -.075 .024** -.075 .024** -.075 .017**
* 
Education (vs. no education)       
No Answer .150 .121 .118 .119 .106 .103 
Primary  .217 .053**
* 














Working in the government  -.074 .036* -.077 .035* -.074 .024** 
Professional .031 .055 .036 .054 .034 .036 
Farmer or agricultural worker -.060 .071 -.057 .067 -.050 .040 
Manual worker .050 .038 .050 .038 .480 .023* 
Student  -.026 .057 -.032 .056 -.046 .035 
Unemployed .045 .053 .040 .053 .042 .030 
Household income .001 .010 -.000 .010 .001 .004 




























Political party membership -.093 .060 -.094 .060 -.097 .025**
* 
Cross-level interaction       
Internet x Authoritarian 
regime 
  .467 .143** .352 .086**
* 
Internet x KOF economic 
globalization 
    .001 .002 
Internet x GNI per capita     -.000 .000 
Internet x Corruption 
perception index 
    -.037 .022† 
Internet x Percentage of 
individuals  
    -.002 .002 
Internet use       
NOTE.–(1) Coeff denotes coefficients and robust SE denotes robust standard errors. (2) † p < 
0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). (3) Independent variables with 
missing values are dummied out. (4) Data are weighted by country weights. 
 
Next, I explore how symbolic resource of law impact Internet’s politicized effects 
within authoritarian contexts. I first run models for each country separately and present the 
results in Table A-10. Internet use is significantly associated with distrust in the 
government only in China and Iran. Next, I analyze the five-country dataset and present the 
results in Table A-11. I start analysis from a baseline model (Model 4), which only 
incorporates individual-level independent variables and a random intercept. The 
relationship between Internet use and critical attitudes toward the state is significant. I 
further explore cross-level interaction effects. The small number of authoritarian countries 
and the correlation between country-level variables highly constrain my statistical analysis. 





gap between the state’s efforts in publicizing law and realizing rights is positively related to 
the size of the Internet effect. In fact, China and Iran are the only authoritarian countries of 
the five I examined where the state does a better job in publicizing law than building 
institutions to protect rights. It is noteworthy that the existence of such a gap is unusual. 
Among the 66 places covered in the Rule of Law Index, a positive gap exists only in China, 
Iran, Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates. Most governments attend more to 
protecting rights than disseminating laws. Although the results of Model 5 support 
Hypothesis 2, unfortunately, I cannot rule out some confounding relationships due to data 
limitation. Models 7 and 9 show that GNI per capital and percentage of individual Internet 
use are positively and negatively related to the size of the Internet effect, respectively. In 
any event, my analysis does suggest the possibility that laws and rights play an important 







TABLE A-12: Logistic regression models on distrust in the government in five 
authoritarian countries. 
 China Vietnam Morocco Iran Jordan 
Information 
source 
     
Internet 0.545* 0.510 0.238 0.385*** 0.224 
 (0.302) (0.595) (0.219) (0.115) (0.241) 
Newspaper -0.0254 0.115 0.0113 0.151* -0.204 
 (0.245) (0.486) (0.221) (0.0881) (0.201) 
Radio or TV -0.199 0.129 0.0951 -0.214* 0.220 







 (0.420) (1.521) (0.293) (0.219) (0.623) 
NOTE.–(1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests). (3) 






TABLE A-13: Hierarchical regression models on distrust in the government in five 
authoritarian countries. 
Independent variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model7 Model 8 Model 9 
       
Intercept -1.676† -1.704† -1.669† -1.675† -1.676† -1.687† 
 (.726) (.726) (.722) (.719) (.726) (.723) 
Individual-level effects       
Information source       
Internet .300** .095 .454* -.161 .595† .810*** 
 (.085) (.120) (.200) (.219) (.331) (.224) 
Newspaper .101 .110 .102 .108 .102 .109 
 (.070 ) (.070) (.070) (.070 ) (.070 ) (.070 ) 
Radio or TV -.068 -.064 -.065 -.063 -.065 -.062 
 (.082) (.082) (.082) (.082) (.082) (.082) 
Age -.005* -.005* -.005* -.006* -.005* -.006* 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Female -.146* -.143* -.147* -.144* -.147* -.144* 
 (.060) (.060) (.060) (.060) (.060) (.060) 
Education (vs. no education)       
No Answer .546 .591 .547 .572 .549 .580 
 (.479) (.481) (.479) (.480) (.480) (.480) 
Primary  .175 .223* .180 .214† .181† .221† 
 (.110) (.112) (.110) (.111) (.110) (.111) 
Secondary .521*** .575*** .525*** .562*** .526*** .570*** 
 (.117) (.119) (.117) (.118) (.117) (.118) 
Tertiary .949*** .978*** .950*** .971*** .951*** .975*** 
 (.141) (.142) (.142) (.142) (.142) (.142) 
Working in the government  -.098 -.098 -.099 -.102 -.098 -.101 
 (.097) (.097) (.097) (.098) (.097) (.098) 
Professional .179 .201 .195 .218 .194 .217 
 (.186) (.185) (.187) (.186) (.187) (.186) 
Farmer or agricultural worker -.207 -.219 -.223 -.263† -.217 -.255 
 (.148) (.148) (.149) (.150) (.149) (.149) 
Manual worker .320** .278* .308** .267* .310** .266* 
 (.112) (.113) (.113) (.114) (.113) (.114) 
Student  -.168 -.180 -.177 -.186 -.178 -.186 
 (.139) (.139) (.140) (.140) (.139) (.140) 
Unemployed .014 .004 .009 -.002 .009 -.002 
 (.104) (.104) (.104) (.104) (.104) (.104) 
Household income .019 .017 .018 .017 .018 .016 
 (.018) (.018) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Life satisfaction -.086*** -.086*** -.086*** -.086*** -.086*** -.086*** 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Happiness -.414 -.409 -.410 -.407 -.410 -.407 
 (.080)*** (.080)*** (.080)*** (.080)*** (.080)*** (.080)* 
Interested in politics -.162* -.153* -.161* -.157* -.161* -.156* 
 (.069) (.069) (.069) (.069) (.069) (.069) 
Politics is important  -.124† -.120† -.123† -.120† -.122† -.119† 





Political party membership -.162 -.177 -.164 -.169 -.166 -.172 
 (.119) (.120) (.119) (.120) (.119) (.120) 
Cross-level interaction       
Internet x Gap between 
publicized  
 2.819*     
Law and rights protection  (1.132)     
 
Internet x  
  -.004    
KOF economic globalization   .(005)    
Internet x GNI per capita    .000058*   
    (.000)   
Internet x      -0.095  
Corruption perception index     (.104)  
 
Internet x percentage 
     -0.036* 
of individuals Internet use      (.014) 
NOTE.–(1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed 









In sum, my analysis of cross-national survey data shows that political contexts inflect 
the effects of the Internet. Contrary to the expectation that the Internet is less likely to have 
political ramifications in authoritarian contexts due to the absence of a democratic 
foundation and an autonomous civil society, I find that the Internet has a stronger 
politicized effect in creating a boundary between citizens and the state in authoritarian 
versus non-authoritarian contexts. A further examination of variation within authoritarian 
countries finds that laws and rights serve as important symbolic resources. Although 
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